Manchuria The Cockpit Of Asia

125817

3VI .A. 3NT

TI-IE, COCKPIT OF

f

THE LA-MA-TA, OR TOWER OF THE LAMA. AT MUKDEN, REPUTED
TO BE 2,000 YEARS OLD

THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

By
COLONEL P. T. ETHERTON

LATE HM CONSUL-GENERAL IN CHINESE
TURKESTAN AND ADDITIONAL ASSISTANT
JUDGE OF HM SUPREME COURT FOR CHINA

and

H. HESSELL TILTMAN

AUTHOR OF "THE TERROR IN EUROPE,"
"J RAMSAY MACDONALD," ETC

sixteen reproductions from photographs
and a map

FREDERICK A. STOKES COMPANY

NEW YORK MCMXXXII

Copyrsght 9 1932, by

H. HESSELL TILTMAJ

All rights reserved. No part of this
work may be reproduced without the
written permission, of the publisher.

JPrinted m the TJ-nifed States of America

CONTENTS

CIIAP1X.R PAGE

FOREWORD ix

I. MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS . I

II. THE ERA OP CHANGE . . 38

III. THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA . 78

IV. MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 114
V. THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 141

VI. COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 170

VII. INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 205

VIII. WAR CLOUDS OVER ASIA 234

IX. THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 258

X. THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 298

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Tower of the Lama at Mukden frontispiece

PACING PAGL

Imperial Tombs at Mukden 10

Chinese Emigrants Entering Manchuria 48

The Chinese City of Mukden 90

The New Mukden 102

Open Cuts at the Great Fushan Colliery 122

Soya Beans Awaiting Shipment 132

Dairen the Famous Japanese Port in Manchuria 164

The Outrage that Precipitated the Nonni Bridge Battle 174

Japanese Troops Entrenching at Shan Hai Kwan, the

Gateway from Manchuria to China Proper 220

A Prisoner of the Manchurian "War" 220

Japanese Advance Post in the Battle Area 242

Burying Japanese Dead after the Nonni Bridge Battle 246

An Improvised Hospital Train on the Tsitsihar-

Honan Line 252

Japanese Troops Rushing Ammunition to the Front

Line while the League Deliberates 264

Japanese Reenforcements Entraining for the Front 284

Map of Manchuria 316

FOREWORD

FW questions in recent years have excited more
interest and anxiety in diplomatic and political
circles than the future of Manchuria, that rich
treasure-house of natural wealth forming three of the
outlying provinces of China, in which Japan, the
United States, Soviet Russia, and Great Britain have
vital interests, yet which to the public is scarcely more
than a name.

Manchuria was destined by the accident of history
to become the cockpit of international ambitions.
Nominally Chinese soil, and yet outside China proper,
its strategic and industrial importance caused world
statesmen to realize the complications which might
arise from the presence of a predominant foreign
Power attempting to occupy and exploit it.

The present situation is the outcome of all that has
happened since the Treaty of Peace signed at Shimo-
noseki, between China and Japan, in April 1895,
allocating to the Japanese a portion of the southern
half of Manchuria as the spoils of war.

The booming of the guns announcing the victory
had scarcely died away before Russia stepped in and
deprived the Japanese of all they had won by right of
conquest. Russia in turn was expelled ten years later,
and thenceforth the story of Manchuria, with its
rapid industrialization and ever-increasing foreign

trade has been a dramatic one.

ix

x FOREWORD

To-day its importance is industrial and economic
rather than strategic. Access to the food and raw
materials of Manchuria has become a political prin-
ciple of the first importance to Japan, while the de-
velopments financed and carried out by the Japanese
have transformed the country from an empty, back-
ward land into an area destined to play an increas-
ingly important part in the industrial economy of
the Far East.

It is our endeavor to give a clear and concise ac-
count of this battle-ground of Asia, with its immense
pastoral, mineral, and economic wealth the land that
is the Mecca of millions of Chinese and other settlers
to-day to outline the issues at stake, and to relate
the facts behind the crisis in the Far East, with its
grave repercussions, at Shanghai, which was precipi-
tated by the occupation of almost all Manchuria by
the Japanese after the seizure of Mukden in Sep-
tember 1931.

It raised issues of world-wide international import,
upon which information has been scanty and often
contradictory. We trust that this volume, by exam-
ining the facts relative to the origin of the present
crisis, and the arguments of both Chinese and Japa-
nese advocates, may assist in securing a settlement in
the interests of both Manchuria and its people.

P. T. ETHERTON
LoNDO H. HESSBLL TILTMAN

January, 1932.

MANCHURIA:

THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

CHAPTER I

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS

MANCHURIA, the promised land of Asia,
where drama never dies, is a land of strange
incongruities. Over a portion of it a West-
ern veneer has been spread, but only after great labor.
The veneer is deceptive; it ends at the edges of the
towns, and even where the crust is thickest there are
sudden cracks through which you see, unperturbed
and unchanging, a land whose people quite obviously
desire to remain oblivious to civilization.

Great commercial activities, run by modern meth-
ods, steadily develop in the midst of a large popula-
tion, who are content to live as their ancestors did
centuries ago, swayed by customs that nothing can
alter.

Manchuria is a dependency of China, bounded by
Siberia on the east, northeast, and northwest, on the
west by Mongolia and a part of the Great Wall,
which is still in a wonderful state of preservation,
despite the lapse of seventeen centuries since it was

built.

i

2 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

Korea is the border on the southeast, and its present-
day shape is approximately a triangle with the base
in the north running along the Amur River, the apex
dividing the Gulf of Chihli from the Yellow Sea.

The sea and rivers define the frontier on the north,
east, and south, and two extensive mountain ranges,
with fertile valleys between them, traverse Manchuria
from north to south, the northern part well wooded,
the southern half highly fertile and productive and
with twice the population.

There has never been a proper survey of Manchuria,
for such a work would be distasteful to the Chinese,
especially in parts of their dominions of which they
have imperfect geographical knowledge. So far as
is known, and from estimates we have made on the
spot, it is about 370,000 square miles, the size of
Britain and France combined, and lies in the same
latitude as London, Berlin, and Naples.

The Manchurian climate is the despair of weather
experts. In the summer it will be blazing hot, with
temperatures as high as Egypt, and in the winter the
thermometer will drop to fifty degrees below zero.
Cold and searching winds come down from the north,
sweeping over from the Gobi Desert, the second larg-
est desert in the world, freezing everything in their
path.

The rivers are frozen over and the people move
about in ice boats propelled by sails. Races are held
between these rough and ready craft, for the Manchu

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 3

is a sportsman and likes to combine it with a little
gambling.

Manchuria is one of the world's most fascinating
regions, and, apart from its era of war and conquest,
the scene of the largest migration of modern times,
whilst it is also the richest and most progressive part
of the Chinese republic.

Here through many turbulent years three antago-
nists have met, whose struggles shook the world.
Stupendous forces political, martial, and economic,
have loomed large in the stirring history of Man-
churia, and added to its repertoire of high adventure.

None of these factors affects the destiny of age-old
Manchuria itself, but they affect the welfare and fu-
ture being of China, Japan, and Russia, apart from
Britain and the United States.

To-day Manchuria stands forth in vivid outline,
the prey of contending factions, the coveted prize of
the Far East, and a land that has provided the hardest
problem the League of Nations has yet had to tackle;
it tests the power and ability of the League to enforce
its decisions, and has put the League on trial, and the
world is wondering how it will finally emerge from
the ordeal.

Before we examine the various forces that have
been at work in Manchuria, and the issues involved
in the present crisis, let us briefly trace its history,
and see how the various parties on the stage there
came into the picture.

Russia is the leading actor in the play, for Russian

4 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

interest in Manchuria has existed since the sixteenth
century, when Russian and Cossack expeditions
crossed the Ural Mountains, the dividing-line between
Europe and Asia, to look into the unknown country
beyond, to search for gold, silver, and furs, of which
they had heard so much. Encouraged by the results
of these ventures, the gold hunters and fur trappers
gradually made their way eastwards through Siberia
to the shores of Behring Sea. Then by a treaty dated
October 1687 the Russian empire was extended to the
northern boundary of Manchuria. When Moscow
heard of the wonders of this new land other expedi-
tions were sent out, until the opening of the eight-
eenth century gave them Nerchinsk and the Upper
Shilka. There Russia remained, satisfied with existing
treaties, and not until the middle of the last century
did she resume her forward movement. This eventu-
ally culminated, as we shall see, in the acquisition of
the maritime province of Manchuria by General
Ignatief , the astute Russian representative at Peking,
in 1860.

Peaceful penetration and development went on,
until in 1858 the whole vast territory north of the
Amur River was definitely ceded to Russia, and fur-
ther concessions under the common ovcrlordship of
Russia and China gave rise to an armed protest from
Great Britain and France, and in 1860 Anglo-French
forces occupied Peking. Russia took no active part
in the dispute, but the Czar's Minister at the Chinese
Court General Ignatief watched developments and

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 5

was prepared to take such action as the resources of
Russia in the Far East then permitted. The Trans-
Siberian Railway had not even been thought of at
Petersburg, and more than thirty years were to elapse
before the first rail was laid. The Russian Fleet was
negligible, and the facilities for transporting a fighting
force to the Far East were so limited as to preclude
any timely and effectual interference in Far Eastern
affairs.

The Chinese were naturally anxious to get rid of
the Anglo-French forces at the earliest possible mo-
ment, their continued presence was a menace to the
imperial throne, and rendered the omnipotence of the
Chinese emperor illusory in the eyes of his subjects.
They regarded him as the Son of Heaven, who ruled
over all beneath the sun, holding the nations on earth
as vassals. It was obviously desirous to maintain the
imperial reputation, and here the Russian Minister
Ignaticf saw his opportunity. He assured the Chi-
nese that he could restore the status quo ante by
securing the prompt evacuation of the capital; the
taint of foreign intervention and the damaging effect
of the presence of foreign troops in the imperial city,
the center and focus of Chinese authority, would be
removed, the prestige of the emperor restored, and
the world would go on as before.

The proposition was a welcome and tempting one,
and even the terms on which it was to be arranged
did not appear to the Chinese drastic or far-reaching,
so eager were they to see the last of the invading army,

6 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

and appear well before the world. At all costs they
must preserve "face," to quote the Chinese phrase,
one of the most powerful in the language, an expres-
sion the people put above all else. If "face," or
prestige, can be preserved, all is well; on the contrary,
should it be sacrificed, then only ignominy and dis-
grace remain.

Ignatief understood Chinese mentality and, besides
being an astute politician, was conversant with the
curious psychology of the Orient, and in the chance
happening that now came his way he meant to draw
the utmost advantage to the benefit of his country.

So the Chinese closed with the Russian offer, which
was the cession of the maritime province of Man-
churia, complete with six hundred miles of coast line
and the harbor of Vladivostok. Considering the vast-
ness of the Chinese empire, occupying as it does
one-seventh of the land surface of the globe, and con-
taining a quarter of the human race, the surrender of a
comparatively insignificant piece of territory did not
appear to the Chinese emperor anything out of the
ordinary, for being supreme landlord of the whole of
China, in theory at any rate, he no doubt felt well
able to afford it.

Strange are the workings of fate. The cession of a
portion of Manchuria to Russia in this free and easy
fashion was destined to have tremendous consequences
in the history of the Far East. Two wars were to be
fought out over the question of its possession, one of
them the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-J was to

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 7

offer a fruitful field for study by the Anglo-Saxon
race, and, incidentally, it was in Manchuria that the
new machinery which science and invention had given
to the modern armies and navies of the world, was to
be put to the practical test of real war. Many prob-
lems relative to the conduct and application of modern
campaigns were to receive convincing answers on the
Manchurian battlefields. But there was far more than
that in the cession; it was, when it passed to Japan,
as will be seen hereafter, to be the gateway for the
latter country to the promised land of Asia, the
granary of the East, with a foothold on the mainland
of Asia which Japan has desired since her entry into
the comity of nations. This gateway to a rich and
fertile land was one through which the overflow from
the Japanese population, increasing at the rate of eight
hundred thousand yearly, could enter and find a fu-
ture for itself besides taking a definite part in the
great and ever-widening field of commercial compe-
tition in China.

With the rise of Japan, the coming of the New Far
East, Japanese statesmen had foreseen the problem of
placing their surplus population, the difficulties aris-
ing over immigration restrictions, the ban on the yel-
low races, and the opposition that would inevitably
be met with from those Western Powers who held
land in or adjacent to the Far East, to any attempt
on the part of Japanese colonists to gain admittance.

Even if there were no other circumstances to be
weighed than those already related, the case of Man-

8 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

churia and its partial cession would far exceed in
didactic interest similar contests which have arisen in
the checkered story of the Far East.

So passed Manchuria to the Russians, through the
vision of their minister at Peking, who foresaw a great
railway linking Russia-in-Europe to the East, its
terminus on the Pacific Ocean, with Russia as its
controller.

The agreement of the Chinese to the transfer of
the province was a momentous step in Far Eastern
history, and from here onwards we should follow with
close attention the growth and aims of Russian ambi-
tion, for Russia has become woven into the history
and fate of Manchuria in a particularly vital and
absorbing fashion.

We will begin with Central Asia where there had
been a definite and all-conquering advance, resulting
in the consolidation of Russian interests in close prox-
imity to the frontiers of India. During the seventies
and eighties of last century Russia imposed upon
Great Britain by the menace of her weight and ap-
parent strength. Her steady advance across Asia
seemed to the rulers at Westminster akin to the march
of destiny, and it caused much anxiety to our states-
men, becoming almost a form of nightmare.

Having firmly established herself in Central Asia,
the eyes of Russian ministers were turned in the direc-
tion of the Pacific, and the task of developing Siberia
and spanning it with a railway was seriously con-

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 9

sidered. Already the vision of Ignatief in 1860 at
that dramatic move in Peking was taking shape.

In 1891 the Trans-Siberian Railway had reached
Eastern Siberia; slowly but surely it was creeping
across Asia, opening up a land of immense distances,
where transport in the summer was by cart and dur-
ing the long winter months by sledge. It had for
many years been thought fit only for exiles and crim-
inals, a land that was a byword, at the gateway of
which might well have been written "All hope aban-
don, ye who enter here."

The railway swept away the reputed terrors, it
opened up to colonization vast stretches of fertile
land, and brought the East into close and intimate
touch with the West, whilst it was the sheet anchor
of Russian dominion in the Far East.

Contrary to expectations the railway was con-
structed with great rapidity and in 1896, five years
after the first sod had been turned, it had reached
Chita on the borders of Manchuria, where an inter-
esting situation developed, another of the incidents
proving that in Manchuria drama never dies.

The fixed destination of the railway was to be at
Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean, not an ice-free
port in winter, but the best that Russia had been able
to secure. Six hundred miles of additional line would
be saved if the railway could be carried direct from
Chita southeast to Hailar, thence across Manchuria to
the terminus. No doubt, the Russians had more
visions of the future when they desired this short

10 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

cut through Manchuria where the latter country cuts
into Siberia, and so they came to the Chinese for per-
mission to build the line as indicated, with the modest
object, as they expressed it, of continuing the railway
by the shortest route to its Pacific terminus.

At the same time that this request was made a
secret pact in treaty form was concluded between
China and Russia. The treaty, which was kept secret
for many years, provided for a Russo-Chinese alliance
against Japan, besides granting the permission for the
railway to be carried to Vladivostok.

Once more the Chinese had agreed and given the
Russians what they asked. To appreciate the readi-
ness with which this request was granted, we must
go back to the previous year 1895 when Japan had
emerged from a victorious war with China. As part
of the spoils of that campaign the Japanese, under the
terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895,
received in perpetuity the Liao Tung peninsula, or all
land south of a line drawn from the mouth of the
Yalu to Newchwang, an open treaty port on the Liao
River.

This acquisition was of the utmost benefit to Japan,
zor, as already remarked, it gave her a footing in
Asia, in that promised land that was being so steadily
developed and opened up by railways, and invaded by
hosts of settlers whose influx recalled the early boom
days in the American West. It was the realization of
a great dream, where expansion could go on un-
checked, and the ever-rising tide of population could

*Vi
'.%'

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 11

be dealt with and a commercial market created to
Japanese advantage. Small wonder then, that the
Japanese regarded this prize of their war with China
as the all-important one, which gave them, inter aha,
the long-desired location on the Asiatic mainland.

But sinister influences were already at work. Russia
was electrified at the treaty which ceded the Liao
Tung peninsula to Japan. It was of outstanding value
in many ways; it had first-rate commercial and
strategical advantages. Port Arthur at its southern
extremity was a natural fortress; the port of Dalny,
alongside of Port Arthur, was open all the year round,
and the ideal terminus for the Siberian Railway.

It would give the warm water port, and was of
geographical and political import from its close prox-
imity to the capital of China.

Instant action had to be taken if the visions of a
Russia on the Pacific, and paramount in the Far East,
were to be realized. At all costs the treaty must be
upset and Japanese occupation of the peninsula pre-
vented. Russia stirred up a tremendous commotion
in the diplomatic dovecotes of continental Europe,
she drew dark pictures of the yellow peril, of the
advent of the Japanese on the mainland of Asia, and
all the consequences that such events must bring in
their wake.

No stone was left unturned to avert the impend-
ing disaster, whilst keeping her own plans dark, for
Russia was not yet in a position to disclose her hand,
the Siberian Railway was still in an unfinished state,

12 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

and she was unable to enforce her will upon China
against the opposition of Japan.

Within nine days of the bombshell of Shimonoseki
Russia had secured the adhesion of France and Ger-
many, and the three Powers presented a combined
note to Japan calling upon her to evacuate the Liao
Tung peninsula, since her presence there constituted
a menace to the safety of the Chinese capital, rendered
the independence of Korea illusory, and jeopardized
the sovereignty of China.

Appalled by such a combination Japan looked
around for a friend to support her in this critical:
moment of the national fortunes. None was at hand;
alone she had to face the demand.

The Imperial Japanese rescript, signed by the
Mikado, and issued to the Japanese people, is a re-
markable document in that it throws an interesting
sidelight on the psychology of the nation and the
restraint that followed it amongst a people infuriated
by an ultimatum depriving them of the spoils which
they had won by right of conquest.

In the main it ran as follows: "Consulting the best
interests of peace and animated by a desire not to
bring upon our people added hardship, or to impede
the progress of national destiny, by creating new com-
plications and thereby making the situation difficult,
we have decided to accept the advice of the friendly
Powers. "We therefore command our subjects to re-
spect our will; to take into consideration the general
situation, to be circumspect in all things, to avoid

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 13

erroneous tendencies, and not to impair or thwart
the high aspirations of our Empire."

The course adopted by the Japanese emperor was
the only one possible at the time; Japan was totally
unprepared for war on a large scale. The navy and
army were still in the making, the reserves of men and
material were negligible, and the only hope lay in
-quiet and strenuous preparation for the struggle
jwhich the world knew must, sooner or later, even-
tuate.

So the Japanese withdrew in dignified retirement
and there and then began to work out their destiny.

The circling years again rolled on, but they
brought no amelioration in the state of Manchuria,
or of China itself. New forces sprang up to aid in
'the general disruption, amongst them being the Box-
ers, or Society of the Harmonious Fist, which spread
rapidly from north to south. It had the support of
the powerful Empress-Dowager, the main object be-
ing, as they expressed it, "to drive the foreigner into
the sea."

From facts that subsequently came to light it was
evident that the Boxer rising had the approval of
'high Chinese officials, one of whom would appear to
.be the famous Li Hung Chang, who wielded vast
influence and was one of the richest men in China.
His was a curious complex nature; reputed to be
worth more than one hundred millions sterling, he
derived greater pleasure from swindling a coolie out
of sixpence than in engineering a big commercial

14 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

deal. He once remarked that the value of any ap-
pointment was in direct proportion to the amount
one could make out of it, and from this simple
premise we can gauge the system of bribery and
peculation that goes on unchecked throughout China.

On June 20, 1900, the world outside China lost all
touch with the Legations in Peking, and rumors of a
general massacre were in the air. The American Gov-
ernment telegraphed to Li Hung Chang, who was
then all-powerful, to safeguard foreigners, which Li
had to make an outward show of doing. But only
the timely arrival of the international force saved
the Legations and others from complete annihilation.
It was largely due to the American efforts, in the
person of Secretary Hay, the author of the celebrated
Note on the Open Door in China, that a disaster was
averted.

This Note is a classic on the political and commer-
cial status of the Chinese empire; the drastic handling
of the Boxers by the international expedition, the
defeat of the Chinese by Japan, four years later, and
the disintegration that was rapidly materializing,
make the effort of Secretary Hay to preserve the po-
litical and territorial integrity of China of world-
wide interest.

The United States has all along been opposed to the
break-up of China; they were strongly averse to the
scramble for concessions, mining and railway rights,
and spheres of influence, and expressed themselves in
no uncertain terms. Whilst recognizing the necessity

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 15

o assuring their own commercial interests in the
Far East, they definitely refused to support the claims
made by nations for territorial and other advantages
in China, and apart from all that the Open Door
policy implied, they rejected offers or suggestions of
alliances or combinations which were at variance with
their declared views.

The American Note asked that the Great Powers
should stand by existing treaties, not to interfere with
the existing system of taxation as prevailing in China,
and to observe conditions already laid down for Euro-
pean and American nationals in seaport and railway
dues. It was a masterly document in that it forced
the Powers to disclose what was in their minds. Great
Britain agreed with the United States, but the others
were not so disposed and sent evasive replies, indi-
cating that they wanted to take part in the scramble
and get all they could whilst the going was good.

Let us now return to the point where we left the
Russians in I89J, requesting permission to carry their
railway through Manchuria to Vladivostok. Russia
had recently evidenced her friendship for China by
securing the eviction of the Japanese from her ter-
ritory; had she not done the same thing thirty-five
years before, and so proved her pacific intentions, at
any rate so far as the Chinese were concerned?

With the Chinese consent the line was carried
through as the Russians wished; all over the world it
became known as the Chinese Eastern Railway, and
from it dates the rise of modern Manchuria.

16 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

At this time a scramble was going on for conces-
sions of territory in China; it appeared as though the
country were to be dismembered, and the action of
France, Germany, and Russia in denying occupation
of Chinese ground to Japan, showed what was upper-
most in their minds in the plans for partition of
China, apart from the fact that it implied a refusal
to recognize the right of Japan to play a part on the
Asiatic mainland.

As a solace to her wounded feelings Japan was
granted an increased indemnity from China, which
she applied to steady preparation for the struggle
ahead.

In 1896, a year later, Russia again came to China
requesting a lease of the Liao Tung peninsula with
authority to carry the railway down to Port Arthur.
The Chinese agreed, and the Russians established
themselves in the very position from which they had
ousted the Japanese the previous year.

The new railway, running from Harbin to Port
Arthur, was known as the South Manchurian Rail-
way, and both lines, with the political and economic
rights they carried, were to work wonders for Man-
churia. They were to turn a little-known country,
a wild nomadic land, into one of milk and honey,
a granary of the Far East, attracting a population
that is increasing at the yearly rate of a million and
a half.

For the construction of the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way and its subsidiary line, the Russo-Chinese Bank

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 17

afterwards the Russo- Asiatic Bank was formed;
this was in effect an agency of the Russian Ministry
of Finance and imparted the desired commercial as-
pect to the negotiations, making it appear less politi-
cal and strategical than was actually the case.

Under the terms of the agreement the railway was
to be a joint enterprise. Russian engineers built it,
a Russian staff controlled all its operations, both tech-
nical and administrative, and in its general manage-
ment Chinese and Russian directors were supposed
to have equal rights, but in actual practice they ex-
isted purely as a body of sleeping partners.

When finished in 1903 it had cost 40,000,000, of
which the Chinese were allowed to contribute one
million and to share proportionately in the profits.

When finished the Chinese Eastern line ran from
Chita on the Siberian-Manchurian border in the
northwest, to Pogranichnaya on the eastern side,
where it joined the main line of the Trans-Siberian,
continuing southeast to Vladivostok, a distance of
about one hundred miles. We have already noted the
direction of the South Manchurian line.

Despite the trickery by which Russia had gained
the Liao Tung peninsula, Japan refrained from any
action, merely contenting herself with a protest and
holding steadily on to the course already determined
upon.

By 1899 both lines of railway in Manchuria were
in military occupation and under military control, *
strong Russian garrison held Port Arthur, and there

18 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

was every sign that Russia intended to stay on rather
than evacuate the country. In 1902 came the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, followed by a Manchurian Con-
vention, under which the Russians agreed to leave
Chinese territory in installments on successive fixed
dates. Much of the land in question was to be evacu-
ated by the spring of 1903, but the season passed
without any definite move on the part of the Rus-
sians, and their failure to budge showed that they
had determined on the annexation of Manchuria.

In the summer of 1903 the Czar created a Vice-
royalty of the Far East, and to the first incumbent
was assigned the control of all affairs, diplomatic,
civil, military, and commercial of Russia in East
Asia. This ukase disclosed the Russian hand, and in-
dicated beyond all doubt that she intended to remain
on. The Japanese now became thoroughly alarmed;
it was vital to their own immediate interests and
welfare that the independence and integrity of Korea
should not be jeopardized, which they would be with
Russia right on the Korean border. It was evident
that a Russian occupation of Manchuria rendered the
independence of Korea illusory; to all intents and
purposes Manchuria had fallen to Russia, and Korea
must soon follow suit. Indeed, the Russians were
already busy in Korea, by a process of peaceful pene-
tration, which, as in the Manchurian case, would
surely be followed by more definite and concrete
action.

The Japanese Government suggested negotiations

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 19

with a view to early adjustment of clashing interests,
to which the Russians agreed. The Japanese then
formulated their proposals which were submitted for
the consideration of the Czar's ministers. These
negotiations are all-important, since they throw con-
siderable light on the Russian intentions at the time,
and are an illuminating picture of the trend of events
as they were afterwards to materialize, besides the
bearing they had on the future history of Manchuria,
and all that has happened, and is now taking place,
there.

The Japanese proposals forced the pace, and still
further exposed the Russian hand. Russia declined
to pledge herself regarding the sovereignty of China,
and rejected a clause as to the equality of treatment
for all nations having commercial relations with
China.

The most damaging rejection, however, was the re-
fusal to recognize that Japan had any interests in
Manchuria, or its littoral, coupled with a request that
she should consider them as beyond her sphere. But
that was not all. Japan was to have numerous restric-
tions placed upon her movements and influence in
Korea; she was not to make use of any part of Korean
territory for strategic purposes, and was asked to
agree to a neutral zone.

After much negotiation ending in negative results,
Japan saw looming ahead of her a life and death
struggle with Russia, on the outcome of which her
own fate in Asia must inevitably be decided. She

20 MANCHURIA- THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

fully realized this at the close of the Chino- Japanese
War in 1895, and had been preparing for it with re-
doubled energy since the Russians had forced her to
quit Port Arthur.

Over a period of ten years she prepared with grim
determination; the Government, backed by a united
nation, threw all their energy and resource into the
scale, until in 1904 came the collision. Although
the story of the war does not concern us the results
of it are germane to the narrative.

Japan regained the Liao Tung peninsula, with pos-
session of the South Manchurian Railway as far north
as Changchun, China confirming the transfer and
subsequently extending the Japanese lease over a
period of ninety-nine years.

The port of Dalny-Dairen which had been cre-
ated almost overnight by Russian imperial order, was
the talk of the East. Vast sums had been expended
on its docks and wharves, its streets, squares, and
buildings, and the general lay-out made provision for
a large population. The rapid and almost phenome-
nal growth of traffic and merchandise carried, con-
firmed the original opinion of the Russians that
Dalny must eventually become a great port, to which
the terminus of the overland railway, and through
trains from Europe would give added weight.

The Russians were right; Dalny grew from a tiny
fishing village on the Pacific shores of Asia, to the
second port in China.

The overwhelming victory of the Japanese in their

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 21

war with Russia had a profound effect upon the
Orient, for here was a small island race, of untried
power and resources, engaged in a struggle with a
first-class military state, with a reputation for doing
things on a big scale, capable of mobilizing an army
several millions strong, with unlimited financial re-
sources, a Power accustomed to having its own way,
and brooking no delay or interference. Here, in-
deed, was a foe to be reckoned with, holding a railway
by which she could pour into Manchuria, and any
point in the theater of Russian operations, a con-
tinuous tream of reinforcements and supplies. To
tackle such an adversary and emerge victorious was
a formidable proposition.

The Orient viewed the result with wonder and
amazement; this nation of alien race and religion,
born of the East, imbued with all the ideals of the
Asiatic, had beaten the West on ground of its own
choosing, had raised aloft the flag of the Rising Sun,
humbled the pride of Russia, and more than justified
the Japanese entry into the great comity of nations
and her accession to the grade of leading Power in
the East.

We remember well the effect the Japanese victory
had in India, and still further north in Central Asia,
where Russia had long since been regarded as in-
vincible. The gunfire in Manchuria reverberated
throughout Asia; Port Arthur the impregnable had
fallen, Mukden, famous city of the Manchus and
with a far-spreading renown, hitherto regarded as

22 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

virtually Russian, was in Japanese hands, the Russian
fleet was at the bottom of the sea; all these things
had a cumulative effect, the gravity of which few
could appreciate in those days before the Great War.
The new nation, confident in its strength, fearless
in its march, had gripped the Bear in a vice and
thrown him headlong through the ropes, gaining a
verdict that was almost beyond belief.

The Japanese victory was a challenge to Western
domination, and in the sequence of cause and effect
it was to have a profound effect upon relations with
the Orient. A new tide had set in, new forces were
at work, Japan had overtaken the West in the art of
peace and war, she has crowded into a matter of sixty
years the experience and lessons which it has taken
other nations all over the world centuries to acquire.
The general result declared to the rest of the Oriental
world that the West was not so all-powerful as had
usually been supposed, and that the example of Japan
might perhaps be followed with a like success. At all
events, Japan's decisive victory had its repercussion
and was undoubtedly the prelude to much **hat has
since happened throughout the East.

After the setback received at the hands of the
Japanese, Russia modified her policy in Manchuria,
mainly due to developments in Europe, and particu-
larly in the Balkans, where German activities had
for some time excited her suspicions. There was then
a reversal of Russian policy with regard to Man-
churia, which showed a desire to cooperate with Japan

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 23

in dual development of the country, and two con-
ventions were concluded to that end in 1907 and
1910.

In 1912 came the revolution in China and the fall
of the imperial Manchu dynasty, a chapter of Chinese
history closing with the advent of the republic and
accession to power of Yuan Shi Kai. The Manchu
emperors had held the scepter, and wielded the fa-
mous vermilion pencil in the drafting and approval
of edicts from the throne, since 1644, and were re-
sponsible for many of the brilliant episodes, as well
as some of the dark ones, in the story of the nation.

The revolution was primarily the outcome of dis-
content with the rule of the Son of Heaven; the
celestial mandate, which the Chinese claim to have
been handed down, had, with the advance of time
and introduction of the modern way, failed in its
purpose, no effort had been, made to keep abreast of
the times, and it had long outlived its welcome. Yet
there was no satisfactory alternative, least of all in a
republic, which Yuan Shi Kai admitted was not suited
to the Chinese temperament. His aim was to retain
the monarchy on strictly constitutional lines. He
knew that 80 per cent of the people had been accus-
tomed from time immemorial, long prior to the
Christian era, to look to one individual as the per-
sonification of the state, and they were aghast at the
introduction of a new administrative and govern-
mental machinery.

Yuan Shi Kai introduced his constitutional regime

24 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

and began to pave the way for his own elevation to
the throne, a course that was to prove his undoing.
Political opponents sprang up whom he ruthlessly re-
moved; very soon China was being governed by ter-
rorist methods, life throughout the country assumed
an abnormal aspect, the republic was a fiction of
representative government, and civil war became rife.

Events were marching apace; no sooner had the
republic come in than Mongolia, an ancient depend-
ency of China, threw off the Celestial yoke and
declared its independence. This step had long been
in the making, for the Mongols were dissatisfied with
Chinese rule which jeopardized the supremacy of the
Mongol feudal lords and their medieval rights,
coupled with the alarming influx of Chinese settlers
who threatened by their encroachments to displace
the Mongols, essentially a race of horsemen and riders
of the plains rather than agriculturists.

A nationalist movement set in, fostered by Russia,
which aimed at checking the northward movement
of the Chinese. Torn by internal dissension, with the
entire country in the melting-pot, the Chinese were
compelled to withdraw from Mongolia, and to ac-
quiesce in the independent government formed there.

Still further disasters were in the offing, Tibet,
always antagonistic to the Chinese and desirous of
keeping aloof from the world beyond, broke out into
open revolt and drove the Chinese from the country,
celebrating their triumph by concluding an agree-
ment with Mongolia, with whom they were in re-*

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 25

ligious sympathy, for both were followers of
Lamaism, the perverted form of Buddhism.

We now come to the Great War and the focus-
ing of international interests on the European scene.
The collapse of Russia in 1917 and the subsequent
Bolshevik regime brought about chaotic conditions
in the Far East which we must now recount. The
country to the east of Omsk was overrun with pris-
oners of war taken by the Russians and incarcerated
in Asiatic Russia and Siberia.

"When the Bolsheviks seized power the Red army
was partly composed of these prisoners, and although
originally numbering over one hundred thousand,
they had, through typhus, scurvy, and various dis-
eases, been reduced to approximately 38,000.

These prisoners of war presented a curious aspect
to the situation; they were there by force of cir-
cumstances and not by design, and in the main were
friendly to the Allies and China. The majority were
afterwards utilized as the nucleus of the anti-Bol-
shevik forces in Siberia and the Far East, as well as
to cover their own retirement on Vladivostok, and
prevent the munition supplies at that port from
reaching Soviet hands.

Large numbers, composed of both prisoners of war
and refugees, poured into Manchuria from Russia
and Siberia, adding to the general confusion and
forming an unruly element which surpassed anything
known in the days of the Californian or Klondike
gold rushes.

26 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

During the period of confusion and chaos that had
supervened the Chinese took advantage of the oppor-
tunity to seize part of the Chinese Eastern Railway,
ostensibly with the object of restoring order and giv-
ing protection to aliens and natives alike. This was
late in 1917, and shortly afterwards fresh contingents
arrived of Hungarian, Czech, and Austrian prisoners
of war, released by the Bolsheviks, but with no facili-
ties for returning to their own countries, a wild and
undisciplined mob, acting much as they felt inclined.
So serious did the situation created by the release of
these war prisoners and their movements become,
that it was determined to rescue them by interna-
tional effort. It was considered highly undesirable to
allow them to overrun Manchuria, which they would
certainly have done had not timely steps been taken.

It was now 1919, and the Bolsheviks were pressing
hard towards Siberia where they were fighting with
the antagonistic Siberian and Far Eastern elements.
A provisional government, of moderate and anti-
Soviet tendency, had been set up under Kolchak
with headquarters at Omsk, but they were violent
in their methods and added still further to the reign
of terror. Moreover, none of these governments was
recognized by the Allies, their military plans were
upset by a lack of strength as well as by want of
Allied support, and when retreat set in, and confi-
dence was lost, the armies became demoralized and
disorder was widespread.

After the debacle and the definite success of the

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 27

Bolsheviks, numbers of new refugees poured into
Manchuria, some of them in semi-organized bands
under the leadership of officers who often acted in
a high-handed manner and increased the feeling of
insecurity.

One of these generals, a personal friend of the
authors, camped outside a town on his arrival from
Siberian territory, but beyond some slight indiscrimi-
nate requisitioning by his mixed force of Hunhutzu,
or brigands, a Manchurian word meaning "red beard,"
his force abstained from any overt acts of robbery or
violence. Our friend was a buccaneer of the old
Spanish Main type, a man who brooked no interfer-
ence with his designs, and rode rough-shod over all
opposition. When he moved on to another town the
Chinese closed the gates against his arrival, hoping
that, under the circumstances, he would depart in
peace. They little knew the Russian and his way of
dealing with difficulties. Finding the gates bolted
and barred, and no means of gaining access to the
town within, except by the process of climbing the
lofty walls, a proceeding incompatible with dignity
and safety, he promptly blew in the offending gate-
way with his two field guns.

Another of these Russian generals hanged workmen
to get rid of Bolshevism, and shot all who failed to
answer his call to arms. The Cossack, Semenofif, was
no better, and afterwards acted independently on the
Manchurian border, where he was reputed to be in
the pay of the Japanese.

28 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

The successes of the Bolsheviks, and collapse of all
opposition, alarmed the Japanese more than it did
the Allies in Europe, but the strongest representations
came from the Russians in Manchuria who appealed
for Allied help. Finally an international expedition,
composed of British, American, French, and Japanese,
landed at Vladivostok, and the neighboring territory
in Siberia was placed under military control, whilst
an inter-Allied committee was formed to restore
order on the railways running through Manchuria.

Early in 1920, when matters were to some extent
normal, the Americans withdrew their contingent,
being of opinion that the original object of the ex-
pedition was now fulfilled; the other allied Powers,
with the exception of Japan, followed suit shortly
afterwards.

Then came the formation of the Far Eastern Re-
public, a branch of the Moscow Soviet, with head-
quarters at Chita, exercising jurisdiction over Eastern
Siberia and the country to the north of Manchuria.

The creation of the new republic at Verkne Udinsk
on April 6, 1920, was an event of far-reaching im-
portance. It was apparently intended as a buffer
state between Russia and Japan, but at the outset
its career was a stormy one, although formal recog-
nition was accorded by both Moscow and Japan.
Later on in the year the Japanese effected a somewhat
reluctant evacuation of Siberia, as the Allies had
already done, and Chita was declared the capital of

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 29

the united provinces of Trans-Baikal, the Amur, and
the maritime province of Manchuria.

There was constant friction between the new re-
public and Japan, and the Japanese cannot be absolved
from the charge of creating certain difficulties and
troubles. In March 1921 they announced their in-
tention of reoccupying Nikolaevsk and Sakhalin, in
Siberia, stating that they did so in Allied interests
and on their behalf, which step evoked a vigorous
denial from the United States.

The situation was becoming increasingly difficult
and complicated when the Washington Conference
was called in 1921, at which Japan endeavored to
secure the approval of the Powers to her position in
Siberia, and the Shantung province of China, but
world opinion was against the Japanese and desired
their withdrawal.

Other conferences and discussions as between the
Japanese and Russian Soviet followed, but were pro-
ductive of no tangible results.

Pursuing our review in chronological sequence we
must now refer to a so-called Congress of the Mongol
peoples held in 1922 at Urga, the capital of Eastern
Mongolia, and the residence of the Hutuktu, or Liv-
ing Buddha. There it was agreed that Soviet and
Mongol policy should coincide, and deference be paid
to China by a clause in the treaty formulated that
Outer Mongolia should be an integral part of the
Chinese republic.

We have spoken elsewhere of the Russian efforts in

30 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

Mongolia and the campaign in progress there; this
was so far successful that by 1925 Outer Mongolia
was virtually part and parcel of Soviet Russia.

Despite a treaty of May 1924 between Russia and
China the vexed question of definite control of the
Chinese Eastern Railway remained unsettled. Nego-
tiations between the Soviet and China resulted in a
recognition that "the railway was a purely commer-
cial enterprise, that China was entitled to redeem the
railway with Chinese capital, the future of the line
to be determined by the two Governments to the
exclusion of any third party." These events had fol-
lowed on the Japanese withdrawal of their forces to
their own immediate sphere of influence in southern
Manchuria, the Chinese Eastern Railway being left
to the mercy of the Chinese and the changing war
lords. Under this new Treaty, the Chinese shared
equally with the Soviet in railways profits, and were
given control of the railway zone, which, in the
meantime, had been populated largely by Russians
and others of the white races. It was also agreed
that both Soviet and China should abstain from any
form of propaganda against each other.

The most far-reaching clause in the new agree-
ment, and one that directly affects Europe and
America, was the abandonment by Russia of her
extra-territorial privileges in China, which she had
enjoyed since 1689. This will be referred to in the
chapter dealing with the problem of extra-terri-
toriality.

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 31

The Japanese were not so interested in the above
line as in their own special position in Manchuria
generally, and she managed to effect a treaty with
the Soviet in 1925 under which the Japanese status
in Manchuria was to be on the basis established by
the Treaty of Portsmouth after the Russo-Japanese
War in 1905. The Soviet was, of course, anxious for
recognition wherever possible and so accepted de-
mands and made sacrifices which would doubtless in
other circumstances have been rejected.

The year 1925 is a landmark in Manchurian and
Far Eastern history for in it the Nine-Power Treaty
became operative, by which the signatories bound
themselves to respect Chinese sovereignty, independ-
ence, and territorial integrity.

The next two years in China are a record of civil
war and internecine strife, without much effect upon
the outside world, yet of international significance
for they marked the passing of Peking as the center
of Chinese political power and authority. Anarchy
and disorder increased, China became the prey of
rival war lords all hungering for power and loot,
Moscow was watching its opportunity and spreading
Communist propaganda wherever possible, until at-
tacks on the British concessions demanded prompt
action. This culminated in the dispatch of an armed
force to Shanghai in 1927 which did much to re-
store confidence and order.

now come to the era of Chang-Tso-Lin, the

32 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

redoubtable Manchurian war lord who was so dra-
matic a figure until his death in 1928.

Chang-Tso-Lin had qualified for his position in the
school of brigandage, and rose to great distinction
in the military profession, a rarity in China where
the profession of arms is regarded with contempt, in
accordance with the ancient teachings of the people,
who consider that reason and argument must come
before force.

Under Chang-Tso-Lin Manchuria enjoyed better
government than any other part of China; it was
lucky in being under the control of one war lord,
rather than the happy hunting ground of a score of
rivals. Chang was statesman as well as soldier, his
financial policy was beneficial, officials received their
salaries a most unusual proceeding banks were
solvent, and trade was reviving. A general era of
prosperity seemed to be dawning, and the world in
China, and even that in remote Europe, began to ask
itself if, after all, the great genius had arisen who
was to restore law and order, and bring China from
the welter of anarchy and chaos to the position of a
rising nation.

It would serve no useful purpose, and merely tend
to weary the reader, to include here a recital of the
rise and fall of fortunes, of the coming and going
of rival parties, of the intrigue and conspiracy that
have darkened Manchurian history within the past
five years.

Chang-Tso-Lui's retreat from Peking, his son's

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 33

succession to the leadership, the Chino-Russian dis-
pute over the Chinese Eastern Railway, and other
disturbances occurred, but without any lasting effect
on the situation in Manchuria. The outstanding
event in the north was the entry of Marshal Chang-
Tso-Lin into Peking with his Manchurian army in
December 1926, where he established a military gov-
ernment, while still holding the governor-generalship
of Manchuria. Chang at once became the de facto
ruler in North China and Manchuria, and a ding-
dong fight ensued for supremacy between the various
rivals, until Chang was facing the combined forces
of General Chiang Kai Shek and Generals Yen and
Feng, together known as the Kuomintang or Na-
tionalist Army. Chang was hard pressed, and not
wishing to risk a battle for the possession of Peking,
retreated to Mukden on June 2, 192 8, after having
held Peking for eighteen months.

Japan had warned the opposing sides that should
the fighting disturb the peace of Manchuria, or the
defeated troops and those in pursuit threaten the
security of the country, steps might have to be taken
to preserve peace and order, and to prevent Man-
churia from being involved in the civil war. The
warning had its effect and Manchuria escaped from
serious disturbance.

In pursuance of his decision to retreat Chang-Tso-
Lin left Peking by train, and on the night of June 4
as he was about to enter Mukden a violent explosion
occurred, Chang's saloon was wrecked, the famous

34 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

marshal being so severely injured that he died from
his injuries, his son Chang Hsueh-liang being elected
to reign in his stead.

Soon after the latter's accession a compromise
between him and the Nanking Government was
effected, under which Chang recognized the author-
ity of Nanking, but was given autonomy in local
affairs. At the same time the Nanking party, after
the capture of Peking, changed its name from Peking
(northern capital) to Peiping (northern peace), so
as to destroy the tradition of its having been a capital.

This ended another period of strife between north
and south, and the relations between the Manchurian
government of Marshal Chang and that at Nanking
gradually became more satisfactory.

Formal recognition of the new order was given
by the hoisting of the nationalist flag at Mukden in
December 1928.

The moment was now favorable to evolve plans
for the unification of China, but although two con-
ferences dealing with economic affairs and the dis-
bandment of the military forces were held, petty
jealousies and rivalry amongst the war lords gained
the day, and another opportunity to create a unified
China was lost. The many war lords were alarmed
at the reduction in their power, and the hungering
desire for wealth and power brought on a further
succession of civil wars.

There was, however, a brief lull early in 1929, and

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 35

no political or military issues disturbed the Man-
churian atmosphere until May of that year, when
the Chinese after alleged provocation raided the
Soviet Consulate at Harbin and imprisoned a number
of Soviet officials. This called forth a vigorous pro-
test from Moscow, but in July the Chinese still
further aggravated the situation by arresting the Rus-
sian general manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway,
and others, besides closing all Soviet commercial or-
ganizations in and around Harbin.

It was asserted that Chinese troops were massing
on the Soviet frontier, so Moscow dispatched a per-
emptory ultimatum to the Chinese on July 13,
stating that their action represented an obvious and
gross violation of the clear and unequivocal clauses
of the several agreements concluded between the
Soviet and China, and suggesting a conference to
regulate the questions affecting the Chinese Eastern
line.

The Soviet demanded the immediate release of all
Soviet citizens, the canceling of orders regarding the
railway, and the cessation of arbitrary measures di-
rected against Soviet nationals and institutions. A
time limit of three days was fixed for compliance,
after which the Soviet would take such steps as it
deemed necessary in support of its interests.

In the main the Chinese complied with the demands
of Moscow, and negotiations were initiated for the
adjustment of differences, Britain, America, France,
and Japan joining in a combined effort at mediation

36 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

with a view to settlement by peaceful parley rather
than resort to arms.

The Chinese were disinclined to accept the full
Soviet terms, but finally in December 1929 an agree-
ment was arrived at with the National government at
Nanking by which the status quo of the Chinese
Eastern Railway and Soviet rights and privileges
therein were restored.

In China proper, however, peace was still far from
realization, and hope of national unity became more
remote.

Clique after clique revolted, resentment one against
another, differences between this war lord and that,
disappointment at the shares allotted amongst them,
bribery, corruption, and intrigue, all had full play,
until a fight ensued amongst the wolves. Sixty gen-
erals, each concentrating solely on his own personal
gain, were engaged in a medley of intrigue, accusing
one another of self-interest, issuing blast and counter-
blast, each at the same time ordering the extermina-
tion of the traitor.

Finally, General Yen set himself up as the para-
mount authority, and war of a more direct nature
ensued between him and Nanking, each side making
great efforts to secure the support of Marshal Chang
Hsueh-liang, who, however, maintained a strict neu-
trality.

A confused series of fighting followed, until the
Nanking Government gained the upper hand, and in
agreement, temporary at any rate, with Marshal

MANCHURIA AND THE NATIONS 37

Chang, eulogized the latter for his action in the cause
of peace and unification.

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, the "Young Marshal,"
settled down in the kingdom he had inherited from
his father. His pact with Nanking saved Manchuria
from the bitter strife prevalent elsewhere, and the
richest undeveloped region of the Celestial dominions,
with the highest per capita trade, enjoyed a period of
comparative peace and quiet, until the Chino- Jap-
anese difficulties came to a head.

The "Young Marshal" has been brought up in a
military atmosphere, he has first-hand knowledge of
the country and its people, and possesses attributes
and has evolved ideas favorable to the creation of
a prosperous state. His tastes are decidedly Western;
a good tennis player, he rides well on the race course
and over the jumps, is an uncommonly good dancer,
and plays an exceptional game at golf.

Chang Hsueh-liang is an attractive conversational-
ist, can converse in English on most topics, and, apart
from his general interests and desire to introduce
Western ideas into his country, has a breadth of
vision unusual in the Oriental.

We shall see in a subsequent chapter how Chang
Hsueh-liang retired from Manchuria with his forces
to the southern side of the Great Wall, leaving the
country at the end of 1931 in the virtual occupation
of Japan.

CHAPTER II

THE ERA OF CHANGE

WE referred to Manchuria as a country of
strange incongruities with a veneer of
Western civilization. To the average
Anglo-American the country is simply a name. Ac-
customed as he is to the benefits of civilization, with
all the comforts and calmness arising from good
order, he finds it difficult to realize conditions that
are entirely different.

Nothing in the dramatic history of Manchuria is
more significant than the struggle now taking place
for possession, in which, as already remarked, great
issues with direct influence on the rest of the world
are involved.

From Manchuria and the adjacent land of Mon-
golia, the land of the Living Buddha, the Mongol
hordes in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries set out
to conquer Asia, and in the process they subdued
half Europe, penetrating as far as the Adriatic Sea
and the western borders of Hungary. They would
have advanced much further but for the death of
their leader, which necessitated a return to their base
in far Mongolia.

From Manchuria also came the restless Manchus,
contemporary with Charles I of England, whom the

38

THE ERA OF CHANGE 39

Chinese thought to keep out by the Great Wall which
they had erected fourteen hundred years before. But
the Manchus were not to be deterred by anything so
trifling as a wall, although it might be the greatest
the world has ever seen and the only thing on earth
that astronomers tell us could be seen from the moon.
They scaled the wall and occupied Peking, founding
the Manchu dynasty in 1644, which lasted until the
collapse of the empire in 1911.

Twelve centuries before the Manchus descended on
Peking, they had equipped a vast armada of Chinese
junks, with high stern and low bows, sailing across
uncharted seas to find a new world in Japan. They
carried furs with them, for Manchuria is a country
second to none in tiger, sable, fox, and ermine, and
in return they brought back silks and brocaded goods
for which Japan was famous even in those remote
days.

When Marco Polo crossed Asia to visit the court
of Kublai Khan, the Mongol emperor, in the thir-
teenth century, the Mongols were then at the zenith
of their power and fame; they had created an empire
stretching from the shores of the Yellow Sea to the
Danube, but not satisfied with these conquests,
equipped a fleet of eleven hundred vessels to sail
against the Japanese. On the way a great storm came
up, the entire armada was wrecked, and the largest
naval expedition in medieval history ended in disaster.

We have seen how Manchuria became the scene of
a scramble amongst the Powers on the spot, and its

40 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

subsequent career down to the present time. Even
in the midst of the existing anarchy Manchuria is a
land of plenty, for it is not only a granary of the
East, but has immense coal deposits, and is rich in
gold and silver. There are, too, forests of pine, oak,
elm, and walnut, and resources in timber that rival
the American West.

Its varied crops give valuable yields; tobacco, fruit,
vegetables, and above all wheat and other grains, for,
contrary to the widely-held belief, millions of Chinese
live not on rice but on wheat.

In a hundred ways the world has depended on
Manchuria without always realizing it. We will,
therefore, give a brief account of the people, their
manners and customs, and the industries and re-
sources of the country before going on to examine
present problems.

The Manchus who originally conquered China in
1644 formed part of the Tartar race, allied to the
Mongols, who were welded into one great fighting
people by Nurhachu, Mongola Napoleon, of quite
humble descent, whose father owned a few small vil-
lages which were formed into one state and called
Manchu. Nurhachu extended this, accounted for
the neighboring chiefs who were rivals, and gradually
cleared the way for a more or less undisturbed rule.
He was a statesman as well as a soldier, his laws were
few but they were swift in application, and his people
secured much better justice than they had hitherto
known. In consequence he gathered to his standard

THE ERA OF CHANGE 41

an enormous number of adherents, and so definitely
put Manchuria upon the map.

Of the Manchus there are probably not more than
one million, and only five or six per cent of the people
now speak the Manchu language; Chinese has long
since taken its place. The Manchus are uncommon
objects in their own country, and where found they
dress similarly to the Chinese. A few are left far up
in the mountains, remote fastnesses where they eke
out a scanty existence by fishing and hunting, in addi-
tion to some cultivation of the ground.

The average dwelling of the farmer and the col-
onist, who form the bulk of the population and are
the backbone of Manchuria, usually consists of a
couple of rooms with a hall in the center. The hall
is the kitchen, and along the sides of each room is
a raised platform two or three feet high. It is of
mud caked hard, and spread with matting and furs.
This platform, known as the kang, is hollow, and
heated by a flue from the kitchen stove. It is the
Chinese equivalent of central heating, and on the
platform the inmates sleep at night.

There may be as many as a dozen or more people
to accommodate in these small farmhouses; there is a
distinct note of discomfort, but the crowding is only
one of numerous economies practiced daily in a Man-
churian household.

There is no waste; the struggle for existence is too
acute, and a concentrated individual economy in fuel,
food, clothing, and space is the ruling characteristic

42 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

of the Manchurian agriculturist. They also make use
of every minute of daylight, laying up stores of food
against a possible famine, for a bad season means
much to families that have only enough to carry
them on from season to season. Yet withal they are
extraordinarily cheerful, endowed with exceptional
physical endurance, and supported throughout their
life and being by a profound moral philosophy which
the Westerner has never yet been able to fathom.

The Manchurians, in common with all Chinese,
work as it were in partnership with nature, liking
and understanding the land they cultivate, never con-
cerning themselves with politics, yet stanch believers
in true democracy.

They never admit to any inferiority to other races,
regard themselves, rightly or wrongly, as the salt of
the earth, and content in their surroundings make
a practice of self-denial and derive the greatest pleas-
ure from work well and truly done.

Conservative as they are, knowledge is quickly ac-
quired, and they can adapt themselves to any position.
They may be superstitious and credulous as children,
their face and clothing strange, and entirely without
ambition as we understand the term, yet in the short-
est time they will drive a motor-car or work a
mechanical piano better than the average skilled
mechanic.

Climate seems to have no effect upon the immi-
grant; he may arrive from Fukien in the far south,
but from wherever he hails he takes to the new life

THE ERA OF CHANGE 43

and surroundings as though to the manner born.
His temperament is such that he settles down philo-
sophically in his new home, and no matter how
uncongenial it may be he is happy and contented. Ob-
viously the Chinese settler, and indeed all Celestials,
is the man of the world, for nothing comes amiss to
him, and he goes merrily on, drawing on his store
of geniality, self-sacrifice, and optimism, which his
ancestry has bequeathed to him in a measure that no
other race can boast of.

If Manchuria can support a population greater to
the square mile than that of the most densely
crowded country in Europe, it will be due to the
yield of agriculture being much higher, coupled with
capacity for work and a passion for getting the most
out of the land.

The vast majority of the population to-day is
Chinese, the construction of the railways having
brought an influx that since 192J has totaled about
one million five hundred thousand annually. This
immigration, which is the main aspect in the transi-
tion of Manchuria, arose partly from the anarchy
and chaos prevailing elsewhere, the incessant civil
war, and the numberless factions fighting for power
and loot in the twenty-two provinces of China.

Nearly all these provinces are bandit-ridden and
infested with discharged soldiery, who have no occu-
pation and wander about the country in bands killing
and pillaging. As opportunity offers they take
service with any war lord who is able at the moment

44 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

to give them a certain livelihood, and sides are
changed with startling rapidity.

This has resulted in the population migrating from
the more disturbed areas to less stricken districts, and
Manchuria has received most of this wave. In the
present year 1932 there are possibly thirty-five
million settlers, and the stream of new arrivals goes
on increasing.

In the days before the fall of the Chinese monarchy
(1911) the imperial authorities strongly discouraged
any emigration north of the Great Wall; age-old
conservatism decreed the land to the north of that
structure to be dangerous and a bad land, and so
until the coming of the railways it remained unex-
ploited. Now the Chinese are making up for lost
time.

In the early spring the tide of immigration sets in;
men, women, and children, entire families, join the
march to the promised land, carrying all their goods
and chattels with them, tramping on with the fatal-
istic energy and patience peculiar to the Chinese
people. Often the stream of immigrants reminds one
of the retreat from Belgium and France during the
war; all kinds of people, high and low, carrying
household goods, pots, pans, and clothing, halting oc-
casionally for rest and food, and then on again to
the goal.

Many of the immigrants enter the promised land
by the Peking-Mukden Railway, built largely by
British finance; they crowd into open cars, packed

THE ERA OF CHANGE 45

like sardines, but contented and cheerful withal.
Some come by Japanese steamers from Tsingtao to
Dairen, and although the fare is only one dollar per
head the steamboat owners make large profits, for
there are no laws as to overloading, and tiny steamers
will carry as many as eighteen hundred or two thou-
sand people, massed as closely as in a London crowd.

In 1931 about two millions came in from China,
spreading out over the farmlands in this fertile corner
of northeast Asia.

Of all nations in the world the Chinese is the most
conservative; China does not change, and while she
is sometimes ready to accept the purely mechanical
gifts of the West, when it comes to ideas she prefers
her own. As an illustration of this a certain Man-
churian war lord left instructions that his expensive
limousine car complete with stuffed chauffeur and
footman should be burned at his funeral, so that they
might be ready for him on the other side. Neither
he nor the chauffeur, who knew all about magnetos
and big ends, could see anything ridiculous in the
idea. It was merely in accordance with Chinese be-
lief that adequate arrangements must be made for
those passing to the next world.

On a first visit to Manchuria "Western visitors are
surprised to find cities, factories, and motor-cars, and
they are apt to imagine China has become Western
and modernized. Nothing could be further from the
truth. All that we mean by civilization sits as un-
easily on China as a coster's feather hat on a Mayf air

46 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

dowager. China has taken certain ideas and articles
from the West, but they make no real difference to
her; they are just tacked on.

Large cities like Harbin and Mukden may have
factories, fine buildings, and motor-buses, their keen
business men of many nations, and all the bustle of
industry, but immediately outside this influence
everything is different.

Roads are practically nonexistent, and vehicles of
the most primitive type journey over the roughest
tracks. Here the mule or the camel does the work
of the train and motor-lorry, and the coolie, using
his back, will cheerfully compete with a motor- van
in the carriage of everything from a bag of coal to
a piano.

In the summer the tracks are full of ruts and
covered with a fine powdery dust; in the winter they
are frozen hard, the season when they are most pass-
able. This lack of good roads, and the necessary
bridges to cross the numerous rivers, impedes the
import of material for trucks and mechanical trans-
port.

The contrast of the old and the new, both in trans-
port and in the mode of life, is striking. Through-
out Manchuria you are just as likely to run into a
bandit as into a hard-working peasant. The trans-
continental train that travels with all its luxury and
speed from Moscow across Russia and Siberia will
journey in its transit of Manchuria alongside of men

THE ERA OF CHANGE 47

who are pushing barrows fitted with sails just as they
were in the days before Confucius.

The lines were driven through the land and have
been constantly added to, until the time has come
when Manchuria can show more railway construc-
tion than any country in the world.

In our endeavor to present a picture of Manchuria
of to-day, we must draw attention first to the sys-
tem of administration, and then to its latent wealth
and resources, and how the latter can be utilized and
developed. So far as the administration is concerned
this was originally conducted on a military basis, but
there is now a mixture of civil and military with the
latter element predominating. 1

Each of the three provinces, Kirin, Fengtien, and
Heilungkiang, was divided into prefectures, presided
over by a Taoyin; under him were minor officials for
the various parts of the civil machine. These men
constituted the general administrative body of the
provincial service. But there is also a form of gov-
ernment for the people by the people, established in
each village and dictated solely by immemorial cus-
tom. The village elects a headman, who fulfills the
duties of magistrate, arbitrator, assessor of taxes,
judge and jury. He is responsible to the district offi-
cer for any decisions of an important character, but
beyond this enjoys supreme power within his own
village limits.

1 These details refer to the Chinese administrations which exercised
control before the Japanese occupation Whether the same system will
be retained under any settlement is uncertain.

48 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

Then there are the local guilds playing a vital part
in the everyday life of the worker. These guilds
wield an incalculable power in internal and external
Chinese politics, and wage war against all their ene-
mies. As a rule the people dislike discussing these
guilds, even with one of their own race, for they are
regarded with an awe equaling the respect which
every good follower of Confucius has for those who
govern him, even for the war lords who preside over
the destinies of the people and come and go with
kaleidoscopic rapidity.

In Manchuria the guilds are clans rather than po-
litical bodies, the guiding principle being to help
their own members much in the same way as our
British friendly societies of former days. In the
towns and villages there are no laws governing the
conditions of labor in industry, and members of a
guild therefore give mutual aid in acts of industrial
aggression, while those who fall on evil times or are
unemployed, receive benefit to the extent of about
one-half their usual earnings. The guilds also pro-
vide for the families of deceased members in distress.
These activities, which may be described as the peace-
time work of the guilds, fulfill a necessary function
in the daily life of the Manchurian. Side by side
with the care of their members the guilds often pur-
sue other activities, accounting for the fear in which
they are held.

If any man falls foul of a guild he must beware;
should the cause of dispute be a charge of snaring

THE ERA OF CHANGE 49

game in a wood, regarded as the preserve of another
village with its own particular guild, or cheating a
guild member and flying from the country, the feud
begins and does not end until the offender has been
punished.

A blood feud, such as we have amongst the tribes
along the northwest frontier of India, may last for
a generation; they are a law unto themselves, and
often surpass in ruthlessness the vendettaS* of the
Italians. One such feud originated in the right of
one guild to fish in the river looked upon as the prop-
erty of a neighboring village. A villager cast his
line into the waters belonging to the rival clan, and a
feud began which lasted for several years.

It is the aim of a guild to secure the support of
every man in the village, town, or trade, and if one
joins a guild in a village or town outside the place in
which he lives there is trouble, which may lead to
untimely demise.

The fact that these guilds have existed from time
immemorial probably accounts for the respect in
which they are held, and the hold they have on the
people.

Amongst the best known is the Builders' Guild,
founded by an early emperor, under whom it was
said furniture was first made.

Before being admitted to a guild a man must have
served an apprenticeship to the trade he desires to
take up. Once enrolled he must cooperate with every
member, openly and in secret, for the good of the

50 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

guild, which matters to him more than the welfare
of his town or village, or even of China itself.

Having become a member he does not contemplate
resignation. A man may be a resident of Harbin,
Tsitsihar, or a remote village up in the hills, which
he might leave to settle in some other part of China,
or even to venture abroad to the Pacific Coast of
America. None the less he is still a member of the
guild, and instructions may be sent across the seas
to him.

More than one unsolved crime in sundry "China"
towns abroad could be traced, were the facts but
known, to the flight of an erring member of a guild
to the fancied security of an American or European
city.

Each guild possesses a distinctive emblem more or
less sanctified by its adherents, and which, when
carried upon them, ensures assistance by a brother
member in time of need. Thus the emblem of the
builders of bamboo scaffolding, a special trade, is a
spider, for the latter spins a web that resembles scaf-
folding. The spider is a passport which will produce
assistance from any member of the guild, or from
any other guild with which it may be allied.

The blacksmiths have the spark, for from it ema-
nates fire, and from fire the energy which makes their
work possible. The sampan, or junk men, who trade
on the Yalu, Liao, and other waterways of Man-
churia, have the bamboo for their guild emblem, for
the reason that it never sinks. The farmers hold the

THE ERA OF CHANGE 51

swallow in veneration, and they tell us that this
graceful bird knows all about the weather and indi-
cates the prospects of the crops.

With the rise of new forces in Manchuria, the
proximity to Soviet institutions and influence, and to
some extent the supplanting of the guilds by modern
labor unions organized on Communist principles, the
power of the old guilds will probably decline. Al-
ready the march of events is robbing them of their
significance, except in local matters.

China is gradually being educated, although this
education affects only two or three per cent of the
entire population, but with its spread antagonism
between the guilds and this new enlightenment must
appear. The new China will resent the power of the
guilds, but the abolition of these institutions will not
be easily accomplished, since Manchuria, like all
China, is the land of old custom, and the people
cling to their beliefs with extraordinary tenacity.

The first appearance of trains was regarded with
hostility, for they interfered violently with the life
to which the inhabitants were accustomed. They
clashed with age-old customs, and these "smoking
devils" were not wanted. They would, too, disturb
the long sleep of the ancestors, and whenever an op-
portunity occurred construction trains were seized
and buried in holes by the irate natives.

Once more it was the compelling push of the West
that fell foul of ancestor worship, an extreme form
of filial piety which is the basis of Chinese morality.

72 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

The spirits that pass from this world to the next must
be given every comfort and attention, food and
clothing, money and transport, must be provided for
their use, and they must not be disturbed by any-
thing that is not in accordance with custom and re-
ligion.

The Chinese believe that whatever happens to us in
the way of illness or death, or any calamity through
life, is brought about by neglect of the spirits. They
have a saying that the most important thing in life
is to be buried well and remain so.

Tremendous forces are, of course, at work in Man-
churia, and the ceaseless tide of immigration must
inevitably alter to some extent the course of life and
habits of the race. Over a large part of the country,
however, even the mechanical gifts of civilization
are scorned. People insist that if wide highways were
built, motor and cart traffic would throw the coolies
and porters out of work. The traveler from the
West who has seen strings of these skeleton-thin men
with dark scars on their shoulders, where innumerable
pack ropes have cut into the flesh, might feel inclined
to welcome the abolition of their toil, but the Chinese
sees nothing degrading in it. He has no objection to
using his countryman as a beast of burden, and steps
into a rickshaw or piles his luggage on a coolie's back
as cheerfully as if the man were a mule.

Nevertheless, so far as Manchuria is concerned, the
railway has won, and has already ushered in a peace-

THE ERA OF CHANGE J3

ful revolution from which there can be no turning
back.

A feature of Manchuria is the romantic and high-
waymen element, furnished by the Hunhutza, "red
beards," an interesting race of mounted bandits who
rivaled the far-famed legendary Cossacks.

Banditry and piracy in Manchuria, and along its
coasts, have been common from the earliest times,
and both have defied the best efforts of the Chinese
to stamp out the evil. Whatever the historical origin
of Manchunan bandits may be, they are now com-
posed mainly of discharged soldiery; many of these
have served in the various forces of provincial war
lords and governors, and when the particular side to
which they profess momentary allegiance failed to
pay a portion, at any rate, of their wages, they passed
on to the next, and so found their way eventually to
Manchuria. In their dealings with the rest of man-
kind, these wild characters think nothing of commit-
ting atrocities of a fiendish nature. They hold all
and sundry to ransom, and lop off an ear or a finger
for dispatch to the relatives, or finally, if nothing
is forthcoming, slay prisoners without further ado.

Roaming the country in bands they issue from
their mountain fastnesses to swoop down on villages
and caravans, and disappear with the loot before the
hue and cry. Officials are often captured and only
released when ransom is forthcoming, which usually
takes the shape of so much gold dust.

The bandit groups have an intelligence service

54 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

which tells them of the movement of treasure and
valuable convoys, and smash-and-grab raids are as
frequent in Manchurian towns as they are in London.
So extensive is this highway robbery that insurance
companies exist for the sole purpose of insuring
against loss or outrage during the transit of people
and goods from one point to another. If you are
traveling from Mukden to an outlying town perhaps
a hundred miles away, and it necessitates passing
through a dangerous area, you are supplied with a
small flag which must be placed in a conspicuous po-
sition on your cart and with you travels an escort of
half a dozen men. This insignificant force is ob-
viously incapable of putting up any serious resistance,
but they are there only for effect, the insurance com-
pany having to pay blackmail to the brigands who
then allow the passage of the traveler.

The Japanese are kept busy hunting down these
brigands, a difficult proposition, for these highway-
men regard their occupation as an honorable and tra-
ditional right, and parents enter their children for the
ranks of the "Hunhutza" as we might send our sons
to Sandhurst or West Point.

In the past, and even at the present time, the
Chinese find it convenient to enter into negotiations
with the brigands, utilizing them for action against
the Japanese, as well as for the suppression of local
trouble. While the Russians were opening up Man-
churia along the railway they often enlisted the
services of these bandits, and when wealth and trade

THE ERA OF CHANGE 55

increased through economic development it was an
incentive to further activity on their part. They
receive drastic treatment from the Manchurian
Chinese when caught. The prison system and modes
of punishment in vogue are crude and much in-
genuity is displayed in the invention of deterrents.

Here offenders are treated in an original manner;
they are placed in an oblong box measuring about
five feet by two and two feet in depth, the counter-
part of a coffin, and there, chained and manacled, are
left to pass weeks, some of them months, and not in-
frequently years if their constitution, always amaz-
ingly virile, is able to withstand it. They can neither
stand up nor lie down, but must perforce assume a
semicrouching posture, with the result that their
limbs become shrunken and useless, and after a time
they are nothing but shriveled wrecks from the con-
stant and agonizing position to which they are sub-
jected. They are taken out for a few minutes daily
and food is passed to them through a small hole in
the side of the box. For covering at night a thin
worn blanket is given, this being exchanged in winter
for a sheepskin coat, quite inadequate as bedclothes
when the thermometer drops to forty and fifty de-
grees below zero. Indeed, how a bandit survives the
torture of this coffin, the disgusting food, and the
unspeakable filth is beyond one.

In law as in most other matters Chinese principle
and practice are the opposite of our own; for in-
stance, a prisoner is considered guilty until he is

56 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

proved beyond all doubt to be innocent, and his trial
before a court has for its main object the establish-
ment of the charge of guilty and determining the
punishment he shall undergo. This in itself shows
the dangers confronting any one who may be subject
to Chinese law.

Again, for any given offense responsibility must be
fixed on some person or persons; whatever the facts
may be, under duress, an act of God, or those over
which the accused had no control, the onus of re-
sponsibility must be fixed, for none of the latter
circumstances is recognized in Chinese law. The
doctrine of responsibility throws a curious sidelight
on Celestial psychology. The father as head of the
family is responsible for their good behavior, a vil-
lage, which is a little kingdom in itself, is liable in
the person of the headman, the district magistrate
must answer for the good conduct of the area com-
mitted to his charge, and so on up to the governor
or head of a province.

This creed develops a counterinfluence, making
detection of crime difficult. The magistrate in whose
district a murder occurs has a black mark scored
against him by the provincial government, and is
consequently regarded with disfavor. "What wonder
there is shuffling, subterfuge, and a strong disinclina-
tion to follow up clews? This simple fact alone ac-
counts for the difficulty in unraveling intricate cases.

Public opinion plays an important part in the
Chinese official's discharge of his duties, for if he

THE ERA OF CHANGE 57

ignores it by an excess of avarice it may react un-
favorably upon him. To follow the line of least
resistance three conditions must be observed, first of
which is law and order, then the collection of taxes
imposed in his district, and, lastly, the preservation
of a spirit of contentment during the process of tax
gathering. Provided questions do not arise out of his
administration he is left alone, and can exploit his
district so long as the above conditions are not vio-
lated.

Prior to the revolution of 1911 the system of local
government was comparatively efficient, but the
transfer from a monarchical to a republican form of
government brought in a lower class of men who
secure their positions by purchase and by ingratiating
themselves with the local war lord or official tem-
porarily in charge of the area. The standard of gen-
eral capability and integrity has been lowered to such
an extent that one could not truthfully say that there
is any integrity, and most of the precautions formerly
in vogue to obviate malfeasance have been entirely
swept away. As an illustration, the term of office
in any one post was limited to three years, but this
often extends to seven and more. Further, no offi-
cial could hold office in the province of his birth.
By such means it was sought to guard against local
interests growing up to compete with duty, and espe-
cially against territorial attachment which might be-
come the basis of disloyalty. Obviously the system
had serious drawbacks, for it is the absence of local

58 MANCHURIA- THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

and territorial - attachment that encourages some of
the worst official abuses. Nor, in such a short term
of office, is an official likely to interest himself in,
much less to spend money on, a place which may
know him no more during his career.

The vagueness, uncertainty, and barbarity of
Chinese law justify the many objections to relin-
quishment of extra-territorial rights held by for-
eigners. Throughout China official and political
corruption are rife, due to the extent of territory
and the relative difficulty of control, multiplied by
the time during which the custom of fraud and pecu-
lation has been growing. These would in themselves
yield a product adequate to account for the magni-
tude and methodization of embezzlement. The root
of the evil lies in the fact that officials are practically
unpaid, their salaries being quite insufficient to satisfy
even primary needs. They thus gain all they can for
the least possible outlay, leaving their servants and
dependents to follow suit.

From this simple beginning we can trace the whole
system of fraud and peculation, assisted by the
knowledge that many officials begin their career in
debt, having been obliged to pay for their posts with
money borrowed at high interest; in addition they
must perforce make expensive presents in money and
kind to* their superiors, to avoid the danger of ad-
verse report and dismissal. There are innumerable
forms of corruption, and many stories could be told

THE ERA OF CHANGE 59

of the wiles and stratagems of civil and military offi-
cers for acquiring wealth.

Colossal sums have been exacted from the people
all over China during the past ten years, and from
1922-1925, almost a boom period, it is estimated that
by illegal taxation, and every form of corruption,
sufficient money was raised by predatory war lords
to pay off the entire foreign monetary commitments
of China.

The administration of a Chinese province possesses
no system of accounts; officials never render any, and
there is no machinery for checking them which would
not itself need in turn to be checked. The taxes are
farmed and monopolies granted, all of which are a
stimulus to raise the largest possible surplus for the
individual. No regard is paid to local improvements,
or to objects tending to enhance the value of the dis-
trict from an agricultural or economic standpoint.
If an official is interested in an undertaking his sole
object is to make it a paying thing for himself; his
whole tenor and trend of mind would revolt at the
idea of showing any regard for the rights and inter-
ests of others.

This is evidenced in the system of revenue and taxa-
tion which afford many interesting sidelights on
Chinese rule. There are regulations fixing the
amount of taxes leviable, but these have been so per-
verted by the methods of embezzlement, and the
widespread opportunities offered by the prevailing
anarchy and chaos all over the country, that one

60 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

cannot differentiate between the regular and the ir-
regular tax, nor determine what part of the sum
collected finds its way into the treasury.

Then again, no accurate evidence of the incidence
of taxation can be formed, for, in addition to the
illegal exactions going on, the taxes fixed in one dis-
trict may in practice differ from those in another,
and those levied by one official in any given area may
be quite different from the ones imposed by his suc-
cessor.

Apart from the general shaking of the pagoda
tree, whiclj is not confined to any particular class, one
is often amazed at the effrontery of those who prac-
tice it.

Part of the revenue collected from the agricultural
classes is taken in grain, and the taxpayer appears on
specified dates with his quota of cereals, a fixed
amount calculated on the area and productivity of
the land. He will, however, be grievously disap-
pointed if he thinks that by bringing that amount he
is freed from further obligation. Ordinarily the
scales give comparatively correct measure, but when
it comes to an adjustment of the corn tax it is aston-
ishing the amount that is required to induce them to
obey the laws of gravity.

The Chinese are the ideal colonists for Manchuria;
from the days of Noah, aided by a system of agricul-
ture, they have supported a population of four hun-
dred millions, through history far longer and more
checkered than our own. The Chinese lives on his

THE ERA OF CHANGE 61

small holding aided by climatic conditions and the
fertility of the soil, with effective agricultural meth-
ods, extreme personal economy, and, in normal times,
the small taxes levied by the state. A far-seeing em-
peror who celebrated the fiftieth year of his reign in
1711 made a statement which is typical of Chinese
thought and perspicacity. "As the population of the
empire increases the amount of land for cultivation
does not increase; the land tax of this year should
therefore be calculated on the census for that year
and should not be increased."

So closely did they adhere to the dictum that in
1920 the revenue from the land tax showed the
merest variation from the figures of 1711, this being
probably accounted for by famine and distress of
previous years.

The Manchurian Chinese is what one might term
an intensive cultivator; not an inch of ground is
wasted and nothing is left undone that may enhance
the food crops. The tools are crude, and the methods
are dictated by custom and tradition, but the soil is
carefully worked, and the outstanding feature of
agriculture as exemplified here is in the amount and
sum of human labor expended upon it.

Speaking generally Manchuria is a blend of forest
and meadow land, but as yet less than half the arable
part has been plowed, and there are still immense
areas available to settlers. It is estimated that the
country is capable of supporting a population of up-
wards of one hundred millions, and when that num-

62 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

ber has been accommodated there are the grass lands
of Mongolia to the west, which must in time be ab-
sorbed by either Chinese or Japanese settlers.

Millet, wheat, and beans are the principal crops of
Manchuria. The soya bean is cultivated on a vast
scale, yet it was only some twenty years ago that the
world realized the value of it. To-day it is used
everywhere for all kinds of purposes. As nourish-
ment both for men and animals, as a fertilizer, and
raw material for industry, it has created an agricul-
tural record. 1

Dalny, the new port originated by Russian im-
perial command, exports large quantities to Japan
and elsewhere throughout the world. By the soya
bean alone Manchuria could be self-supporting and
supply the rest of the world besides. For the growth
of this industry, and its development on scientific
lines, the Chinese owe much to the Japanese, who
brought in modern methods and by wise expenditure
have built up the soya bean trade.

Manchuria, especially in the south, is a second
California, the climate being favorable to the growth
of fruit, and soon we may see canning factories estab-
lished there and Manchurian produce dispatched to
the four corners of the earth.

In several ways we have depended upon Manchuria

without always realizing it; for instance, the women

in Europe and America who wear beautiful-looking

furs that are given high-sounding names, would

1 See Chapter TV

THE ERA OF CHANGE 63

doubtless be surprised that these furs once covered
Manchunan dogs. Numbers of black and yellow
mongrels are bred for this purpose, and, incidentally,
it is usual for a Manchunan bride to be given several
as a dowry. The raising of these dogs is an important
industry, and there are large farms of the fur-bearing
kind. The coats reach perfection during the winter,
when the dogs are slain and skinned, and after sort-
ing and curing go out into the Western world under
various fashionable names.

It is curious to think that the smart furs one sees
in London, Paris, and New York may have emanated
from a Manchurian dog farm, the wearer never for
one moment imagining it was a four-footed canine,
and not a sable, mink, or a fox, who died that she
might have an ultra-chic fur.

So far as America is concerned more furs are im-
ported from China than any other part of the world,
so that the supply must equal the demand, although
not of the actual quality the purchaser believes.

There is nothing essential to life and industry that
cannot be found in Manchuria; raw materials of
every description, and coal deposits of unlimited ex-
tent. These coalfields were known to exist, but the
Chinese always showed a strong disinclination to
work them for fear of disturbing the spirits of the
departed; they called the masses of black stone that
covered the ground in the coal areas "the burning
stones/' and when it came to be used as a fuel, the
imperial authorities in Peking issued orders that min-

64 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

ing for coal was forbidden out of consideration for
the ancestors.

With the coming of the Russians mining started
on a fairly large scale, and the Chinese eagerly took
to the work. The development was carried out
mainly with American material and advice, up-to-
date machinery was imported, operations in the
Mukden and Fushun coal areas yielding immense
quantities of coal, and even with war and anarchy
ruling supreme the output in 1931 totaled over seven
million tons.

So extensive are these coalfields that reliable esti-
mates give the deposits available in both North and
South Manchuria at seventeen hundred million tons.
In building up a great economic Manchuria the Jap-
anese are taking full advantage of the coalfields;
throughout the Liao Tung peninsula adjacent to the
railway lines factories and plants have been installed
for the iron, bean, oil, and a dozen other trades. As
we shall show in a later chapter cement works, timber
yards, shipbuilding, and all the evidence of economic
life and ambition are in full swing, fostered at every
step by the industrious Japanese.

Research stations and experimental farms are
springing up, science has been introduced to help the
farmer, cultivator, and miner, and the quest is unre-
mitting for new materials and methods which will
lead to, and assist in, sound commercial and agricul-
tural enterprise.

Speaking generally, the best farm lands are found

THE ERA OF CHANGE 65

in the north, millions of acres of virgin land are still
open to settlement, and there is an attractive market
for farm machinery in opening up these undeveloped
lands,

We have remarked that, contrary to popular be-
lief, millions of Chinese eat no rice, but depend en-
tirely on millet and other cereals. Kaoliang, or
millet, is the staple food of the native population, as
well as the principal grain food of numerous animals
engaged in farm and general work. For centuries
the cultivated land of Manchuria has been devoted
to the raising of this grain, and its production sur-
passed the celebrated Manchurian bean. The demand
in the markets of the world for the bean, however,
gradually displaced the kaoliang, and to-day only
about 25 per cent of the land is given over to its
cultivation.

The millet is a form of universal provider; it is
not only food, but the stalks are used for fuel in
districts where wood or coal is scarce or not imme-
diately available. It comes in useful as thatch for
roofing houses, for making mats, and the Manchurian
brews beer from it.

Apart from cereals, other staple products of Man-
churia are flax, tobacco, raw cotton, and silk. All
are in a state of primary development, tobacco and
cotton being the most promising, for the improve-
ment of which the Japanese have set up an experi-
mental farm on the South Manchurian Railway. The
Japanese Government also provides farmers with to-

66 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

bacco and cotton seed, supervises the cultivation of
tobacco and controls as far as possible its sale in the
cities.

In all this work of development and steady prog-
ress credit must be given to the Japanese; amongst
the Chinese methods of farming, as in every other in-
dustry, have changed very little during many cen-
turies. Strenuously the natives of Manchuria have
clung to the past; while steam shovels, for example,
made in the north of England are moving lumps of
mountain for a new track, you will find a few yards
away men at work with wooden hoes as in Biblical
days.

Since the Japanese advent the most energetic steps
have been taken to improve agriculture by the estab-
lishment of model farms, live-stock stations, and seed
nurseries. This has to some extent stirred the Chinese,
who are slowly being brought to a sense of apprecia-
tion of modern ways and means.

Before outside influence came into Manchuria, the
trade there, and in the adjacent land of Mongolia,
was based upon horse breeding, the main industry of
a fighting race who achieved almost world-wide em-
pire. The Mongols and Manchus are the original
example of mounted infantry, they possessed the most
mobile army on earth, and under their restless leaders
they sacked Moscow one summer and were at the
gates of Delhi the next. The most famous of these
leaders Timurlane in the thirteenth century de-

THE ERA OF CHANGE 67

throned no less than twenty-seven kings and even
harnessed kings to his chariot.

So stock farming was the chief occupation of these
hardy people; then with the entry of the Chinese
the rich lands were gradually put to the plow, and
to-day only a shadow of the old pastoral age is visible.

The forest wealth of Manchuria is considerable, and
as a former Manchu emperor once expressed it there
are "seas of trees." There has, of course, been much
destruction of timber, mainly by Manchurian tribes,
who in order to protect their crops and herds from
the attacks of wild animals destroyed the forests.
Then when the Chinese came, they acted in a similar
manner to clear the ground for farm purposes. In
turn came the railway penetration, and the Russians
were active in timber undertakings, especially for the
supply of sleepers and fuel. Wholesale spoliation of
the forests thus continued, but when the Japanese
assumed charge of the leased areas in South Manchuria
they took the initiative in the work of afforestation,
over one hundred million trees being planted in the
zone under their control. Nevertheless, in spite of
the denudation that has gone on the forest wealth is
still immense, and every year thousands of log rafts
are floated down the rivers to ports on the Gulf of
Pechili.

The Chinese lumbermen are resourceful, and for
the long voyage down the rivers they heap earth up
at one end of the raft and there improvise a garden
for the supply of vegetables. Time is no object, and

<J8 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

if the voyage of a few hundred miles stretches into
months, what matters it, if life goes on in calm beati-
tude?

Of minerals other than coal there are gold, copper,
iron, barytes, asbestos, magnesite, and talc. All these
are ready to be exploited now that the outlook on
mining has changed, and the death penalty is no longer
inflicted for working without authority. In theory
it has always been sacrilege to disturb the earth, and
the sin of mining was said to have been the cause of
the Ming dynasty's downfall.

The rise of the agricultural, mining, and other in-
dustries reminds one of pioneer days; railways came
in, new cities and towns sprang up, a migration far
exceeding those of Biblical times swelled the popula-
tion, and in a single generation Manchuria has moved
from almost prehistoric conditions to a land of trade
and agriculture, brought about with outside skill and
capital.

Before the building of railways the Chinese were
engaged almost wholly in agricultural pursuits, or
primitive manufacturing industries, of which agri-
culture was the basis. They pressed oil from the soya
bean for food, as well as light, which is still largely
used by the people, and even though electricity is
common in all the foreign stores you see by way of
contrast the native light provided by oil-soaked wool
wrapped round a stick.

The Russians first introduced modern manufactur-
ing methods to North Manchuria, the Japanese per-

THE ERA OF CHANGE 69

forming a similar task in the south. The Chinese,
always alive to their own interests, are gradually being
stimulated by the rise of new industries in the foreign
concessions, and their natural ability helps in the
improvement.

Manchuria as a manufacturing country possesses
certain outstanding advantages. We have seen its
great natural resources in the form of agricultural
and mineral wealth, besides live stock and other staple
products. Fuel is there in the form of coal, and first-
rate labor of the sturdy north China type; it has mar-
kets accessible on all sides. It can be made a modern
industrial country, for it already possesses the nucleus
of expanding industries, enterprising spirit, technical
skill, and the supply of capital available would rapidly
be increased once law and order are established and
the depredations of numerous war lords, wandering
bandits, and organized bands of discharged soldiery
suppressed.

Whilst the Chinese have provided the labor and the
physical means of making the country what it is,
Russia and Japan have rendered the development pos-
sible. The Chinese have distinct capacity for pio-
neering, and have shown what they are capable of in
agriculture and commercial life, but they lack the
elements of formulating and carrying on sound rule,
although Manchuria under Chang-Tso-Lin had better
government than any other of the twenty-two
provinces of China. This blessing continued, mainly
due to Manchuria having suffered comparatively little

70 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

in the civil war that has rent the remainder of the
country. Economic collapse and general depression,
following on the widespread factional strife and out-
breaks, have scarcely affected Manchuria, but revenue
has been squandered on military expeditions with
political ascendency as their aim, and only the pres-
ence of Japan has saved the country from bankruptcy
and disruption in every sense.

Were it not for the Japanese conditions in Man-
churia would indeed be chaotic, seeing that a large
proportion of the immigrants come from the bandit-
ridden provinces of China proper, and with them
arrive varied elements from Russia and Siberia. Man-
churia has, in fact, become the dumping ground for
those eager to make the most out of this promised
land.

The southern section of the three eastern provinces
is more fertile than the north, and has double the
population, who are mainly devoted to agriculture,
with local and foreign trade in the towns. Millions
more would have migrated to Manchuria long before
the fall of the empire in 191 1 but for the strong oppo-
sition of the Manchus at Peking, who wished to re-
strain the Chinese emigrant from moving north of
the Great Wall, where his agricultural and peaceful
temperament would have contaminated the warlike
tribes and the military mainstay of the Manchu
regime.

The drastic laws against this infiltration into the
land of the three provinces did much to check but

THE ERA OF CHANGE 71

did not entirely prevent it. It had, in defiance of the
law, been going on for more than fifty years, and
only since the Great War has the number increased
to such a formidable extent.

The tide of immigration flowing through the large
towns spreads out into the fertile valleys which
traverse the land of the Manchus from north to south.
Nearly thirty-five millions are settled in the country
to-day, turning the virgin soil, cultivating the soya
bean by which alone Manchuria could live and supply
the world, hewing timber in the dense forests, floating
the logs down on innumerable rafts by way of the
arterial rivers, and generally tapping and opening up
this granary of Asia, with its riches in minerals, beans,
coal, furs, and timber.

In the cities and larger towns the trade is mainly
in the hands of Chinese and Russians, the Chinese
shops supplying the local needs of farmers and peas-
ants.

Life in a Manchurian town is much the same as else-
where in China proper; the streets in the native quar-
ters are narrow and would be the despair of any
sanitary authority. There are long lanes where the
sun has difficulty in penetrating, and in this artificial
gloom thousands of Chinese live and have their being.
Here business is brisk, the streets and lanes from wall
to wall pulsate with life, and the shops are open to the
world. Privacy there is almost none; you could shake
hands with ease with a dweller in a house or shop
opposite, for the overhanging eaves are set as closely

72 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

together as the teeth in a comb, bending forward like
gargoyles intent on malicious and dreadful gossip.
The sky is often hidden by these eaves and by the high
verandas jutting out from many of the houses.

The space between roofs and streets is filled with
signboards covered in Chinese characters of faded
gold or red, and fashioned from narrow strips of
colored wood hanging vertically. The more enter-
prising of the shopkeeping fraternity attract the
attention with colored paper lanterns, arranged re-
gardless of order, and of every imaginable shape and
size. A jingling cacophony is set up when these signs
and lanterns are set swinging in the breeze. Dark
and forbidding alleyways branch off from the main
streets, where there is a malodorous stench of rags and
refuse, of dirt and squalor. Twilight, grotesque and
frightening, is their portion, and in this gloom disease
breeds unchecked, child lives are sacrificed, the young
grow old before they have known manhood.

Scattered over the pavements as though a thousand
children had played a fantastic game of hare and
hounds, are fragments of" red paper. If you are
poetically inclined you may imagine them to be faded
rose petals. Actually they are the torn wrappings of
joss sticks, the incense which every Chinese, poor or
rich, offers to the memory of his ancestors. The
latter must be provided with everything needful to
their comfort and well-being in the world beyond;
every day their memory must be hallowed by the
wafting of the incense. Hard by the temples you

THE ERA OF CHANGE 73

would imagine the ground had been painted crimson,
so thick does the paper lie. Even the constant squelch
of muddy feet cannot dim its blood-red witness to
the religion which is stronger than life itself in China.

Few of the shops have windows or doors; merely
huge shutters which can be readily removed and cause
little trouble. They are gaudily painted and gilded
fantastically, some lacquered, others daubed over with
many colors as though a post-impressionist artist had
been having a riotous day.

Great plank shutters protect the contents of the
more pretentious shops, and the presence of heavy
bars and bolts indicates that thieves and prowlers are
not unknown.

By some of the shops you will notice a brightly
painted recess, usually of porcelain and half -filled with
sand, into which the joss sticks are thrust, and
throughout the day and night their smell pervades
the air, rising to the comfort of the dead and gone.

Every lane and street is packed shopping is an
easy matter, for most trades are grouped together
here fifty yards of shoe shops, there a succession of
emporiums where baskets, boxes, lacquer work, and
pictures are sold. Gambling, tea-drinking, and bar-
gaining are in full swing, each one intent on his occu-
pation, doing everything with that persistence and
application which are the prerogative of the Chinese
race.

In strong contrast to the native quarters are those
of the foreign residents. The land leased or acquired

74 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

by Europeans and Japanese has by initiative and en-
terprise developed into model cities. It has required
much time, patience, and labor to construct the up-
to-date buildings, adapt sites to modern requirements,
and install the amenities of civilization. In some
cases land has had to be filled in, marshes drained and
rivers dredged, before the areas were suitable for resi-
dence and trade.

As time passed Western methods of municipal ad-
ministration and the security enjoyed by the popula-
tion, Chinese and foreign, within those areas, induced
many Chinese banks, business firms, and others, to
purchase or rent property under foreign control.
Often the Chinese population is far in excess of the
white inhabitants or that of the Japanese, for when
it is a question of trading in security and life going
on in calm beatitude, the Chinese appreciate law and
order, and general conditions are on such a high level
that both trade and property values rise in conse-
quence.

The standard of living, hygiene, and comfort
within the European and Japanese quarters is the re-
sult of years of constructive energy, and control of
them should only be relinquished when there is a cer-
tainty of responsible government authorized to speak
for China as a whole. fc

In Mukden, Harbin, or in any of the cities, you
will see the perambulating restaurant; a coolie carries
a huge wickerwork table on his back, and a collection
of stale fish and shark's fins, liver of all kinds, meats

THE ERA OF CHANGE 75

boiled, baked, and roast, with spices of every kind to
tempt the appetite. He puts his table down in the
roadway, the customer chooses his dishes, pays the
price, and the restaurant goes on its way again. If
you are a gourmet you may prefer a pottage in which
rat is the principal ingredient, invaluable, so the Chi-
nese tell us, in cases of baldness, whilst a stewed black
cat will ward off a fever.

Beggars abound, for begging is a recognized pro-
fession throughout China. As the begging class is
one that might be a danger to the state, the Chinese,
who are an eminently practical race, place it under
the control of a headman who is responsible to the
local authority. This man accounts for the good con-
duct of the ragged and diseased army committed to
his charge, and enjoys considerable power in connec-
tion with his office. He reports periodically to the
governing authority, and arranges with shopkeepers
for the payment of a fixed sum monthly to his fol-
lowers, thus saving merchants and traders from being
pestered during business hours.

Should there be any refusal to pay the sum de-
manded the beggars soon bring the refractory one to
a sense of his obligations. A dirty and disheveled
party will appear and demand alms. Their malodorous
presence scares away customers, potential buyers can-
not get anywhere near the shop, whilst traffic is held
up, and all business is at a standstill.

If the shopkeeper still proves obdurate his resistance
is countered by an increase in the number of importu-

76 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

nates, who press their demands for charity until noth-
ing can be heard above the din. Finally he is forced
to capitulate, and the beggars retire with flying colors.

The Manchus, and those who have lived long in the
country, are essentially insular in their outlook, as,
indeed, are the people from each and every province
of China. They speak a different tongue from those
in the south, their outlook on life is different, and a
man from Mukden would not understand the Canton
dialect, nor be able to carry on a conversation with
one from Shanghai. But all alike, whether from
Peking, Canton, Nanking, Mukden, or Hankow, con-
sider themselves the real Chinese, and regard their
city much as the English public schoolboy regards his
Alma Mater with pride and veneration.

Back in the streets and lanes of Manchurian cities
there is an ever-moving panorama of passers-by, every
trench-like thoroughfare teems with its thousands,
mostly Chinese, of a uniform sallow complexion, and
almost without exception clothed in blue, black,
brown, or gray. In the summer heat thin clothes
are worn, and in the winter garments heavily padded
with cotton. If it gets colder another wadded suit
is added.

So it comes that all this teeming life and prosperity
in town and country have been initiated by the
exertions of Russia and Japan. The Japanese display
remarkable efficiency in the areas under their control,
and even the ways and means of the Soviet are superior

THE ERA OF CHANGE 77

to anything that Chinese administrative ability can
show.

To-day, as an outlet for surplus population it must
be said that Manchuria is more the home of the Chi-
nese. The influx of Chinese settlers continues with
unabated vigor. Under ordinary circumstances this
migration would prove the decisive factor in deciding
the ultimate fate of awakened Manchuria. But to-
day other and no less powerful influences are at work,
shaping the destiny of that land. Industrial and
strategic considerations cannot be ignored. Nor can
the fact that if China owns Manchuria, it is Japan
that has ushered in the new age.

CHAPTER HI

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA

AS the railways play the most important part in
r\ development of Manchuria we will mention
briefly the main lines along which flows the
increasing trade of the Three Provinces. Of these the
Chinese Eastern is the first, both from its original pur-
pose, and as the initial factor in opening up the coun-
try, whilst it is also the oldest concession line.

This railway, nine hundred miles in length, operat-
ing under Chino-Soviet joint management, traverses
the heart of North Manchuria with its terminus at
Vladivostok. It constitutes not only a section of the
trans-Asiatic route to Europe, but is the main factor
in exploitation of the virgin lands of North Man-
churia.

The Emperor Alexander III, father of the late
Czar Nicholas, was the driving force in the construc-
tion of the Trans-Siberian Railway to connect Euro-
pean Russia with the Pacific, and so anxious was he
to forward the plans that he appointed Count Witte
to be both Minister of Finance and Ways and Com-
munications. The Finance Minister, who had been
summarily dismissed, was actively opposed to the im-
mense undertaking, and appalled at the work and cost
involved in this project of railway construction.

78

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 79

Witte, in his double capacity, with a free hand and
none to interfere, concentrated on the task, and at
the audience with the Czar when full powers were
given him by the autocrat, he is said to have remarked,
"I will devote myself body and soul to the task."

The construction of the Ussuri Railway, which, as
reference to the map shows, connects Vladivostok
with Khabarovsk, commenced in May 1891, was fin-
ished under Witte's administration. In the meantime,
the Trans-Siberian had reached Trans-Baikalia, and
the question arose as to the direction the line should
now follow. Witte wished to carry it straight across
Manchuria to Vladivostok, as this was easier and
much more economical than taking it entirely
through Russian territory along the line of the Amur
River, which here makes a pronounced curve.

This route shortened the line by 570 miles, and
after the war with Japan, Russia in 1908 built the
Trans- Amur Railway, thus connecting Europe with
Vladivostok on Russian territory throughout. This
line, 1240 miles long, took eight years to build, and
cost three hundred million rubles.

The Chinese Eastern line having been completed,
a branch line from its central point at Harbin was
carried due south to Port Arthur and Dalny. This
line was known as the South Manchurian Railway,
and after the war of 1904-5 was ceded almost in its
entirety to the Japanese. The development and con-
structional work that Russia carried out in Manchuria
were colossal; the two lines in question, the creation

80 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

of Port Arthur as a naval station, the extensive fortifi-
cations, the conversion of the fishing village of Dalny
into one of the world's busiest ports, with its spacious
squares laid out like an American city, the wide av-
enues, and the docks and wharves, are a monument to
Russian activity and enterprise at that time.

Only the authority of an autocrat could have
brought about the transformation, and the appear-
ance of a magic city and port which were the talk
of the East.

There were no parliaments to hold up the scheme,
no committees to scrutinize the plans and subject
them to the pruning knife and the scissors. The order
was given, and the machinery of construction set in
motion. All the trades and professions, the skilled
intellect of architects and engineers, were mobilized,
with millions of rubles to carry the plans for cities,
railways, seaports, and terminus to a triumphal con-
clusion, and give to Russia the predominant position
in the Far East which she believed to be her destiny.

The South Manchurian Railway traverses the heart
of South Manchuria, with its terminus at Dalny, and
it connects with the railways running to China
proper, Korea, and northwards to Europe. It plays
the leading part in the growth of agricultural de-
velopment, and of the ever-increasing international
trade.

This line is the sheet anchor in the South Man-
churian coal and iron industries, besides giving em-
ployment directly and indirectly to many thousands

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 81

of Chinese who have been attracted from their own
provinces by the lure of Manchuria.

Then there is the Peking-Mukden line, 390 miles
in length, between Mukden and Shanhaikwan, where
the Great Wall terminates, which, with its branch
lines, was built with British capital. It also plays a
valuable part in development, but has suffered badly
at the hands of various Manchurian war lords, who
have confiscated the rolling stock, appropriated the
revenue, and acted in defiance of the British loan
agreement.

There are other and smaller lines for which the
Chinese have been mainly responsible with their own
capital, the idea having been to provide military lines
for operations in the endless civil strife.

The lines are being extended, and more railway
construction is in hand in Manchuria than in any
other part of the world.

The South Manchurian line is remarkable in more
ways than one; it is the most curious and complex
organization of its kind, for not only is it a railway
company, but conducts as accessory enterprises, coal
mines, iron works, docks, wharves, warehouses, and
is engaged in educational, hygienic, and other public
works. Running in connection with it are joint stock
companies, gas works, electric light institutions, and
hotels. In fact, it operates as a corporation, a rail-
way, and a political, economic, and commercial con-
cern, with a volume of business that is the largest of
its kind in the world. Its history is also to a large

82 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

extent that of Manchuria, for both are inseparably
bound together.

The line and its associated activities are a tribute to
Japanese enterprise, and for efficiency of administra-
tion it could not be surpassed. Incidentally, through
the agency of this and other lines Japan turns to good
account what she has learnt from the Western world,
and there is no more apt pupil at applying knowledge
as a vital force in the opening up of Manchuria.

The South Manchurian Railway lives through
thrilling times, for it is frequently raided by Chinese
bandits, of the Hunhut type, who move in bodies of
fifty to a hundred strong, holding up trains whenever
the opportunity offers. In the past five years there
have been over twelve hundred raids, so the Japanese
have their hands full, and it is a marvel how they
maintain the services in such an efficient condition.

Much controversy has arisen over Japanese aims
and objects in Manchuria; the searchlight of investi-
gation has been turned on to their movements, both
political and military, in that country, and the world
is wondering whether their ultimate object is domi-
nation in Eastern Asia, or if the course they have
mapped out is merely an altruistic one. In our en-
deavor to arrive at an impartial verdict, we must take
into account the situation as we find it, and, as the
Japanese Emperor himself expresses it, be circumspect
in all things.

It is therefore necessary to take stock of a remark-
able document, one of the most sensational that has

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 83

appeared amongst all the many statements concerned
with the colonization, development, and general ex-
ploitation of a new continental empire of the East.
This document was issued as the outcome of a confer-
ence held in June 1927 in Tokyo, which all officials,
both civil and military, who were directly or in-
directly connected with Manchuria, and the adjacent
country of Mongolia, attended.

In the course of our review we have dealt with the
Nine-Power Treaty to which Japan was a party, but,
from the above document, apparently an unwilling
one. It placed restrictions upon their activities in
Manchuria, it hampered the ultimate aims and objects
they had in view, and the situation thus created called
for immediate action.

The Emperor Taisho therefore convened a meeting
to discover ways and means by which the new order
of things could be circumvented, and the course of
Japanese policy in Manchuria, prepared with such
skill and forethought over a period of many years,
go on unchecked, in the fullness of time to bear the
fruit to which the Japanese so ardently look forward.
A mission was sent to Europe to sound in a manner
so easy to the Oriental, masters in the art of secret
diplomacy and discovering what is in the other man's
mind, what the attitude of the leading European
Powers might be; it was instructed to proceed to
America, for the United States was an uncertain
quantity. Its attitude towards China, and the sym-
pathy displayed for that broken-up land, left an im-

84 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

pression in Japan that opposition might very easily
be met with from America.

The memorial begins with a brief but pointed re-
view of the political and economic situation of Japan
subsequent to the war, which, it declares, is due to
the omission to take advantage of special privileges in
Manchuria and Mongolia.

"Manchuria and Mongolia include the provinces of
Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungkiang, with Outer and
Inner Mongolia, a total area of 74,000 square miles
and a population of 28,000,000. It is three times as
large as our own territory, with only one-third as
many people.

"The advantage is not merely in the scarcity of
population; nowhere in the world is there such wealth
in mines, agriculture, and timber. To make the most
of these resources for the perpetuation of our national
glory we created the South Manchurian Railway.
The total sum invested in our undertakings in rail-
way, shipping, mining, forestry, steel manufacture,
agriculture, *and cattle farming, as schemes claiming
to be mutually beneficial to China and Japan,
amounts to 440,000,000 yen. In effect it is the great-
est single investment, and the bulwark of our coun-
try's organization.

"Although nominally the enterprise is under the
joint ownership of the Government and the people,
in reality the Government has complete power and
authority. The South Manchurian Railway has a pe-
culiar position, with powers analogous to those of the

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 85

Governor-General of Korea, and authority to con-
duct diplomatic, police, and ordinary administrative
functions, so that it may carry out our imperialist
policies. This fact alone is sufficient to indicate the
immense interests we have in Manchuria and Mon-
golia.

"Therefore, the policies of successive administra-
tions towards this country since the time of Meiji are
all based on his injunctions, elaborating and continu-
ously completing the development of the new conti-
nental empire, to further the advance of our national
glory and prosperity for countless generations to

come."

The report then states that the restrictions imposed
by the Nine-Power Treaty, signed at the Washington
Conference in 1922, reduced Japanese special rights
and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an
extent that there is no freedom for the nation.

"The very existence of our country is endangered.
Unless these obstacles are removed, our national life
will be insecure, and our strength will not develop.
Moreover, the sources of wealth are in North Man-
churia; without the right of way here we cannot tap
the riches of this country. Even the resources of
South Manchuria, which we won by the Russo- Japa-
nese War, will also be greatly restricted by the Nine-
Power Treaty. The result is that while our people
cannot move into Manchuria as they please, the Chi-
nese are coming in like a flood. Hordes of them come
into the three eastern provinces, approximating sev-

86 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

eral millions annually. To such an extent have they
jeopardized our acquired rights in Manchuria and
Mongolia that our annual surplus population of 700,-
000 has no outlet. If we do not formulate plans to
immediately check the influx of Chinese immigrants,
in five years" time the number of Chinese will exceed
sixty millions. Then we shall be faced with greater
difficulties in Manchuria and Mongolia."

Premier Tanaka then describes his journey to
Europe and America to ascertain the views of the
Powers towards the Nine-Power Treaty, as regards
Japanese influence in Manchuria and Mongolia, of his
return to Japan through Shanghai, where he narrowly
escaped death at the hands of a Chinese assassin, and
his subsequent recommendations to the Emperor.

"The three eastern provinces are politically the im-
perfect spot in the Far East; to safeguard ourselves,
as well as others, Japan cannot remove the difficulties
in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of 'Blood
and Iron." In carrying this out we have to face the
United States which has been turned against us by
China's policy of fighting poison with poison.

"In the future if we wish to control China the
primary move is to crush the United States, just as
in the past we had to fight the Russo-Japanese War.
But to conquer China we must first take Manchuria
and Mongolia. If we conquer China the rest of the
Asiatic countries, and those of the South Seas, will
fear us and surrender. Then the world will realize
that Eastern Asia is ours, and will not dare to violate

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 87

our rights. This is the plan left to us by the Emperor
Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national

existence."

The memorial proceeds to state that the Nine-
Power Treaty expressed the spirit of commercial
rivalry, and emphasized Japanese trade rather than
rights in China, If, it says, Japan merely hopes to
develop trade she will eventually be defeated by Eng-
land and America, who possess unsurpassed wealth.
ct ln the end we shall get nothing. A more dangerous
factor is the possible awakening of the Chinese people;
when we remember that the Chinese are our cus-
tomers we must beware lest China one day become
unified, and her industries prosperous. Americans
and Europeans will compete with us; our trade in
China will be wrecked.

"The way to gain actual rights in Manchuria and
Mongolia is to use this region as a base, and under the
pretense of trade and commerce penetrate to the rest
of China. Armed with the rights already held we
shall seize the resources all over the country. With
the latter at our disposal, we shall proceed to conquer
India, Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe.
But, if the Yamato race wishes to distinguish itself
in continental Asia it must first get control of Man-
churia and Mongolia; to secure the permanent pros-
perity of our empire the only method is by a positive
policy towards these two countries.

"Considered historically, Manchuria and Mongolia
are neither Chinese territory nor their special posses-

88 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

sions. Dr. Yano has made a wide study of Chinese
history, and came to the positive conclusion that
neither were Chinese territory. This fact was an-
nounced to the world on the authority of the Imperial
University. The accuracy of Dr. Yano's investiga-
tions are such that no Chinese scholars have con-
tested his statement. However, the most unfortunate
thing in our declaration of war with Russia was that
the Japanese Government openly recognized Chinese
sovereignty over these regions, and again later on at
the Washington Conference when we signed the
Nine-Power Treaty. Owing to these two miscalcu-
lations, on our part, Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria
and Mongolia is established diplomatically, but our
interests have suffered serious injury.

** Although the Chinese speak of the five races of
their dominions, nevertheless Tibet, Chinese Turke-
stan, Mongolia, and Manchuria, have always been
special areas, the sovereign power remaining with the
local rulers. So long as they retain administrative
functions the sovereign rights are clearly in their
hands; we may regard, and negotiate with, them as the
ruling power, for rights and privileges. "We must
recognize, and support them as the ruling power.

"Since Manchuria and Mongolia are still in the
hands of the former princes we must back them up.
For this reason the daughter of General Fukishima,
Governor of Kwantung, risked her life among the
barbarous Mongolian people of Tushiyeh to become
adviser to their prince, so that she might serve the

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 89

Imperial Government. As the wife of the prince
ruler is the niece of the Manchu Prince Su, the re-
lationship between our Government and the Mon-
golian princes becomes very intimate. The princes
of Inner and Outer Mongolia have all shown sincere
respect for us, especially after we attracted them by
special benefits and protection.

"Now there are nineteen Japanese retired military
officers in the house of the Tushiyeh. We have al-
ready acquired monopoly rights for the purchase of
wool, for real estate and mines. Hereafter we shall
secretly send more retired officers to live among them.
They should wear Chinese clothes in order to escape
the attention of the Mukden Government. Scattered
in the territory of the princes they can engage them-
selves in farming, herding, or dealing in wool. As
to the other principalities we can employ the same
method as in Tushiyeh. Everywhere we should sta-
tion our retired military officers to dominate the
princes* affairs. After a large number of our people
have moved into Outer and Inner Mongolia we shall
be able to purchase land at one-tenth of its value, and
begin to cultivate rice where feasible to relieve our
shortage of food supply. Where the land is unsuit-
able for rice cultivation we should develop it for cattle
raising, and horse breeding, so as to replenish our
military needs. The rest of the land might be devoted
to the manufacture of canned goods for export to
Europe and America. The supplies of fur and leather
would also meet our needs. Once the opportunity

90 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

comes, Outer and Inner Mongolia will be definitely
ours. While the sovereign rights are not clearly de-
fined, and the Chinese and Soviet Governments have
their attention engaged elsewhere it is our opportu-
nity to quietly build up our influence. Once we have
purchased most of the land there will be no room for
dispute as to whether Mongolia belongs to the Japa-
nese or the Mongolians. Aided by our military
prowess we shall realize our positive policy.**

More interesting revelations continue on the policy
of peaceful penetration, gradual acquisition of land,
and appropriation of a large sum from the secret
service funds to enable four hundred retired officers,
disguised as teachers and Chinese citizens, to proceed
to Outer and Inner Mongolia, gain the confidence of
princes and people, and lay the foundation of Japa-
nese national interests for the next hundred years.

The memorial considers that President Wilson's
declaration of the self-determination of races re-
sembled a divine revelation to suppressed peoples, so
that the spirit of unrest spread abroad, particularly
in Korea. The Japanese, with the perspicacity of
their race, drew lessons from the rebellion in Korea,
and a more conciliatory policy, with a view to utilizing
the Koreans in the campaign of peaceful penetration,
is advocated.

An illuminating passage gives the railway schemes
for all Manchuria, their part in military, political, and
economic development, and the prevention of Russian
influence. "Although the power of Soviet Russia is

fr

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 91

declining, her ambitions in Manchuria and Mongolia
have not lessened one iota. Moreover, according to a
Soviet secret declaration, although they have no terri-
torial ambition, they must retain a hold on the Chi-
nese Eastern Railway, for Vladivostok is their only
seaport in the Far East which gives them the foothold
on the Pacific/'

The memorial declares that a conflict with Soviet
Russia in the near future is inevitable. "In that event
we shall again play our part in the Russo-Japanese
War; the Chinese Eastern Railway will become ours
as the South Manchurian line did last time. It seems
a necessary step that we should draw swords with
Russia in Mongolia, to gain the wealth of North
Manchuria, for, until this rock is blown up, our ship
is denied smooth sailing."

A detailed program for the building of railways
then follows, with plans for mobilization and strate-
gical moves in the regions in question, so as to gain
complete commercial, political, and financial control.

That part of the memorial dealing with the pro-
jected railways is of such interest, and throws such
sidelights on every aspect of the Manchurian problem,
that we give it in detail.

"Tungliao-Jehol Railway. This line is 447 miles
long, and when completed will be of great value in
our development of Inner Mongolia. It is the most
important of all the lines in the undertaking. Ac-
cording to careful surveys of the War Department
there are large tracts of land in Inner Mongolia suit-

92 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

able for cultivation. With proper development there
will be room for twenty millions of our people.
There is also the possibility of producing annually two
million head of cattle, available for food supply and
for export to Europe and America. Wool also is a
special product; it is far superior to that of Australia
and its low cost, high quality, and abundance, make
Mongolia a potential source of great wealth in wool.
"When this industry is facilitated by railway develop-
ment, the total production will increase at least ten-
fold. We have withheld this knowledge from the rest
of the world, lest England and America compece with
us.

"Therefore we must first control the transportation
and then develop the wool industry. By the time
other countries are aware of it it will already be too
late to act. When this railway is in our hands we
can develop the wool industry, not only for personal
needs but for export elsewhere. Moreover, our aim
in joining hands with Mongolia can be realized. This
railway is a matter of life and death to our policy;
without it we can have no part in the development
of Mongolia.

"Suolun-Taonan Railway. This line is 136 miles
long. Looking at the future of Japan a war with
Russia over Northern Manchuria is inevitable. From
a military standpoint this line will not only enable us
to threaten the Russian rear, but will cut off re-
enforcements. Looked at economically it will place
within our reach the wealth of the Tao-er-ho valley;

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 53

our hope of working hand in hand with the Mon-
golian princes, of acquiring lands, mines, and pastur-
age, and developing trade with the natives, as
preliminary steps for later penetration, all depend
upon this line. Together with the Tungliao-Jehol
Railway they will form two supplementary routes
into Mongolia. When the industries are fully de-
veloped we shall extend our interests into Outer Mon-
golia. But the danger of this line is that it might
give facilities for Chinese migration into a new re-
gion, and defeat our own policy.

"The redeeming feature, however, is the fact that
lands and mines along this railway are in the hands
of the Mongolian princes; if we first gain possession
of them we need not fear Chinese immigration.
Moreover, we can make the princes pass laws discrimi-
nating against Chinese immigrants. When life there
is made miserable for the Chinese they will naturally
leave for places far off. There are other methods to
bar the Chinese; only, if we try hard enough no
Chinese footprints will be found on Mongolian soil.

"A section of the Changchun-Taonan Railway. As
this line runs from Changchun to Fuyu and Talai,
the section between Changchun and Taonan is 131
miles. It is immensely important from an economic
standpoint, for the wealth of Manchuria lies in the
north. It will give us easy access thereto, and, at the
same time, prejudice the Chinese Eastern Railway to
the benefit of the South Manchurian line. It runs
through the upper valley of the Sungari River where

94 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

the soil is fertile and agricultural products abound.
Further, in the neighborhood of Talai there are the
Yueh-liang Falls ready to be harnessed for electric
power. That this section of the line will be a pros-
perous center for industry and agriculture is beyond
all doubt. After the completion of this line we can
make Talai a base, and advance on Siberia by three
routes, i.e. Taonan, Anshan, and Tsitsihar. The
wealth of North Manchuria will pass to us. This
will be the first line of advance to Heilungkiang,
forming a circuit with the railway between Chang-
chun and Taonan, which will be admirably adapted
for military purposes when we penetrate into Mon-
golia. This line is thinly populated, but the land is
rich and extensive; no fertilizer will be required on
the farms for the next fifty years. Possession of this
railway ensures all the wealth of North Manchuria
and Mongolia.

"Here there is room for at least another thirty
million people. When the Tunhua Railway is com-
pleted, and is linked with the line running to Hueining
in Korea, everything will be brought to the doors of
Tokyo and Osaka by direct routes. In time of war
our troops could be dispatched direct to North Man-
churia and Mongolia via the Sea of Japan, forestalling
any contemplated entry of Chinese forces into North
Manchuria.

"Nor could American or Russian submarines enter
the Korean Straits. The moment the railways between
Kirin and Hueining, and the line from Chang-

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 95

chun to Talai, are completed, we shall be self-support-
ing in foodstuffs and raw materials. We shall have
no worries in the event of war with any country.

"Kirin-Hueining Railway. Although the Kirin-
Tunhua line exists, the Tunhua-Hueining line has yet
to be built. Hitherto those going to Europe have to
pass through Dairen or Vladivostok; now they can
travel direct from Chmgchinkang via the Siberian
Railway. When we have control of this great system
of transportation we need make no secret of our de-
sign on Manchuria and Mongolia according to the
third step of Meiji's plans. In accordance with his
last will our first step was to conquer Formosa and the
second to annex Korea. With both these completed
the third step has yet to be taken, and that is the con-
quest of Manchuria, Mongolia, and China.

"In history the people of Kirin, Fengtien 9 and part
of Heilungkiang are called Sushan; they are now scat-
tered along the coast and in the basins of the Amur
and Tumen rivers. The ancestors of the Manchurian
dynasty also originated in that neighborhood; they
gained control of Kirin and then firmly established
themselves in China for three hundred years. If we
wish to effect our continental policy we must note
this historical fact, and, like them, proceed to establish
ourselves in that region. Hence the necessity for the
Kirin-Hueining Railway.

"We are free to decide whether the terminus of this
line be at Chingchin or Lochin, or even Hsuingchi.
From the standpoint of national defense Lochin seems

96 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

to be the ideal harbor and terminus. Eventually it
will be the best harbor in the world. On the one
hand, it will ruin Vladivostok, on the other it will
be the center of wealth of North Manchuria and
Mongolia.

"Moreover, Dairen is not yet our own territory,
and Manchuria not yet a part of our empire. There-
fore we should be in a precarious situation in time of
war. The enemy could blockade the Tsushima and
Senchima Straits, and we should be cut off from the
supplies of Manchuria and Mongolia. Not having
the resources there at our command we should be
vanquished, especially as England and the United
States have worked hand in hand to limit our action
in every possible direction. For the sake of self-
preservation, and to impart a warning to China and
the rest of the world, we must sooner or later fight
America. The American Asiatic squadron stationed
in the Philippines is within a stone's throw of Tsu-
shima and Senchima. If they dispatch submarines to
those points our supplies of foodstuffs and raw mate-
rials from Manchuria and Mongolia will be entirely
cut off.

"With the completion of the Kirin-Hueining line
there is a wide circuit line through all Manchuria and
Korea, and a smaller circuit through Northern Man-
churia. We shall thus have access in all directions,
with freedom for the transport of men and material
alike. With supplies thus transported by this route
to our ports at Tsuruga and Nigata hostile submarines

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 97

will find no way of getting into the Japanese and
Korean Straits.

"We are then entirely free from interference; this
is what is meant by making the Sea of Japan the center
and focus of our national defense. Having assured
the uninterrupted transportation of food and raw
materials we shall have nothing to fear either from
the American Navy, because of its size, or from a
Chinese or Russian army by reason of its numbers.

"Manchuria and Mongolia are the Belgium of the
Far East. In the Great War Belgium was the battle-
field; in our wars with Russia and the United States
we must also make Manchuria and Mongolia suffer
the ravages. As it is evident that we have to violate
the neutrality of these territories we must, to be pre-
pared militarily, build the Kirin-Hueining and
Changchun-Talai lines. In time of war we can easily
increase our forces, and in peace time can transfer
thousands upon thousands of people into this region.
This line offers the key to economic development, as
well as to military conquest.

"Now let us consider the economic interests along
the Kirin-Hueining line. According to the careful
investigations of our General Staff, and the South
Manchurian Railway, the total reserve of timber is
200,000,000 tons; if a million tons are felled yearly
and imported to Japan it will last two hundred years.
This will stop the import of American timber which
has been costing us eighty to one hundred million yen
per annum. Although our information is reliable we

98 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

cannot make it known to the world, for, if it comes
to the knowledge of Russia or China that we import
so much timber from America, they would endeavor
to interfere with the construction of this line.

"The United States might also purchase from the
Fengtien Government the timber rights to protect
their own trade with us, or secure a monopoly and,
incidentally, kill our paper industry.

"Kirin was known as the "ocean of trees* even in
the days of the Emperor Chien Lung. In addition to
the original forests, there is the growth in the inter-
vening years since that time.

"Imagine the vastness of the resources!

"In addition there are the Hsin Chin coal mines;
a reserve of 600,000,000 tons, excellent in quality,
easy to excavate, and lending itself to the extraction
of petroleum, agricultural fertilizers, and other chem-
ical by-products, available for home consumption,
and for sale in China. There are many other advan-
tages accruing from the construction of the Kirin-
Hueining line; it is all gain without labor. "With these
coal mines under our control we hold the key to the
industries of all China.

"Hunchun-Hailing Railway. This has a length of
170 miles; all along it are thick forests. This line is
needed both to strengthen the Kirin-Hueining Rail-
way, and to exploit the forests and mines of North
Manchuria. It is also urgently required to transfer
the prosperity of Vladivostok to Hueining. The
climax of prosperity, however, is that south of

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 99

Naining and north of Tunhua, there is the Lake Ching
Po which can be utilized for the generation of electric
power. With the latter we shall dominate the agri-
cultural and industrial undertakings of the whole of
Manchuria and Mongolia."

The memorial then deals with the trade in Man-
churia, which it states is seven to eight billion yen
per annum, "all of which is in our hands.'* "The
trade we do in wool, cotton, soya beans, bean-cakes,
and iron forms one-twentieth of the total volume of
world trade."

Next we are shown "the first steps in gaining finan-
cial and commercial control of Manchuria and Mon-
golia, which lie in the monopoly sale of their products.
These we must have before we can carry out our
continental policy, and obviate the influx of Ameri-
can capital, as well as the influence of Chinese traders.

tc Although the products of both Manchuria and
Mongolia may pass through any of the three ports of
Dairen, Yingko, and Antung, nevertheless Dairen
holds the key to the situation. Every year 7,200 ships
touch at this port, with a total tonnage of eleven and
a half millions, representing 70 per cent of the total
trade of Manchuria and Mongolia. Fifteen sea routes
radiate from it. We have in our grasp the entire
transportation system of Manchuria and Mongolia.
The monopoly sale of Manchurian products will
eventually come into our hands. Then the vast quan-
tities of beans, upon which Central and Southern
China depend, will be subject to us; the Chinese are

100 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

an oil-eating people, and in time of war we can cut
off their oil supply and the life of the whole country
will become intolerable.

"Bean-cakes are important as fertilizers for rice
cultivation; if we control the source of supply, as
well as the transport, we can increase our rice pro-
duction by a cheap supply of bean-cakes, and
the fertilizers manufactured as a by-product at the
Fushun coal mines. In this way we shall have the
work of all agricultural China dependent upon us.
In case of war we can place an embargo on bean-cakes
and mineral fertilizers, prohibiting their export to
Central and South China. Then Chinese production
of f oodstuflfs will be greatly reduced. This is one way
of building up our continental empire which we must
not overlook. We should remember that Europe and
America also need large quantities of beans and bean-
cakes. When we have a monopoly of the supplies and
full control of the transportation, both on land and
sea, the countries requiring the special products of
Manchuria and Mongolia will have to seek our good-
will. To be paramount in the trade we must have
control of the transportation system. Only then will
the Chinese merchants be under our thumb.

"We must overthrow Manchuria's inconvertible
silver notes and divest the Government of its pur-
chasing power. Then we can extend the use of our
gold notes * in the hope of dominating the economic

1 It is of interest to note that Japan has recently been forced to abandon
the gold standard

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 101

and financial activities of Manchuria and Mongolia.
Further, we can compel the authorities of the three
eastern provinces to employ Japanese financial ad-
visers to assist us in gaining financial supremacy.
When the Chinese notes are displaced our gold notes
will take their place.

"It has been our traditional policy to exclude from
Manchuria and Mongolia investments of any third
Power, but, since the Nine-Power Treaty is based on
equal opportunity for all, the underlying principle
of the International Consortium, which regards
Manchuria and Mongolia as outside its sphere, becomes
anachronistic. We are constantly under the watch-
ful eyes of the Powers and every step taken arouses
suspicion. It would therefore be well for us to invite
foreign investments in such enterprises as the de-
velopment of electrical power, and the manufacture
of alkalis. By using American and European capital
we can further our plans for the development of
Manchuria and Mongolia; moreover, we shall thereby
allay international suspicion and clear the way for
larger plans, and induce the Powers to recognize the
fact of our special position. Whilst welcoming any
Power wishing to make investments we must not allow
China to deal with the leading Powers at her will. In
view of our desire for the Powers to recognize our
special position in Manchuria and Mongolia, both in
political and economic spheres, we are compelled to
intervene and share all responsibility with her. To

102 MANCHURIA- THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

make this a matter of customary diplomatic practice
is another important policy for us."

The memorial, speaking of the enterprises of the
South Manchurian Railway, says: "Iron and steel are
closely connected with national development. Every
country attaches great importance to them, but be-
cause of the lack of ores we have found no solution
to this problem. Hitherto we have had to import
steel from the Yangtze Valley and the Malay Penin-
sula, but according to a secret survey of our general
staff a wealth of iron deposits are found in many
places in Manchuria and Mongolia, a conservative esti-
mate of the reserve being ten billion tons.

"The iron deposits are estimated at 1,200,000 tons,
and the coal at 2,500,000,000 tons. With such large
amounts at our disposal we should be self-supporting
for at least seventy years.

"Another important commodity which we lack is
petroleum; it is essential to the existence of a nation.
Fortunately there are in the Fushun coal mines 5,200,-
000,000 tons of shale oil from which oil may be
extracted.

"From the standpoint of national defense and na-
tional wealth, petroleum is a great factor. "With the
iron and petroleum of Manchuria our army and navy
will be impregnable walls of defense. That Man-
churia and Mongolia are the heart and soul of our
empire is a truism.

"According to independent surveys magnesium and
aluminium are promising. The deposits in our terri-

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 103

tory of Manchuria and Mongolia are nothing less than
a God-given gift. After we have gained control of
the Yalu River in the three eastern provinces we can
harness the water power to work these metal ores. In
view of the development of aircraft the world will,
in the future, come to us for the materials necessary
for aeronautics."

The memorial deals with railway functions in the
problem of immigration, and to encourage the latter
rapid transportation is essential. "This will both
afford facilities to our people and bring the natural
resources to market. Moreover, both Russia and our-
selves have been increasing our armaments. Owing
to our geographical positions we have conflicting
interests. If we wish to obtain the wealth of North
Manchuria, and build up the new continent according
to the will of the Emperor Meiji, we must first rush
our people there and endeavor to break the friendship
between China and Russia. In this way we can enjoy
the wealth of North Manchuria and hold at bay both
Russia and China.

"In the event of war our immigrants in North
Manchuria will combine with our forces in the south
and at one stroke settle the problem for all time.
Where this is found to be impracticable they can still
hold their own in North Manchuria and supply us
with foodstuffs and raw materials.

"As the interests of Japan and North Manchuria
are so interwoven we should march directly into the
latter country and pursue our settled policy."

106 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

dating, could possibly have accepted them without
sinking to the state of a subservient vassal. The de-
mands were subsequently modified, as the result of
protest from the West once their nature became
known.

Yuan Shi Kai, the President, when the demands
were submitted to him at night, flatly refused to ac-
cede to them, and only after the presentation of an
ultimatum were the Japanese able to secure their ac-
ceptance in a modified form.

The treaty rights so gained are really the crux of
the Manchurian dispute, and successive Governments
which have wielded temporary and precarious author-
ity in Peking, Nanking, and elsewhere, have declined
to consider them as in any way binding on the people
or Government. Their protests to Europe and Amer-
ica eventually resulted in a clause in the Nine-Power
Treaty, binding all the contracting parties with rights,
privileges, or interests of any kind in China, to respect
the policy of the Open Door, originated, as we have
seen, by John Hay, U. S. Secretary of State, in 1900.
They also undertook, and this was inserted doubtless
owing to the Japanese action in 191?, to agree to "full
and frank communication on eviry occasion when the
full application of the treaty was involved/*

This treaty is remarkable in that it really originated
as the result of the secret presentation of those no-
torious Twenty-One Demands, and the necessity for
insuring against a repetition of such unparalleled
action. Under its terms, as well as by those of the

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 107

Covenant of the League of Nations, Japan agreed to
consult with other nations concerned prior to under-
taking any naval or military operations in or against
China. That she has omitted to do so in the case of
the military operations in Manchuria is due to the war
party having forced the pace, and precipitated action
with which the civil authorities are not entirely in
accord.

We now come to the question of racial rivalries
as between Chinese and Japanese, and the relative
acumen in business and commercial ability.

To appreciate the mentality of both peoples in re-
gard to economic development, at which the Japanese
are such adepts, it should be explained that the dis-
inclination of the Chinese to admit foreign capital
and exploratory enterprise in any form, whether it be
in Manchuria or elsewhere, arises from the deep-rooted
conviction that this will bring with it alien influence
and domination, with which concessions in the past
have been accompanied. Whilst admitting that the
introduction of foreign capital is desirable, they fear
the simultaneous rise of diplomatic difficulties and
dangers.

It is unlikely that development, other than under
European or Japanese supervision, could take place,
for so widespread is the practice of bribery and cor-
ruption that investors would be lacking for a purely
Chinese enterprise, despite the fact that under the
agreement concluded between China and Great
Britain in 1902, British subjects investing in, and a

108 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

party to, Chinese ventures shall be under the same
obligations as the Chinese participants and entitled to
the same privileges. There are, of course, large sums
of British capital invested in sugar and rubber com-
panies in the Straits Settlements, but conditions there
are so entirely different from the chaotic state preva-
lent in China that no comparison is possible.

Generally speaking, where the development of the
country is concerned the Chinese are hostile only to
those schemes that appear to be prompted by ulterior
motives; anything in the nature of a sound business
proposition, entirely divorced from relation to land or
territorial issues, receives approval. To ensure success
and continuity in management both Europeans and
Japanese have seen the necessity for personal control;
Chinese business methods are in a class by themselves,
and, although admirable in their way, and often
superior to those of their Japanese rivals, are not easy
of mastery by Europeans. For example, industries in
China are either on a basis of single proprietary rights,
or a system of partnership, and only in rare instances
is there anything in the nature of a joint stock com-
pany. This is due to China being in the initial stage
of industrial life, the development of modern enter-
prises still lying before her.

As merchants and traders the Chinese are outstand-
ing examples of honor and devotion to a sense of their
obligations. Their word is as good as their bond, and
once an obligation has been incurred they never deny
it. Cashiers of banks, and other institutions where

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 109

there is much money passing, are invariably Chinese,
and as managers they are both quick and reliable.

The Chinese are not a people who indulge in ex-
tensive schemes, nor are they keen on development,
whether it be of land or trade, to anything approach-
ing the extent common in the West. Plans for the
creation of public works, the exploitation of minerals,
and opening up of vast coalfields, fail to interest them.
In that respect there is no initiative, and the requisite
driving force must come from Japan or the West.

On the other hand, the Japanese are a race of differ-
ent caliber, despite the fact that both in mode of life,
in dress, and in general aspect there is a strong re-
semblance. Like the Chinese, the Japanese are intel-
lectual, and even amongst the lower classes the level
of intelligence is at least as high, if not higher, than
in other nations. They are extraordinarily adaptive,
whilst their ingenuity and powers of application to
new ways and means, and utilizing what they have
learned from the West, are well known.

A dominating force with the Japanese is patriotism,
an unknown quantity amongst the Chinese, amongst
whom there is no public spirit or subordination to the
common good, a great disadvantage to a nation in
the making.

Permeating all classes of Japanese society, from the
highest to the lowest, is a moral force that governs the
conduct of the nation as a whole, a form of religion
handed down through the centuries, a code of ethics
that puts the state before the individual, inspires the

110 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

utmost courage in face of the enemy or in any situa-
tion where the good of the country is involved, whilst
it teaches the recognition of authority and subordina-
tion of private interests.

This knightly code of honor dates back to an era
long before the dawn of Christianity, but it is not so
much a religion as a philosophy, that knows nothing
of the bitterness of religious persecution. It confines
itself to loyalty and devotion to those in superior au-
thority, and to the imperial house in the person of the
emperor, the representative of the oldest dynasty in
the world, which goes back for nearly three thousand
years. The Articles of the Japanese Constitution tell
us that "the sacred throne was established at the time
when the heavens and the earth became separated,
that the emperor is heaven-descended, divine and
sacred, that he is preeminent above all his subjects,
and must be reverenced and remain inviolable/*

The Japanese people are in accord with these senti-
ments, which account for the strength of what lies
behind all their movements, and largely explains the
underlying motives inspiring their actions in peace
and war.

Although not original they are acutely imitative,
and can assimilate with remarkable ease the outward
and visible signs of Western civilization. Professor
Nitobe in his authoritative work on Japan, declares
it to be true that in a sense the Japanese certainly
possess imitativeness. "What progressive nation has
not possessed and made use of it?'* "Just think of

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 111

how little Greek culture has originated on Hellenic
soil! It seems to me that the most original that is
the least imitative people are the Chinese, and we
see where their originality has led them. Imitation
is educative, and education itself is, in the main, imi-
tation. We shudder to think what might have been
our fate, in this cannibalistic age of nations, had we
always been consistently original. Imitation has cer-
tainly been the means of our salvation."

Turning again to the resemblance between the
Chinese and Japanese races, both sprang from the
same Mongolian stock, and living as they do in such
close proximity, have long been associated in peace
and war, with the Japanese improving upon what
they acquired from China and elsewhere. This
inter aha, is notable in the lacquer trade in which
Japan soon went ahead of her Chinese instructors,
the art of porcelain making brought from Korea and
developed in Japan to a far greater extent than was
possible with the Koreans. There are other examples
of this dual acquisition and improvement, not the
least being the silk industry, which Japanese traders
and observers brought from Europe and advanced
to a state of perfection.

The Japanese are in evidence in the markets of
China, and are found in all the important quarters,
the military and naval schools imparting the knowl-
edge originally acquired from the West, of which
such remarkable use has been made.

We have seen the interest Japan has always evinced

112 MANCHURIA- THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

in China, and how the republic has been traversed
by agents inquiring into, and reporting on, commer-
cial as well as political possibilities. It has also been
shown that the future of Japan is largely dependent
upon her retention of the Chinese market, and its
expansion in her favor. Japan is unsuited for agri-
culture, and with an ever-increasing population she
must seek her future in industrial development. To
that end she is therefore engaged in transition from
an agricultural to an industrial state.

The Japanese are slowly but surely growing in
China, moving along with that country, and identi-
fying themselves with the mainspring of its national
life.

First-hand knowledge of China and Japan, more
particularly with the parts of the Chinese republic
which are the centers of activity, has revealed the
steps taken to develop Japanese trade by the forma-
tion of banking institutions to finance it, and so
prove a medium for Japanese commerce. In Mon-
golia the Japanese have been particularly active with
a view to the acquisition of the old Russian rights.
Great efforts are also being made there to gain a trad-
ing monopoly, and build up an unrivaled commercial
position in East Asia.

We should touch briefly on the Russian aspect in
the Far Eastern drama. Associated with either
Chinese or Japanese the Russians make a strangely
assorted couple, so different in thought and being,

THE PROMISED LAND OF ASIA 113

and with an outlook on life which is the antithesis of
their neighbors.

The Russian has never been persona grata in the
East; his ways and methods have filled the Eastern
people with alarm, he was too dominating, he paid
scant attention to their feelings, and was scornfully
oblivious of the rights and privileges they held in
their own land.

With the passing of the old Russian regime we
have to consider anew the relative positions of Russia
and China, at any rate in the outlook for the future.
We shall not attempt to analyze so vast a problem,
since the possibilities of the future cannot be gauged.

In Manchuria the Russian influence has to a large
extent been eliminated, and their prestige has fallen,
the collapse dating from 1905, with the cumulative
effect of all that has happened since that date.

The all-powerful factor in Manchuria to-day,
moving with steady measured step and the organiza-
tion that skill and forethought gives them, with a
definite object, and determined to gain it, is Japan,
who, endowed with the essentials in strength, tenac-
ity, and a clearly defined purpose, is gradually assum-
ing the paramount place in Manchuria and East Asia
for which she has fought so hard and endured so
much.

CHAPTER IV

MAISTCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY

WITH the three essential factors natural re-
sources and fertility, foreign capital, and
abundant supplies of labor all available,
the development of Manchuria, industrially and com-
mercially, has in the past twenty years proceeded at
a tempo which, so far as Asia is concerned, can be
compared only to the meteoric rise of Japanese in-
dusty during the latter half of the last century. The
guiding hand in the task of tapping the resources of
these northern provinces has been the same. What-
ever the motives which impelled the Japanese to
devote their money and energy to fostering the eco-
nomic growth of this richest region of China, it
remains true that without the initiative and enter-
prise of the maritime nation, Manchuria would not
occupy the position of economic preeminence in the
Pacific which is hers to-day.

This economic importance is due primarily to an
accident of history. True, her soil will always be
fertile, and her natural resources, as detailed figures
in this chapter show, are enormous. But the contrast
between the wealth of Manchuria and the compara-
tive poverty, in natural resources, of other parts of
China, is directly attributable to the fact that until

114

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 115

recently Manchuria was a "virgin land" in which
foreign trade was forbidden, and agriculture the only
activity, whereas China proper, with its teeming
population, was to a large extent "worked out" gen-
erations ago. While the Chinese drew out the mineral
wealth of the empire, Manchuria remained empty,
and her natural resources untapped. The province
might have continued in that unchanging era but
for the ever-expanding activities of the industrial
nations in search of new markets, and the impera-
tive need of the rising Japan to find fresh sources of
food supply for her rapidly growing population, and
outlets for the products of her factories. That
double challenge unlocked the wealth of Manchuria
and raised the region to a position of importance in
the Far East which her rulers neither sought nor, per-
haps, desired.

The measure by which one may gauge the eco-
nomic importance of Manchuria to-day, and the
rapidity of development in the past decade, is the
soya bean. The soya bean, be it noted, would not
have attained the position of importance it occupies
on the balance sheet of Manchurian trade without
the coming of the railways.

The part the railways have played in Manchuria
has already been indicated; more than 3,700 miles of
track have been built since 1897. Of this China
owns half, Russia 1,070 miles, and Japan 700. In
commercial importance, however, the Japanese-
owned South Manchurian Railway occupies a com-

MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

mandmg position, linking up the rich and fertile
plains of the south with the modern port of Dairen
Manchuria's front door. The main coal, iron, and
other industries are situated on this line.

The coming of the railways enabled the produc-
tion of the soya bean to develop until it now con-
stitutes 60 per cent of the entire Manchurian export
trade. In 1929 the production of soya beans
amounted to 221,000,000 bushels, or 5,300,000 tons,
a figure exactly double that of fourteen years earlier.
The soya bean and its by-products oil and cake
are the foundation of Manchuria's prosperity and
commercial importance. They are also one of the
factors which have caused Japan to regard her com-
mercial position in Manchuria as a matter of vital
consequence to her people. For the Manchurian
bean has assisted, to a greater degree than any other
single import, in solving the pressing food problem
of heavily populated Japan.

A Report of Progress issued by the South Man-
churian Railway Company in 1931 shows that, of
4,721,000 tons of beans and bean products exported
in 1929, 40 per cent went to Japan, 44 per cent to
Europe, 13 per cent to China, and the balance to the
United States and elsewhere.

Next to the bean which has made Manchuria
f amous, millet is the most important crop, the annual
production amounting to 171,000,000 bushels, of
which upwards of 14,000,000 bushels are annually

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 117

exported to Korea. Thus millet helps to solve the
food problem in Japanese Korea.

Taking the figures for agricultural production as
a whole, the amount of soya beans, millet, wheat,
barley, oats, and rice has risen from 404,500,000
bushels in 1915 to 876,000,000 bushels in 1929, a re-
markable achievement when it is remembered that
during ten of those fourteen years the civilized world
has been beset by economic difficulties, and that in
most agrarian nations production has been falling.
Moreover, this increased production has been attained
by the development of only 25 per cent of the arable
resources of Manchuria.

Final figures of agricultural production for 1930
are not yet available, but estimates compiled by the
South Manchurian Railway give a total crop of all
cereals, including rice, of 18,672,000 kilograms.
Consumption in Manchuria for that year is estimated
at 12,475,740, leaving a surplus for export of
6,196,260 kilograms an increase over the 1929 sur-
plus of 700,000 kilograms. And there is every reason
to believe that this increase in the cereal output of
the Three Provinces continues.

A glimpse of agricultural development in the fu-
ture is contained in the following forecast made by
Mr. Putnam "Weale: "Chinese agriculture in North-
ern Manchuria will soon not be merely confined to
winning over to the mattock and the plow the whole
of these thirty million acres (on the Sungari and
Nonni), it will steadily invade the vast area of

118 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

Northeastern Mongolia the Inner Mongolia of the
geographers and will bring all the rich grass country
lying east of the Gobi Desert under painstaking cul-
tivation. Already it is calculated that the Chinese
agricultural belt is advancing on the Mongols and
their wandering flocks at the rate of thirty U 9 or
twelve miles a year. In fifteen or twenty years the
spade and mattock will have captured millions of
acres, and bound them tight to the Chinese system
of bounteous crops; and much of the harvest of those
fields will be available for export. Thus a wheat-
belt, contemptuous of political and geographical
labeling, will grow up in these latitudes to be almost
as remarkable as the Canadian Northwest, or the
ever-expanding Vest Siberian grain districts; and
this belt will be exploited in times of stress by those
who, without possessing any legitimate right of emi-
nent domain, have their money-bags lying ready, and
their soldiers in the immediate background."

Only the building of more railways is needed to
make that prediction come true. Since the prophecy
was made the agricultural production of Manchuria
has enormously increased, and shows a consistent rise.
Its momentum is supplied by the hard work of the
most skilled cultivators in the world, the Chinese
farmers who, as Sir H. E. M. James has stated, "get
up at two in the morning, work with hardly any in-
termission until dark, and then go to bed at once,
so as to rise again early the next day. The result is

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 119

marvelous. Instead of the seed being scattered broad-
cast, it is carefully planted in ridges at regular inter-
vals apart, and the cultivator is forever weeding,
hoeing, or irrigating, so that each head of grain
develops like a prize plant."

Modern improvements and implements are, how-
ever, still lacking. The soil of Manchuria is lightly
worked and artificial manures have only recently been
introduced. The result is that those same peasants
who are responsible for the phenomenal increase in
Manchuria's total production, live from hand to
mouth, a bad harvest being still a disaster of the first
magnitude*

Turning to mineral resources, a survey by the
Geological Institute of the South Manchurian Rail-
way Company states that "coal, iron, magnesite, fire-
clay, and talc are most important in quantity, and
second to these are gold, copper, lead, barytes, feld-
spar, and asbestos."

Manchuria possesses forest areas estimated to total
88,798,872 acres. This timber reserve is situated in
the northern portion of the Three Provinces, the
forests of the south having been destroyed, as already
stated. The output of the lumber industry in 1929
was 38,684,000 cubic feet, a figure which is capable
of wide expansion.

The estimated deposits o workable coal are 1,200,-
000,000 in the south, and a further 500,000,000 tons
in the north. The gross annual output of the Fushun

120 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

and Yentai mines, operated by the Japanese, is
7,000,000 tons.

Manchuria is rich in iron, one estimate crediting
her with 400,000,000 tons of this mineral beneath
her soil, mostly in the Mukden province.

Two further sources of natural wealth must be
mentioned. The number of persons engaged in the
fishing industry within the territory leased to Japan
alone is 30,000 Chinese and 141 Japanese, and the
annual catch is valued at 4,682,000 yen. In addition
the annual catch in Northern Manchuria is estimated
to yield over 1,000,000 pounds deadweight.

Finally, the output of salt has increased ten times
in the past twenty-three years, and now totals
900,000,000 pounds a year.

Even more significant than the development of
these natural resources has been the transformation,
under Japanese guidance, of Manchuria from an agri-
cultural to an industrial nation. Forty years ago
the Chinese in the Three Provinces, as has been said,
were engaged almost entirely in agriculture; the soya
bean provided oil for food and light, flour was
ground, coarse silk was spun from the wild cocoon.
Otherwise life and the standard of living remained
as it had been for centuries under the Manchus.

In 1861 the opening of Newchwang as a port for
foreign trade heralded the coming change. The
Japanese, especially, pressed home the advantage thus
gained, and eventually secured an agreement with

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 121

China opening twenty-four ports and cities to for-
eign traders, including Harbin, Manchouli, Argun,
Suifenho, and Liaoyang. In 1907, following the
Russo-Japanese War, Dairen, in the Leased Territory,
was opened by Japan as a free port and the ter-
minal of the South Manchurian Railway, and it has
remained until to-day the principal port for Man-
churian trade and one of the leading trade centers
of East Asia.

These developments had far-reaching effects upon
Manchuria's commercial importance. Whereas in
1907 the total trade of the Three Provinces was six
per cent of China's foreign trade, by 1929 it had
increased to 20 per cent. Manchuria's trade has ex-
panded over sixteen times since 1900, and Dairen's
share is now 66 per cent of the total, an impressive
indication of the results of railway construction and
the initiative of foreign traders, particularly the
Japanese.

A further indication of the predominant role as-
sumed by the Japanese in Manchuria is afforded by
the figures of factory development within the area
under Japanese jurisdiction:

No. of Capital Invested Value of Products
Factories (in yen)

1909 . 152 16,132,101 6,138,792

1914 .. 244 24,536,830 20,799,196

1919 450 123,571,509 242,882,798

1929 789 302,080,061 126,915,076

122 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

In Northern Manchuria there are approximately
600 factories and mills, of which 150 are bean-oil
and 52 flour mills. 1

The personnel needed to staff this rapid increase in
industrial activity has come almost wholly from
China. Coolie labor is provided in abundance by the
continued and rapid migration of Chinese to Man-
churia, and even in the Japanese zone more than 93
per cent of agricultural workers, 96 per cent of
miners, and 88 per cent of factory hands, are Chinese.
The latest figures available show that in 789 fac-
tories within the Leased Territory, railway zone, and
Japanese consular districts, 1,551,517 employees were
Japanese and 12,019,802 Chinese.

So far as the factories and industries affect Man-
churian export figures, they are concerned only with
the staple crops of the country, such as the soya bean.
Silk and cotton spinning factories have been estab-
lished, but up to the present their output is not
sufficient to materially affect the imports of these
goods.

The oldest as well as the most important manufac-
turing industry in the Three Provinces is the bean-
oil mills. In 1929, 465 mills produced 2,200,000
tons, including 200,000 tons of oil.

The tobacco industry, with Mukden as its center,
has an annual production of 56,000,000 pounds, and
in 1929 exported tobacco leaf and cigarettes valued

1 These figures are quoted from Reports issued by the South Manchurian
Railway Company in 1931

iff^^fl^-jr*

'^3& :j4TV 7?t^r: ,.^fc!.

MANCHURIAS NATURAL WEALTH
Open cuts at the great Fuahan Colliery, developed by the Japanese

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 123

at 1,980,000 taels. In the same year, however, Man-
churia imported tobacco worth 17,000,000 taels, and
the aggregate consumption of cigarettes in Man-
churia is 7,600,000,000. While therefore many to-
bacco factories are in operation it is unlikely that
Manchuria will ever be an exporting country so far
as tobacco is concerned.

Another ancient industry which still flourishes is
the distilling of the native kaoliang spirit, but this,
again, does not affect the figures for external trade.

Manchuria owes the introduction of the modern
fabric industry to the initiative of the Japanese, who
established the first silk spinning and weaving fac-
tory at Antung in 1919. Since that date about one
hundred smaller wild silk filatures, operated by
Chinese, have come into operation, the total pro-
duction being valued at 46,540,000 yen per annum.

More important is the rise of the cotton industry,
a growth which finds its counterpart throughout the
Far East, in China, and Japan.

The first modern spinning mill in Manchuria was
erected by Chinese at Mukden in 1921, with 10,000
spindles, which was later extended to 25,000. Sub-
sequently three further mills were opened by Jap-
anese firms the Manchurian Cotton Spinning Com-
pany with 31,360 spindles at Liaoyang in 1923, a
mill owned by the Naikai Cotton Company of Osaka
at Chinchou in 1924 with 24,000 spindles, and a
third at Dairen in 1925 with 17,664 spindles. In
addition to these large undertakings, there are nearly

124 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

two hundred smaller mills in Manchuria, mainly
owned and operated by Chinese, the total output,
according to the most recent figures available, being
valued at 8,000,000 taels.

The remaining factories in the region are occu-
pied in brick-making, glass-making, and subsidiary
manufacture. There are also many small industries
working for local consumption only. The woolen
industry, for example, includes the manufacture of
carpets and rugs from imported Mongolian wool,
felt boots and other felt goods. Carts and wheels
are manufactured, and junks are built in large num-
bers in the neighborhood of Kirin.

In only one case has an attempt to extend the in-
dustrial activities of Manchuria ended in failure. As
long ago as 1906 efforts were made to found a
sugar-beet industry at Mukden. Although climatic
conditions and soil were suitable, the "open door** to
foreign trade, and competition of world prices, com-
pelled the abandonment of the enterprise, operations
being suspended in 1927. Since that date, foreign
imports of sugar have rapidly increased.

Of greater significance to the nations concerned
with the present Manchurian crisis is the import
trade.

The Customs returns for Manchurian ports show
that cotton goods are still the leading item in the
bill which Manchuria pays the world each year for
its products.

The total imports in 1929 amounted to 329,000,-

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 125

000 taels, of which 80,000,000 taels were cotton
goods, including yarns.

During the period when Newchwang was the only
port open to foreign trade, Britain enjoyed a virtual
monopoly of cotton imports; later, the United States
moved up to first place. For a quarter of a century,
Japan was not a serious rival of either nation. But
her geographical position gave the Japanese an ad-
vantage they were not slow to seize, and when to this
factor was added the infiltration of Japanese capital
and interests into Southern Manchuria, especially
after 1905, the position underwent a radical change.
Prior to the Great "War, which crippled her Euro-
pean competitors, Japan had virtually secured the
entire import trade in cotton goods, apart from the
best qualities. Following the war, the effects of the
rapid development of cotton mills in China began
to be felt, and now 35 per cent of cotton imports
into Manchuria emanate from that country, placing
China second to Japan.

It should be remembered, however, that during the
same period the total Manchurian import trade has
considerably increased, explaining the fact that while
Britain and the United States have lost to the yellow
races in the cotton goods trade, the total quantity
of their imports in other industries has increased.
"Imports of machinery, iron and steel goods, oil,
woolens, and flour from the United States and Europe
are steadily increasing,** states the Report of the
South Manchurian Railway Company. The Cus-

126 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

toms Returns tell the same story. Thus imports from
the British Empire have risen in value from 2,693,000
tatels in 1908 to 26,200,000 taels in 1929, imports
from the United States from 6,775,000 taels to
25,600,000 taels in the same period, and from Ger-
many 151,000 taels to 8,500,000 taels.

Almost the whole of this export and import trade
passes through three ports, Dairen, Newchwang, and
Antung, the following figures for 1929 indicating the
supremacy of Dairen:

Port No. of Ships Entering Tons Cleared

Dairen 8,211 14,056,392

Newchwang 1,711 1,803,527

Antung 908 489,554

In addition, Vladivostok, the terminus of the
Chinese Eastern Railway, handles annually one and
a half million tons of products from Northern Man-
churia.

The construction of a new harbor at Hulu-tao,
on the Pechibili Gulf, was planned as long ago as
1908, and work actually commenced in 1910 after
the subscription of British capital amounting to
800,000. The Chinese revolution, and later the
European war, held up the work, nothing being done
until 1930, when a new contract was entered into
with the Netherlands Harbor Works Company.

Dairen, originally the Russian port of Dalny, is a
typical example of Japanese commercial enterprise.
Although approached by a channel sufficiently wide

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 127

and deep to admit steamers at any state of the tide,
its commercial possibilities were not fully developed
while in Russian hands, probably due to lack of time
and to Russian interests in Manchuria being more
political than industrial.

Under Japanese control Dairen has developed into
a modern and fully-equipped port, increasing in im-
portance with every step of Japanese commercial
and industrial activity in Southern Manchuria.

The port can accommodate the largest ocean-going
steamers, its wharves are nowhere less than 3 JO feet
wide, provided with electric light and steam cranes,
while the South Manchurian Railway conveys goods
alongside the steamers. There are also thirty ware-
houses, covering twenty-five acres, available for the
storage of cargo.

As a further contrast with the Chinese cities of
Manchuria, Dairen possesses electric light and tram-
ways, waterworks, a modern drainage system, and
macadamized roads.

Surveying the trade of Manchuria as a whole, it
will be seen that Japan is still supreme both in imports
and exports, the natural outcome of her dominant
and privileged position within the Three Provinces.
As the owners of the most important railway line,
of the main port, and as the architects of Manchurian
industrial development, in fostering which they have
lavished skill and money, Japanese interests are too
firmly entrenched for other nations, not enjoying the
same facilities, to seriously dispute them. What that

128 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

predominant position means to the Japanese nation,
both in money and raw materials, and at what cost
it has been attained, will be shown later in this
chapter.

Here it need only be added that Japan purchases
more from Manchuria than she sells in that region.
In justice to Japanese interests, it must be admitted
that the chief beneficiaries of Japanese enterprise in
the Three Provinces, and of the more secure condi-
tions of life which Japan has brought to the area
within her influence at a period when other parts of
China have been decimated by civil war and rival
armies, have been the Chinese themselves, especially
those Chinese who have migrated to Manchuria.

Since 1905, order and security for life have been
preserved without serious interruption, a state of
affairs for which the Japanese authorities are entitled
to their share of credit, but not, however, to all of
it. Subsequent to the formation of the Chinese Re-
public, Manchuria enjoyed a position almost of inde-
pendence under the rule of Marshal Chang-Tso-Lin,
a ruler who for twenty years applied the remedy of
immediate execution for the crime of banditry within
his territories, and whose favorite question to for-
eign visitors in Mukden was, "Where in China are
human life and property safer than in Manchuria?"
* Under the combined rule of autocratic war lord
and Japanese Consuls, the standard of living in Man-
churia has steadily risen, despite the large annual
influx of new settlers. Prior to the Russo-Japanese

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 129

War bean-oil was the only method of illumination
and sugar was almost an unknown luxury. In more
recent years imports of sugar and oil have increased
rapidly. Again, the standard of dress of Manchurian
women has improved. Formerly cotton piece goods
weighing about 17 pounds per bolt were the universal
wear, but the weight of such goods has- decreased
to 12-13 pounds, significant of more prosperous con-
ditions.

The importance of that rapidly growing trade,
and Manchuria's abundant supplies of raw materials
to Japan, may be gauged by the nature of the con-
cessions which the latter has sought and obtained in
the Three Provinces.

She has complete control of the most important
railway system, of all mining and timber resources
in partnership with the Chinese, to the exclusion of
all other nations, whilst only Japanese have the right
to carry on industrial undertakings. The powers ac-
corded to Japan permit her to veto construction of
any line which could compete with the South Man-
churian Railway, and gives the right of extension and
construction within that area. Only Japanese settlers
are permitted to establish themselves within the rail-
way zone, but Japanese may reside and trade wher-
ever they wish in Southern Manchuria. In effect,
Japan has secured a position of complete economic
ascendancy within the region. How, then, has that
position been used, and what does it mean to the
Japanese people?

130 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

Manchuria affords an outlet, although a limited
one, to her population. The South Manchurian Rail-
way provides employment for about 20,000 Japanese,
and the total Japanese population in the Leased Ter-
ritory and railway zone is 25 0,000 (1930) compared
with the Chinese in the same area of 1,300 square
miles of IjOSOjOOO. 1

The continued influx of coolie labor from China
has prevented any large-scale movement of Japanese
labor to Manchuria, most of the Japanese engaged in
industry being skilled workers and overseers of
Chinese laborers.

Japan has not attempted to utilize her extensive
Manchurian interests to flood the region with her sur-
plus population: the Japanese peasant cannot com-
pete with the Chinese laborer. Rather does she regard
the Three Provinces, and especially the area adjoin-
ing the South Manchurian Railway, as an outlet for
the energies of her overcrowded professional classes,
a virgin field for the brains of her industrialists, for
the investment of her capital, and, most vital of all,
as a reservoir of the food and raw materials which
are the mainspring of the Japanese nation, which,
be it remembered, must import one-fifth of the food
needed for her people.

If the Japanese grip upon her gains in Manchuria
has been tenacious, and occasionally arbitrary, viewed
by Western standards, the reason is that Manchuria

1 The area under Japanese jurisdiction contains a population of over 875
per square mile, compared with an average of 76 per square mile in Man-
churia as a whole.

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 131

and its products are irreplaceable if she is to remain
a leading industrial and military power in the Pacific,
The "open door" in Manchuria means to Japan what
the "freedom of the seas" means to Great Britain.
Events may from time to time dictate a watching
policy, or prevent a forward thrust, but retreat from
her privileged position is impossible without seriously
weakening her power.

The pivot around which revolve all Japanese in-
terests in Manchuria is the South Manchunan Rail-
way Company. The development of this line during
the past twenty-three years affords an index to the
effects of Japanese industrial development in the
region. The number of passengers carried has in-
creased sixfold, and the tonnage of freight handled
more than eighteenfold, as follows:

Passengers 1907-8 1929-30

First Class 39,152 13,473

Second Class 925,493 159,536

Third Class 547,586 10,237,780

Freight in Tons 1907-8 1929-30

Coal 165,521 9,850,882

Beans 202,857 3,296,534

Flour 12,410 240,443

Salt 47,012 185,960

The annual production of iron at the Southern
Manchurian Railway Company's works at Anshan
was 210,443 tons in 1929-30. The same company

132 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

owns and operates electrical undertakings at Dairen,
Mukden, Changchun, and Antung, the power sup-
plied by the Dairen station being 84,098,492 k.w.h.
in the same year, while the total output of the four
undertakings rose from 21,722,434 k.w.h. in 1917-18
to 142,218,913 in 1929-30.

Of the total trade of Manchuria, 40 per cent of
both exports and imports are in the hands of the
Japanese. The following are the figures for 1929 in
Haikwan taels:

Imports Exports

British Empire 26,218,114 28,820,754

Japan 138,750,134 168,858,511

Russia 1 5,747,789 40,282,245

U. S. A. 25,922,001 12,167,357

Germany 8,534,228 1,420,1 50

China 99,542,731 93,143,327
Total: Imports, 329,603,731; exports, 425,651,491.

A further and impressive indication of the extent
of Japanese interests is afforded by the details of their
investments in Manchuria. As was the case with
both China and Russia, foreign capital has played an
important part in the opening up and development
of Manchurian industry. Most of the railways were,
as has been noted, built by foreign Powers or with
the cooperation of foreign capital. The South Man-
churian Railway on several occasions issued deben-
tures on the London market, the total raised in this
way being 14,000,000. The Chinese Eastern Rail-

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 133

way was built mainly with French and Belgian
capital, while the Manchurian section of the Peking-
Mukden Railway was constructed on a British loan
amounting to 2,300,000. Several Chinese-owned
lines, on the other hand, were built with the aid of
Japanese capital.

As in the case of railways, so the factories, mills,
and mines were developed in cooperation with the
foreign, and mainly the Japanese, financier. Japan
needed raw materials and an outlet for her trade,
Manchuria was rich in resources but poor in pocket.
Thus began a partnership resulting in the investment
up to 1931 in Manchuria of over 2,147,000,000 yen
of Japanese gold, with dramatic repercussions on the
peace and future prospects of the Far East. Accord-
ing to the latest return available from Japanese
sources, this capital is invested as follows:

Yen

Railways 261,882,378

Harbors . .... 78,093,974

Coal mines . . 112,276,860

Oil shale plant . . 8,961,174

Iron works 27,127,139

Municipal undertakings 143,767,667

Loans to Chinese Government (direct) 98,730,823
Capital Funds invested by Japanese

companies 439,003,410

Capital Funds invested by individuals 94,991,560

134 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

It is not difficult to imagine, in view of the heavy
commitments in Manchuria revealed by the above
table, that the Japanese Government could not view
with equanimity any spread of banditry, Commu-
nism, or chaos from China to Manchuria, threatening
the very existence, in addition to the profit-making
power, of her investments in that region.

But an additional and vital reason, apart from any
fear for the safety of her capital invested, may have
dictated recent Japanese policy. A nation's indus-
trial power in time of war is predetermined by its
industrial power in time of peace. In war, or even
if there is the remotest possibility of it, the abundance
of raw materials plays a more important part than
almost any other single factor making for national
safety.

Japan, in the event of a Pacific conflict, would to
a large extent be dependent upon raw materials
drawn from Manchuria, three provinces belonging to
another Power which might attempt to close this
natural storehouse to her. This fear, more than
purely commercial considerations, may be held to ex-
plain the forward policy pursued by Japan in Man-
churia since 1905. Japan wishes, without actually
proclaiming the annexation of Manchuria, to so con-
solidate her position there, as economic overlord, that
China will not dare to close that open door in her
face. Japanese diplomacy, from the presentation of
the famous Twenty-one Demands, has been based
upon that simple fact. Time has been on her side,

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 135

for as China, distracted by civil war and Communism,
has grown weaker, the Japanese grip upon the rich
plains and mineral wealth of Manchuria has strength-
ened.

For the present that interest yields dividends and
trade; but the time may come when much more than
trade may depend upon whether or not those goods
trucks, piled with the produce of Manchuria, arrive
punctually on the quays at Dairen.

Coal, iron, and petroleum are all vital to Japan's
existence. Her island home is deficient in all three,
but they exist in Manchuria, the natural storehouse
adjacent to her own shores.

Let us for a moment leave Manchuria, and by
looking at Japan, see what the Three Provinces mean
to her people, taking first the food supply. Man-
churia provides Japan with cereals, animal products,
and soya-bean cakes, which still rank first among the
fertilizers imported for maintaining the production
of Japanese farmlands. Iron, coal, petroleum, and
salt are all problems for the rulers of Japan. She
can draw supplies from Manchuria which, if not
sufficient to solve the problem, will at least ease her
anxiety.

The deposits of iron ore in Japan are estimated
to be about 83,000,000 tons. There are a further
123,000,000 tons in Korea.

At present Japan draws large quantities of iron
ore from China and the Malay States, but if com-
munications were interrupted, then those new and

136 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

up-to-date mines along the South Manchurian Rail-
way, the deposits in which have at present hardly
been scratched, would be vital to her existence.

With regard to coal, Japan has a total reserve of
ten billion tons, of which, however, only three bil-
lion tons are actually workable. Her consumption
in 1927 was 34,196,000 tons, and it is increasing at
the annual rate of 0.5 per cent. In another thirty
years, therefore, Japan's native coal resources will be
nearing exhaustion, while her need will be more press-
ing than ever. Once again, Japan looks to Man-
churia to overcome the problem with which nature
has presented her Government. According to inves-
tigations carried out by the South Manchurian Rail-
way Company, the coal reserves in Liaoning and
Kirin amount to 1,162,762,000 tons. There exist
another 496,887,000 tons in Northern Manchuria,
and yet another reserve estimated at 1,255,000,000
in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia. Thus the coal
reserve of Manchuria and Mongolia is colossal. More
than that, it is irreplaceable in the Far East, and the
Power controlling those coalfields can, in time, settle
the industrial fate of Japan.

Now as to oil. Japan needs large quantities of
petroleum, almost all of which must be imported.
Where to turn for it more naturally than to Man-
churia, since one oil deposit at Fushun is estimated to
contain 5,500,000,000 tons? The cost of mining this
shale oil is low, the deposits being sufficient to provide

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 137

Japan with all the oil she needs for the next three
centuries!

Therefore the Fushun Colliery loses no time in
putting up eighty units of ovens for dry distillation
at the expenditure of 7,500,000 yen, the capacity
being 2,000 tons of shale a day. Every year the
following products will be turned out:

Crude Oil 26,500 tons

Ammonium, Sulphate . 6,400 ct

Wax . .. 6,500 ce

Coke 2,200 "

Thus Japan hopes to solve her fuel problem.

As for salt, Japan produces only two-thirds of her
annual requirements, being dependent for the balance
upon the salt industry established at Dairen and Port
Arthur.

Magnesium is indispensable for making light metal
alloys, without which aeroplanes cannot be con-
structed. Manchuria possesses extensive deposits of
magnesite, from which magnesium can be obtained.

It is true that large reserves of iron, coal, and other
minerals exist outside Manchuria, especially in China
proper. That is one reason why Japan has sought
gains from China by the method of economic infil-
tration, rather than by taking direct advantage of
China's comparative weakness. But from the day
when Japanese eyes turned towards Manchuria, lying
north of the Great Wall empty and neglected, it be-
came the natural and most easily accessible source of

138 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

future supply. Just as imperial Russia looked for
concessions there to provide an ice-free port and
naval base on the Pacific, so imperial Japan sees in
an orderly development of Manchurian resources,
under Japanese direction, the one sure source of con-
tinuing strength in the Pacific. For in time of war,
if war came, Japan must count upon Manchuria or
perish.

This does not mean that there is anything repre-
hensible in Japanese ambitions. All great Powers are
forced by the law of self-preservation similarly to
look ahead and safeguard the source of their supplies.
Indeed, up to the present Manchuria owes much to
Japanese initiative, which has not only assisted in the
development of her resources but has further pro-
vided a natural outlet for them. But for the presence
of Japanese in authority, particularly in the South
Manchurian Railway zone, Manchuria, like China
proper, would have relapsed, at any rate temporarily,
into a condition of chaos and civil war and damaged
her trade for a generation. The position the Japanese
occupy in the industrial life of Manchuria is a guar-
antee of orderly progress. Thus, while over China
as a whole trade has been declining owing to the
spread of banditry, Communism, civil war, excessive
taxation, and the depredations of rival armies, Man-
churia has gone ahead. ^

Although her trade figures for 1930 show a de-
crease, owing to general world depression, it is a re-
markable tribute to the importance of the region

MANCHURIAN TRADE TO-DAY 139

that Great Britain's share in Manchurian trade in-
creased more than ten times in the past twenty-two
years, that of China proper with Manchuria five
times, and her trade with the United States nearly
six times. According to the 1928 figures, Manchu-
rian trade with Soviet Russia had increased five-
fold, but these were followed by a sharp decline in the
following year, and the most recent figures show an
increase of 300 per cent only, for reasons requiring
no explanation.

Solid gains such as these law and order, improv-
ing trade, a rising standard of living are not
achieved without a quid pro quo. In Manchuria
it took the form of an ever-increasing hold upon the
country by the Japanese, a hold that acknowledged
a certain limit during the lifetime of the sturdy
Marshal Chang-Tso-Lin, but which has, since his
death, become more apparent. In fact, as the Jap-
anese military activities of the autumn of 1931 re-
vealed, it is but one step removed from virtual control
of the entire region by Japanese troops.

It was not to be expected that a proud and ancient
race like the Chinese, remembering those Twenty-
One Demands and pin-pricks in Shantung and else-
where nearer home, would accept such a position
without demur. Nor did they. Material for mis-
understan4ing and strained relations was abundantly
present, and the violent outburst of propaganda
which student China launched, following the entry
of Japanese troops into Mukden on September 18,

140 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

1931, showed how deep was the sense of grievance
felt by Chinese patriots over Japanese "aggression."
Without going into this question, discussed in an-
other chapter, it may be said that the Chinese pro-
tested too late. For over twenty years Japan has
been the virtual ruler of the key-positions in Man-
churia; her brains, capital, and industry have enriched
an erstwhile empty region and exalted it to a position
of world- wide importance. It would now not only
be unreasonable, but futile, to expect the Japanese
to withdraw. That being the position, the states-
manlike course is to seek a formula enabling the
development of Manchuria to continue, for the en-
richment alike of both Japanese commercial inter-
ests and Chinese inhabitants. Were China herself
enjoying the advantages of orderly and settled gov-
ernment, such a course might gain common accept-
ance in view of the community of interest which
should exist in Manchuria between the two races.
Unhappily, past events and present necessities make
agreement more difficult. At the same time, it cannot
be said that the Japanese military commanders who
launched the "offensive" last autumn improved mat-
ters. To-day the world is faced with a new fact, in
the form of an essential conflict between Chinese
aspirations and Japanese policy in Manchuria. How
this antagonism has arisen in an area where, in the
past, a common partnership has yielded such rich re-*
suits, will now be examined.

CHAPTER V

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT

/ I 1HE present situation in Manchuria a phase
I only distinguished from open warfare by the
fact that China can offer no effective military
opposition to what is virtually a Japanese Protec-
torate over Manchuria arose out of two specific
"incidents." These were the damaging of the South
Manchurian Railway lines north of Mukden at 11
P.M. on September 18, 1931 according to Japanese
versions the tearing up of the rails being the work
of Chinese troops and the murder, in June 1931,
of a Japanese army officer, Captain Nakamura, while
traveling in disguise in Mongolia.

But the murder of Captain Nakamura like the
assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at
Serajevo in July 1914 and the sabotage on the South
Manchurian line were in reality merely the culminat-
ing point in a situation of increasing tension and
strain, for the origin of which we must refer to the
Treaty of Portsmouth, which established Japan in
an industrially dominant position in these three
northern provinces of China.

Those conversant with the temperaments of the
two nations, each suspicious of, and antagonistic
towards, the other, saw in that Treaty the seeds of

141

142 MANCHURIA- THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

future conflict. And events in China since the fall
of the Empire have increased the feeling of hostility
towards Japan to the point of open hatred an or-
ganized "hate" which it was inevitable would produce
its most violent and dangerous repercussions in Man-
churia.

To the Japanese, the maintenance and even exten-
sion of their industrial interests and privileged posi-
tion in Manchuria, and the continuance of orderly
government in the Three Provinces, is essential to
their national security. It is essential for the protec-
tion of her vast financial investments there. But
these considerations alone do not explain why Jap-
anese public opinion supported and applauded the
swift action taken by their army commanders in Sep-
tember 1931, support so unanimous that it definitely
prevented the Japanese delegate from making any
real concession during the negotiations conducted by
the League of Nations Council at Geneva and Paris. 1

For the reason behind that display of national
unity it is necessary to look back to 1905, when those
very concessions and privileges which the Japanese
people believed to be endangered by the hostility of
China were gained in the war with Russia, at a cost
to the Japanese people of 200,000 lives and 2,000,-
000,000 yen of gold. That war, say the Japanese,
was fought by Japan to recover Manchuria and Mon-
golia from the clutches of Imperial Russia. It was
fought with China's willing consent. It did not cost

1 See Chapter IX

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 143

the Chinese one man or one penny. Japan won the
war, and Manchuria returned to Chinese control,
Japan retaining, in return for her sacrifices of blood
and treasure, only those limited interests which she
has since that date developed so effectively. On that
fact is based the Japanese view that she is entitled
to special privileges in Manchuria; the memory of her
sacrifices and the knowledge of all that Manchuria
means to modern Japan account for the depth of
public feeling which would have destroyed any Jap-
anese Government that suffered encroachment on her
special interests without protest.

A new and ambitious Chinese Republic, on the
other hand, conscious of a patriotism which sometimes
tends to ignore realities, and impatient of all foreign
"rights" and treaties inherited from the past, regards
the existence of Japanese privileges in Manchuria, and
the presence of Japanese troops, even as railway
guards, on Chinese soil, as an affront to the Republic.
Ignoring history and the niceties of diplomacy alike,
the Kuomintang Government has permitted, or been
unable to restrain, a prolonged campaign of hostility
against Japanese subjects and Japanese trading inter-
ests, both in China and Manchuria. Hence boycotts
against Japanese goods, demands for the abolition of
the "unequal treaties," diplomatic delays, and open
breaches of treaty obligations which have become irk-
some with the changing sentiment of the Chinese
people. Hence numerous "incidents" outstanding

144 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

between the two nations for which satisfaction and
settlement are alike denied to Japan.

There is evidence of growing hostility between the
Chinese Government and their Japanese neighbors
over a period of years. The Japanese complain of
an "attitude of contempt" which may, perhaps, date
back to the presentation of the famous Twenty-one
Demands to Yuan Shi Kai in 1915.

But more serious than official disdain is the growth
of anti- Japanese feeling among the Chinese people,
evidenced by the demands of Chinese students for the
expulsion of the Japanese troops from Manchuria by
armed action, at the very moment when the Chinese
representatives at the League of Nations meetings
were advocating peaceable League investigation of
the crisis.

With these conflicting sentiments stirring the op-
posing yellow races to open antagonism, and solemn
treaties being disregarded on both sides, the essential
conflict came to a head. But not before a long series
of "pin-pricks" had acerbated feelings of the Jap-
anese to a point when they genuinely believed that
only strong action would preserve their position in
Manchuria, and maintain law and order in that
region.

The two events which caused the Japanese authori-
ties to take action have already been mentioned. But
behind these two events were over three hundred cases
of disagreement between the two nations in which
any satisfactory settlement had been withheld, in

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 145

some cases for years. These outstanding issues con-
cern railways, residental rights, leaseholds, tariffs,
and unjust taxation, and, because of the part which
they played in producing friction between the rival
authorities in Manchuria, some details are essential if
world opinion is to form an unbiased judgment of the
Japanese case.

We have already pointed out the vital importance
of railways in the development of a country like
Manchuria. Where there runs an efficient and well-
managed service of goods trains, there development
is rapid. Where transport is still confined to the
wagon and mule team, the land cannot reach its
highest productivity.

Japan's greatest gift to Manchuria has been the
efficiency of the South Manchurian Railway, the
main artery of trade and the mainstay of her inter-
ests in that region. And it is against this railway
that China's antagonism has primarily been directed.
To this end China has attempted an aggressive policy
aiming at the construction of a network of lines in
the same region, which would, when completed, draw
off a large share of the traffic at present carried by
the South Manchurian line and in time reduce this
Japanese investment to a position when further
profitable working or extension would be impossible.

The Chinese say, and it is fair to add that many
foreigners agree with them, that any railway built
in the Far East, strategic or otherwise, is a gain in a
region which is still extremely short of transport.

146 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

While that may be true, it is surely fair to add that
any funds available would be better invested in open-
ing up regions at present entirely devoid of railway
facilities, rather than in building lines in the one
district of Manchuria already adequately served
building those lines, moreover, from political motives
rather than under any spur of economic necessity.

Policy apart, however, the building of any line in
the vicinity of the Japanese railway zone is a direct
breach of the protocol attached to the Treaty of
Peking concluded between China and Japan in 1915,
in which China undertook not to construct any rail-
way line "in the neighborhood of and parallel to the
South Manchurian Railway" while that line remained
in Japanese possession.

Despite this agreement, signed since the fall of the
Empire, the Chinese announced their intention of
constructing a line connecting Chinchou and Aigun,
and other lines at two points, and ignored all pro-
tests made by the South Manchurian Railway Com-
pany.

On the other hand, an agreement embodied in the
Convention relating to Chientao signed between the
two countries in 1909 provided for an advance by
three Japanese banks of 15,000,000 yen for the con-
struction of a railway between Kirin and Kamei on
the coast of Korea. A contract for the building of
this line was signed in 1928, but the line is still in-
complete there being a gap of 66 miles between the
two railheads. The construction of another line

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 147

between Changchun and Taonan was the subject of
an agreement signed in 1918. But work has not yet
been started.

In the same agreement respecting railway develop-
ment in Manchuria, a syndicate of Japanese banks
undertook to provide funds for the construction of a
railway from Kirin to Kaiyuan. The Chinese au-
thorities built this line without notice to Japan, as
provided in the agreement, and, further, connected
it up with the Peking-Mukden line, thus providing
a main line in direct opposition to the South Man-
churian Railway.

All these points, affecting the development of
Manchurian trade, might have been settled without
friction given good will on both sides, and had the
Chinese observed the agreements signed by their repre-
sentatives. Taken together, however, they must, in
the light of events, be regarded as a contributory
cause of the acute tension which precipitated events
and brought the two yellow races into open conflict.

The history of Japanese financial relations with
China has not been of a nature calculated to ease that
tension.

Japan invested 37,000,000 yen in the construction
of the Ssupingkai-Taonan Railway, controlled by
China. In June 1929 the Japanese shareholders were
asked by the Chinese authorities to accept a reduction
in the rate of interest paid on the loans below 7 per
cent, and subsequent negotiations failed to produce
any agreement. Similarly, a short term loan advanced

148 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

in connection with the same railway matured in
1926. The South Manchurian Railway, which had
advanced this money, approached the Chinese au-
thorities with a view to renewing the investment,
but the Chinese evaded the issue. Later a demand
was made for a reduction in the rate of interest.
Here again, no agreement has been possible.

More important, judged by its effects upon Sino-
Japanese relations in Manchuria, was the building of
the Taonan-Anganchi Railway. This line was con-
structed by the South Manchurian Railway Com-
pany and handed over to China in July 1926. Five
years later the Chinese authorities had neither paid
for the construction of the line nor the rolling stock
furnished by the Japanese. Nor had they, in accord-
ance with the agreement signed before the work
began, converted the debt into a railway loan within
one year of the completion of the work. Thus the
Japanese capital sunk in this enterprise six years ago
has remained unproductive, and all efforts to reach
an agreement have failed.

Further, the agreement under which this railway
was constructed provided that the Japanese adviser
to the railway should be in charge of all accounts,
and should have access to the balance sheet. The
Chinese chief of the accounting department refused
to honor this agreement, and when the period of office
of the first Japanese adviser came to an end, the
papers authorizing the appointment of his successor

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 149

remained, under various pretexts, unsigned by the
Chinese departmental director.

In various other cases concerning loans advanced
for the construction and reconditioning of railways,
questions of interest and repayment remain unsettled
after three or four years, during which the Chinese
have evaded every attempt to reach a settlement.

With this spirit in evidence where important mat-
ters of construction and finance are concerned, it is
not surprising that in smaller matters, such as ar-
rangements for the interworking of Chinese and
Japanese railways, the building and staffing of junc-
tions between various lines and so on, similar friction
and delays have been experienced. An accumulation
of incidents has convinced the Japanese that it is the
considered policy of the Chinese Government to
make any further development of Japanese enter-
prise impossible and progressively to sterilize existing
Japanese interests. Unfortunately, friction in other
spheres supports this view.

Even more significant of Chinese hostility to Japan
is the attitude adopted by the Chinese Government
of Manchuria during recent months to those "rights
of residence and travel" in South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia secured for Japanese subjects
by Article 3 of the Treaty of Peking. Despite the
clear wording of that clause, a policy designed to make
it impossible for any Japanese subject to reside out-
side die Japanese consular area has been pursued for
some time past. That policy is expressed in two

150 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

ways; by direct notice to quit, presented to Japanese
residents, and by threats, on the part of the authori-
ties, against any Chinese subject who leases house or
land to a Japanese or Korean subject. Chinese sub-
jects who ignore such instructions have in some cases
suffered imprisonment or even, according to some
reports, death.

How strong is this silent unseen pressure against
Japanese subjects and interests is clearly revealed by
the official orders issued by the Governor of Mukden.
These instructions, which applied to the walled city,
provided that:

(a) No contract for the lease of a house to any
Japanese subject should be renewed;

(&) That all contracts unexpired should be revised
in order that they terminate within 3 years.

Further instructions issued by the Governor of
Mukden in January 1931, prohibited Chinese from
letting any house to Japanese, or to extend any agree-
ments or leases with Japanese subjects.

The usual method of enforcing these instructions
was for the Chinese landlords to demand such drastic
increases in rent, when any lease expired, that the
tenants found it impossible to reach agreement. The
effect of such discrimination is shown by the fact
that in 1927 there were at Mukden 134 houses occu-
pied by Japanese subjects, whereas by 1931 the num-
ber had been reduced to less than 20.

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 151

Nor is this form of intimidation confined to Muk-
den, until the Japanese occupation the headquarters
of the Chinese Government in Manchuria. It ex-
tends to all parts of Manchuria outside the Japanese
zone. At Taonan, one of the cities opened to foreign
traders by China after the formation of the Republic,
an order was issued on April 7, 1929, in the name of
Marshal Chang Hsueh-hang, prohibiting Chinese to
lease or sell property or land to Japanese subjects.
An inn under Japanese management, the lease of
which was due for renewal three days after the
signing of this order, was refused any extension of
title and forced to close at twenty- four hours* notice.
Japanese activities no longer exist.

At Nungan, in Kirin Province, there lived 750
Japanese families prior to the * e drive" against their
race. By 1932 there are only a handful left. The
rest have bowed before the relentless pressure and
gone.

In many other cities, such as Anta and Fakumen,
no Japanese remained. At Antung, in January 1930,
a member of the Japanese consular staff received a
request to give up his house, and the demand was
only withdrawn after an official protest had been
addressed to the Chinese authorities.

Such instances could be multiplied, but sufficient
have been given to enable the reader to judge the part
which this "systematic persecution," of which the
Japanese complain, has played in fanning the flame
of racial antagonism in an area where history has

152 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

brought the two races face to face, and where peace
and prosperity alike depend upon good will.

It may be added that, in the face of continued
provocation, the Japanese authorities have showed
great toleration. ,The number of Japanese consular
districts in South Manchuria were reduced by two-
thirds compared with the number existing in 1922,
before the Japanese army decided to take matters into
its hands and move against the Chinese authorities
who had instigated and continued this pressure
against their treaty rights.

Again, Article 2 of the Treaty of 1915 stipulated
that the Japanese have the right "to lease land neces-
sary for erecting suitable buildings for trade and
manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enter-
prises." One month after the conclusion of that
treaty, China aimed the first of an endless series of
blows against that clause by issuing a law which ren-
dered any one leasing land to a Japanese subject pun-
ishable by death! Land sales in China are legalized
by means of a certificate issued by the Provincial
Government in whose territory the sale takes place.
In order that there shall be no misunderstanding re-
garding official wishes in this matter, such certificates
are stamped with an announcement that the transfer
is invalid if the purchaser is a foreigner.

Thus the leasing of land in Manchuria, which was
one of the questions specifically settled by the Treaty
of 1915, still remains a dangerous source of friction
sixteen years later. Nor are the Japanese disposed to

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 153

let a right based upon treaty sanction, and which
they regard as essential to maintain the Japanese posi-
tion in Manchuria, go by default in the face of the
flagrant breach of contracts.

The same pressure is exerted against Japanese trade.
Just as the Chinese have allowed their antagonism for
Japan to become a factor in railway development
within the Three Provinces, so the Chinese authori-
ties have, by manipulations in the money market,
speculation, and other means, created serious difficul-
ties for Japanese trading interests. The methods
employed to this end are varied and technical. One
cause of annoyance has been the practice, among
some Chinese manufacturers, of forging Japanese
trade-marks, the Chinese imitations being marketed
without interference from the Chinese authorities.
Consignments of Japanese goods addressed to traders
at Mukden have been stopped by Chinese Customs
officials at the gates of the city, and in many cases re-
leased only after protracted negotiations.

In 1909 the Chinese Government agreed to permit
the export of wheat, maize, millet, and other cereals
through the ports of Dairen and Antung, subject to
a condition that in the case of excessive export likely
to affect adversely conditions in Manchuria one
month's notice of the suspension of exports might be
given. In 1926, the Chinese authorities issued an
order prohibiting the export of corn, without any
advance notice whatever, causing serious losses to Jap-
anese traders who had supplies in transit at that time.

154 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

While the weapon of economic boycott, which has
contributed so largely to the difficulties facing the
Japanese in Shantung and China proper, has not been
used in Manchuria, specific instances of interference
with private traders have occurred.

Thus in 1929, Chinese Customs officials picketed
the Showa Yoko, a Japanese shop at Mukden, and
confiscated any Japanese goods purchased by Chinese
customers on the pretext that Customs duties had not
been paid. This was untrue.

Again:

"As a measure to promote home industry, China
has a special system of taxation for goods made by
machine on foreign models, regardless of the nation-
ality of the producers. Such manufactures are ex-
empt from tax when exported, and are taxed only 5
per cent ad valorem for home consumption.

"The Manchurian Cotton Spinning Company at
Liaoyang was granted in 192 J by the Peking Gov-
ernment such privilege for its products. The Muk-
den authorities, however, arbitrarily seized the permit
in course of transmission from Peking, refusing to
extend to the company the treatment rightly granted
by the Peking Government. Under the circum-
stances, the company had temporarily to agree to a
compromise by paying a certain amount of extra
taxation to the Chinese authorities at Liaoyang. But
the final solution remains to be made. 9 * *

* Outstanding Issues zn Manchuria and Mongolia, published by The
Herald Press, Tokyo

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 155

Such cases might be multiplied. They are inevita-
ble while no lasting compromise is effected between
Japanese ambitions and Chinese nationalism. The
Sino- Japanese Treaty of 1915 gave the Japanese the
right to engage in forestry work in South Manchuria.
China has repeatedly declared that she welcomes
foreign capital and skilled direction in developing her
natural wealth. Yet despite both treaty and senti-
ments, the Chinese authorities prohibit their subjects
to sell standing timber to foreigners, and the Fuji
Paper Company, the Oji Paper Company, and other
Japanese concerns which had invested considerable
capital in forestry concessions were obliged to abandon
their enterprises in the face of determined Chinese
opposition.

According to the mining regulations of China, and
a statement made by Dr. Alfred Sze, Chinese delegate
to the "Washington Conference, mining rights are
granted to any company in which foreign interests
do not hold more than 50 per cent of the shares. The
Convention of 1909 laid it down that mining under-
takings within the Japanese railway zone should be
operated on a joint Chinese- Japanese basis*. Later, in
1915, the Japanese were granted the right to prospect
and develop mining enterprises in nine regions with-
out Chinese cooperation. How have these rights,
clearly granted to (a) engage in mining enterprises
in any part of Manchuria conjointly with Chinese in-
terests and (&) to develop minerals at certain places
within the zone of the South Manchurian Railway

156 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

independently of Chinese interests, been honored by
China?

The Japanese complain of persistent interference
with mining operations, and even direct Government
action aimed at the denial of solemn treaty rights.
Thus the Commercial Department at Mukden is-
sued a decree declaring that all mining enterprises
would in future be conducted as joint Government
and individual undertakings, thus clearly making it
impossible for Japanese interests to share in launch-
ing any fresh developments within Fengtien Province.
Even the employment of Japanese technical experts
in those coal and iron mines under Chinese manage-
ment is discouraged by the authorities. This cold-
shouldering of Japanese interests in the raw materials
of Manchuria has become more pronounced since the
death of Marshal Chang-Tso-Lin, and the passing of
power into the hands of his son, who has proved much
more amenable to the nationalist sentiments of the
Nanking Government than was his autocratic and
independent father.

To these outstanding questions and others relat-
ing to taxation, interference with consular jurisdic-
tion and interference within, the Japanese zone
there was recently added a further difficulty, and one
which, if unchecked, might easily have inflicted upon
Japanese interests in Manchuria greater losses than
anything within the power of the Chinese Govern-
ment. This new factor, which caused the Japanese
authorities to act with speed and dispatch after

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 157

months of futile negotiation and protest, was the
spread of banditry from China into Manchuria.

In years during which bandits, Communists, and
disbanded soldiers bent upon loot infested wide areas
of China proper and grew to a menace which the
Nanking Government apparently finds it impossible
to stamp out, Manchuria alone remained an area
where law and order prevailed, and life and property
were comparatively safe.

This was due in part to the presence of Japanese
troops at Dairen and within the railway zone, but
more directly to the stringent measures taken by the
old Marshal Chang-Tso-Lin to maintain authority
within the provinces over which he ruled in virtual
independence. And the Marshal's efforts were ably
carried out by a Manchurian army which was the
most efficient force in China, ably commanded, and
well-disciplined. Faced with the knowledge that the
punishment for banditry was immediate execution,
the lawless elements, while they always existed, were
kept in check.

Following the death of the Marshal, and the growth
of friction between Chinese and Japanese in Man-
churia which was a feature of the rapprochement
between the Three Provinces and Nanking under
Marshal Chang Hseuh-liang, outlawry and lawlessness
began to raise its head in the hitherto well-governed
Manchurian districts. The Japanese declare that out-
rages became increasingly frequent, culminating in
the sabotage on the South Manchurian Railway itself,

158 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

carried out by Chinese troops either when out of
hand, or under orders. The Chinese declare that there
were no bandits in Manchuria before the Japanese
occupied Mukden on September 19, 1931, or alterna-
tively (in the language of the Law Courts) , if there
were, the Japanese put them there to provide an ex-
cuse for armed intervention and the overthrow of
the Chinese Governments in the Three Provinces.

It is. difficult to establish the truth in the face of
these conflicting statements. But there is evidence
for asserting that banditry was becoming an increas-
ing menace not only to Japanese interests but to life
in Manchuria generally, that the Chinese authorities
were either too preoccupied with other problems, or
unable to hold it in check, and that the Japanese
army in Manchuria, having observed the tragic re-
sults within China of permitting this menace to ex-
tend unchecked, and despairing of strong action
being taken by the Chinese, decided to enforce law
and order by direct, and possibly technically illegal,
action on their own account before the position be-
came so bad that they too would be powerless, or
alternatively, until the restoration of settled condi-
tions would have meant a prolonged military cam-
paign carried out in the teeth of Chinese opposition.
There is evidence in support of this view in the fact
that foreign interests generally supported the Jap-
anese in their decision, even while Nanking still pro-
tested that the fear of banditry was merely an excuse

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 159

for Japanese "Imperialism 5 * to aim another blow at a
divided and embarrassed China.

Such, in outline, was the Japanese case. "What of
China? Seen through Chinese eyes, the Japanese
military action was not dictated as a means of secur-
ing law and order, or even the redress of outstanding
grievances, but was one more chapter in the record of
Japanese designs upon Chinese sovereignty which be-
gan in 1895, the essential aim being to wrest new con-
cessions from Nanking by armed force. Certainly a
recapitulation of Japan's relations with China in re-
cent years lends some color to this view, however
great may have been the provocation, or series of
provocations, under which Tokyo acted.

Japanese ambitions in China were first revealed
after the war over Korea in 1894, when the Japanese
attempted to obtain a virtual protectorate over
Southern Manchuria and were prevented only by the
opposition of the European Powers, especially Rus-
sia. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan again
acquired extensive concessions and interests in that
region, interests which were subsequently curtailed by
the Peace Conference held at Portsmouth, U.S.A.,
largely owing to the determined stand taken by
President Roosevelt.

The next move came in 1915, when Japanese aims
at obtaining a strangle-hold on the rich Manchurian
trade were startlingly displayed in the famous
"Twenty-One Demands/* Once again Japan had to
admit defeat in the face of strong American opposi-

160 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

tion in the name of the "Open Door," Equal Oppor-
tunity and respect for the territorial integrity of
China, The ending of the war, however, found the
Japanese still in Shantung and Eastern Siberia, and
the difficulty experienced by the Powers in securing
the evacuation of these areas showed that Japan had
abated none of her designs on the Asiatic mainland.

Further, it may be recalled that in 1920 the Jap-
anese Government made strenuous attempts to have
Japan's financial and industrial activities in Man-
churia and Mongolia excluded from the purview of
the International Banking Consortium on the ground
that the operations of this body might create "a seri-
ous impediment to the security and the economic life
and national defense of Japan/* Thus it will be seen
that ten years before the recent crisis arose, Japanese
diplomacy was using the blessed word "security** to
justify the continuance of a position of virtual mo-
nopoly in Manchuria.

Nor is it surprising if the Chinese Government,
faced with the statement that the Japanese occupa-
tion of Manchuria had become necessary to put down
banditry and provide security for Japanese lives and
property, remembered and found a parallel situation
in the declarations made by the Japanese and Ameri-
can delegates at the Washington Conference regard-
ing the continued Japanese occupation of Eastern
Siberia after the Great War. At that Conference
Baron Shidehara declared that Japanese troops were
remaining in Siberia to protect the lives and prop-

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT

erty of Japanese subjects and the security of the
Korean frontier. Their activity was "confined to
measures of self -protection against the menace to
their own safety and to the safety of their country
and nationals."

Mr. Hughes, American Secretary of State, com-
menting upon this claim, said that in the view of the
United States Government the continued occupation
by the Japanese forces of strategic centers in Eastern
Siberia and their establishment of a civil administra-
tion in the areas occupied "inevitably lends itself to
misconception and antagonism and tends rather to
increase than to allay the unrest and disorder in that
region/* He further regretted that "Japan should
deem necessary the occupation of Russian territory
as a means of assuring a suitable adjustment with the
future Russian Government" and said that candor
compelled the Government of the United States to
declare that it could not, either now or hereafter,
"recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of
the present occupation and control and that it cannot
acquiesce in any action taken by the Government of
Japan which might impair existing treaty rights or
the political or territorial integrity of Russia."

Remembering that history has a habit of repeating
itself, and in the face of this parallel case in which
Japan advanced precisely similar arguments to those
used to excuse the occupation of Manchuria, the
Chinese Government regarded the Japanese declara-
tions that the occupation was intended to secure a

162 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

satisfactory settlement of outstanding issues regard-
ing railways, loans, security, and other matters as
mere camouflage, and declared that the real aim of
the Japanese Government was political and economic
the wresting of new concessions in Manchuria, if
not, indeed, the forcing of virtual independence on
the Three Provinces as a Japanese preserve, and their
separation from China by military action. And it
was on this basis that the issue was political rather
than domestic that the Chinese Government ap-
pealed to the League of Nations and invoked the pro-
tection of the League Covenant, under which the
integrity of her territory was guaranteed by all the
members of the League.

"No nation can be prosecutor, judge, jury, and
executioner in settling disputes with another, with-
out becoming a potential menace to the entire civil-
ized world," declared the Shanghai Evening Post and
Mercury, commenting upon China's case.

"That is precisely the position in which Japan has
permitted the war clique to place her, in its pro-
gram of wreaking vengeance upon China without
regard to pledges of peaceful arbitration.

"No one can doubt for one moment that Japan
has a myriad of grievances against China, many of
them undoubtedly just. No foreign nation which
has struggled for the past decade or decades to ar-
rive at a settlement of diplomatic issues with the
variety of Chinese Governments can wholly lack
sympathy with Japan's desire to accelerate long over-

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 163

due agreements. But wrongful actions cannot be
condoned even in the most just cause.

"We have the spectacle of Japan plunging head-
long into military occupation of Manchuria, bomb-
ing, blasting, shooting its way into civil, political,
and economic control without recourse to the instru-
ments which she signed with China, pledging that
they both would renounce war as a means of settling
disputes.

"It is not over the justice of her charges against
China that we state our sharp disagreement with
Japan; it is with both the wisdom and the justice of
her method of arriving at a settlement.

"Just as private citizens are prohibited by every
civilized state in the world from taking violent meas-
ures to obtain redress from their fellows, without
first having appealed to the state, so are nations in a
civilized world pledged by their honor to submit their
disputes to peaceful arbitration in advance of mak-
ing warlike moves.

"It is both ridiculous and futile to insist that the
Manchurian occupation is a 'local incident/ being
confined to 'local areas.* The fact is that the pres-
ence of Japanese troops in purely Chinese territory
will continue to make it impossible to confine the
aroused bitterness of China to any locality, as well
Japan must know. As these bitter antagonisms arise,
they will be pointed to as the causes of conflict; and
for the purpose of keeping the record entirely
straight, we reiterate our position.

164 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

"Each of Japan's three hundred charges against
China may be just. But Japan's method of attempt-
ing to obtain justice is the method of the savage; the
method of the mob; the methods of the brute. It
will work only if we confess that the whole structure
of civilization has failed/'

Influential British newspapers expressed the same
opinion in more guarded language.

"This is not the first time that a moment when
Western eyes have been distracted by other events
has been seized by Japan to further her own policies,"
stated the Sunday Times, while the London Times
(September 21, 1931) stated that "there is no excuse
for the Japanese officers who struck the blow without
consulting their Government. They have presented
Nanking with a grievance/*

The New York Evening Post likewise admitted, in
the course of an editorial article, that Japan had
sought a settlement of just grievances in the wrong
way, declaring: "Japan's modern European clothes
have not changed her ancient habits. When all the
nations of the West are giving every effort towards
saving the one greatest of them all Japan creeps up
on her ancient enemy and with a sudden military
swoop steals from China the city of Mukden. The
act, in its slyness, shrewdness, and complete lack of
good faith, internationally, is entirely characteristic
of the tribal chiefs who ruled old Japan/'

The New York World-Telegram stated that Japan,
by making war on China, had violated the Kellogg

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 165

Pact. "Two years ago the United States sharply de-
manded an explanation from Soviet Russia for viola-
tion of Chinese territorial rights in North Manchuria.
Now Japan is guilty of one of the grossest aggressive
wars of conquest in modern history. The Chinese
knew they were protected by the Kellogg Pact and
the Nine-Power Washington Treaty of 1922. To
these pacts the United States has pledged her honor.
If the United States Government wishes to have
honor, it will have to act. It will have to demand
jointly of the Treaty Powers alone if necessary
that Japan withdraw and make restitution."

Especially significant, in view of the Chinese pro-
tests that the real aims of Japan were political and
economic, was the opinion advanced by foreigners in
Manchuria, comparatively early in the conflict, that
Japan would take the opportunity thus presented to
seize and hold the Chinese port of Hulu-tao, which
during recent years had proved a serious competitor
to the Japanese port of Dairen.

Railway development in Southern Manchuria has
so closely linked the centers of Manchurian trade
with this port that Hulu-tao has handled millions
of pounds* worth of trade which formerly went to
Dairen. Moreover, its geographical position gives it
decided advantages over the Japanese port, Hulu-tao
being considerably nearer to North Manchuria and
freight charges therefore being lower.

"This place," stated a correspondent in the Man-
chester Guardian- (December 10, 1931), "is the real

166 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

key of all the Japanese movements. Hulu-tao is a
natural land-locked, deep-water harbor, capable of
holding the entire Japanese fleet. This port is free
for navigation, winter and summer. Possessed of
Hulu-tao and with Port Arthur as an outpost, the
Japanese navy would have complete and secret op-
portunities for movement. All its resources could be
drawn from Manchuria. This harbor is an object of
Japanese policy which they have never abandoned,
and, whatever their declarations or their movements
now, they are determined somehow to obtain pos-
session of it/*

To secure Hulu-tao, however, it was necessary first
to occupy Chinchow. Here, perhaps, may be the
real objective behind the Japanese capture of that
city on January 2, 1932, in defiance of the resolu-
tions of the League of Nations, and in the face of the
protests made to Tokyo by the Governments of Great
Britain, the United States, and France.

Japan's record since 1895, and her recent actions in
flouting the opinion of the League in order to obtain
control of the whole of Manchuria, are the basis of
the firm conviction held by the Chinese Government
that Japan is attempting to do to-day what she was
prevented by the United States and other Powers
from achieving in 1915. The Chinese opinion that
the many issues outstanding between the two nations
played no part in Japanese policy except to throw
dust in the eyes of the League and neutral opinion
may or may not be justified. Certainly it may be

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 167

said that, realizing the menace of Japanese aims, the
Chinese Government was badly advised to permit
these outstanding issues to remain unsettled, and thus
present Japan with grievances which could be utilized
to explain away her actions.

Probably the essential conflict in Manchuria had to
come to a head. Whether China is right concerning
Japan's real intentions, or whether Japan is right
when Tokyo states that it exercised patience until
that patience was exhausted and only when Man-
churia was relapsing into anarchy did its troops act in
order to protect the lives and property of Japanese
subjects, is a puzzle the solution of which cannot be
known with certainty until the direct negotiations
between China and Japan which must sooner or later
come, have revealed the price of Japanese evacuation.

Reviewing this record of torn-up agreements, the
denial of treaty rights to Japan, and the continuous
forward pressure which Japan has maintained in
Manchuria for years; remembering the vital impor-
tance of the maintenance of law and order in that
region not only to Japan but to other nations, and
bearing in mind the large amounts of Japanese capi-
tal which have flowed into the country during the
past twenty-five years, it will be realized that with-
out a complete change of heart on the part of either
China or Japan, or both, something like an open
breach was sooner or later unavoidable. There was
no room within a Chinese-owned Manchuria for
Japan's "forward" policy of industrial development*

168 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

exposed to the pin-pricks, delays, and tortuous
methods of Chinese diplomacy. Nor was it likely
that Japan could continue to draw upon the natural
wealth of the Three Provinces as a reserve for Jap-
anese factories, while China, flushed with a patriotic
fever and shouting the catchwords of nationalism, not
only refused to discuss any extension of facilities for
development, but agitated for the cancellation of all
"unequal treaties" and the return of concessions to
China. And while, it may be added, hatred of Japan
grew into a national obsession and the economic boy-
cott against Japanese goods assumed the proportions
of "an unarmed act of war" upon Tokyo.

Whether the Japanese had increased the wealth and
importance of Manchuria was beside the point. To
the crowds of students who parade Chinese cities with
banners bearing the legend "Down with the For-
eigners," they were usurpers. The tension increased
visibly year by year, and it was too much to hope
that it would not spread to Manchuria, the region
where Chinese and Japanese meet face to face, and in
which is congregated the main portion of Japanese
industrial interests in China.

Conflict was inevitable. The Japanese people are
as determined to maintain privileges dating from the
war with Russia, as are the Chinese that these priv-
ileges must be swept away. Hence the Chinese re- fc
fusal to accept any Japanese definition of existing
treaty rights the famous fifth "fundamental prin-
ciple" debated by the League Council and finally left

THE ESSENTIAL CONFLICT 169

out of the League resolutions concerning the conflict
as insoluble. 1 China, in the mood of 1931, far from
being prepared to grant fresh concessions to Japan,
was demanding the rescinding of past concessions on
the grounds that the treaties had been forced upon
past Chinese Governments by force majeure. In these
circumstances, the amazing fact is not that the con-
flict came, but that it was delayed so long, and that it
has affected to so small an extent the expanding trade
of Manchuria.

i See Chapter IX.

CHAPTER VI

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR

TOWARDS the end of 1905 several ominous
events occurred in Moscow, Kronstadt, and
Sebastopol; there were outbreaks and open mu-
tiny in both the navy and army, and a general revo-
lutionary spirit was abroad. Such a breakdown of
discipline in the Russian armed forces was unprece-
dented and may be traced to the untiring zeal of
those who preached the doctrine of revolution.

Propaganda was the new and powerful weapon
that had come to the fore. Throughout the war be-
tween Russia and Japan it had been carried on, active
spirits were at work preparing the ground, under-
mining on a gradually increasing scale, until it blos-
somed out into a widespread organization, backed by
unlimited funds and a virile directorate.

With the requisite driving force, and all that was
needed to give sustained and unimpeded impetus, it
permeated every sphere of society finding its way
into military, political, moral, and economic circles.
In Russia the seed fell on fruitful ground; for gen-
erations the peasants, who comprise three-quarters
of the population, had been in a state of discontent.
They were for the greater part totally illiterate, ready
to listen and respond to any agitators who appeared,

170

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 171

and formed ripe material for the new force the Bol-
sheviks were exploiting.

Following the overthrow of the Czar in 1917, and
the coming of the revolution, there poured into the
country revolutionaries from the old and new worlds,
from whom were chosen the staff and executive to
run the new republic, and demonstrate to the uni-
verse the blessings of Utopia. The Bolsheviks then
elaborated their program, pouring out such material
and propaganda that, in forceful argument, left the
Jesuitical utterances of the Germans and others far
behind.

In so far as Russia was concerned we can trace the
fitful and unfortunate attempts of various ministries,
such as those of Goremykin, Stunner, and Trepoflf,
to stay the normal course of Russian life, and give a
definite check to the desire for education and prog-
ress, even though they be on slow but progressive
lines. This had much to do with the rise of propa-
ganda, and the steps that were taken to hamper pub-
lic opinion, and stultify any attempt at advancement,
provided ample material and roused the resentment of
the people, which was reflected in the navy and army.

In 1918 the tide of Communism flowed towards
the Far East and Manchuria; the war prisoners in-
terned in Russian Central Asia and Siberia were also
moving in that direction when they were released by
the advent of the Bolsheviks, to roam the entire coun-
try in East and Central Asia.

In 1918 Koltchak at the head of the anti-Bolshevik

172 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

party was driven eastwards through Siberia, and his
army broke up and dispersed in various directions.
Amongst them were a number of Chinese soldiers and
followers originally employed as laborers behind the
Russian lines on the German and Austrian fronts.
With the Czarist collapse they had but two alterna-
tives either to regain their own country under try-
ing and harassing conditions, or take service with the
Bolsheviks. The majority chose the latter, with un-
limited opportunities for loot, murder, and rapine,
and to these mercenaries good pay was always forth-
coming as executioners and cleaners of the Augean
stables in various parts of Russia. The pay was, of
course, the ruling element, for there is ever a lack of
it in the Chinese service; it has perforce to filter
through many channels, and only reaches the soldier
in an attenuated form.

With all the many protagonists of anarchy and
chaos moving towards Manchuria it may be readily
imagined that confusion reached its climax. Quick
to seize opportunities, and to derive the utmost advan-
tage from the apt material at hand, the Bolsheviks
still further developed their system of propaganda, of
which the main feature was its anti-British tone.
Some of it was also quasi-Islamic in character, reveal-
ing them in the light of champions of the oppressed
peoples of the East. To give the requisite color to
this illusion they sent a number of Indians headed by
one who had been expelled from India as a dangerous
anarchist.

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 173

It is interesting to note that the Bolsheviks con-
sidered Britain as the main obstacle to overcome in
their endeavor to establish paramountcy in the Far
East, and they, therefore, devoted themselves with un-
abated energy to the task of destroying British power
and prestige, declaring that the success of the scheme
for emancipation of the East and the realization of
their ambitions towards a Soviet domination of Asia
must stand or fall by the success achieved against us,
and that this, incidentally, was the only way to in-
sure a revolution in Great Britain.

By a general conflagration in the East the British
could be burnt out of Asia, and the world revolution
would go on unchecked. At the same time there was
method in their madness, for they appreciated the
dangers involved in an Asiatic flare, and realized that
only by continually directing its force against the
British could they prevent its turning and burning
themselves.

Amongst the interesting libels circulated through
Central Asia concerning us was one to the effect that
we had bombarded and destroyed the tomb of the
Prophet; that we had ravaged and laid in ruins the
holy places, had violated the women, and cast the
Quran amongst swine.

The Chinese authorities in Manchuria and East
Asia were remarkably tolerant of all the numerous
and discordant elements that swept into the country
during 1918-20, and their forbearance at this time
did much to mitigate the difficulties of a situation for

174 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

which they were totally unprepared. All Eastern
Asia was swarming with propagandists, and not only
the Chinese but the allied forces then in part occupa-
tion of Siberia became alive to the dangers of a con-
flagration and realized that drastic action was called
for. A number of agitators were arrested and sum-
marily executed, which had the temporary effect of
instilling dread into the others.

In order to present a clear picture of events leading
up to the efforts the Soviet made to constitute East
Asia as the headquarters for the revolution designed
to put all Asia in their grip, we must explain that
there were many obstacles to concerted action on the
part of the Powers in the Far East. Not the least of
these was the jealousy amongst them, Japanese sus-
picion of the United States, and the Chinese fear that
every move made had some ulterior and sinister mo-
tive, threatening not only their authority but their
sovereignty in China proper.

The Chinese were also apprehensive of the Bolshe-
vik intentions in Mongolia, where they were carrying
on an intensive propaganda by means of agitators
who endeavored to recall to the people the days of
their forefathers and their former might. Only from
the triumph of anarchic revolution could universal
peace and prosperity be gained, they said, and not by
the steady progress of democracy that favors govern-
ment in the interest, and subject to the control, of
all the governed. Here again effective grease for the

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1HE OUTRAGE THAT PREaPlTATED THE NONNI BRIDGE BATTLE
The Japanese-owned Taonan-Angandu railway line destroyed by the Chinese.

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 175

wheel is money, and of this a supply seems always
forthcoming.

"With finance, derived whence none can exactly
say, the Bolsheviks have brought propaganda to a fine
art; but so far the Mongols have remained deaf to
Soviet exhortations. Probably the tenets of Lamaism,
and its opposition to any form of progress and ad-
vancement, least of all that engendered by a revolu-
tion, are responsible for the Mongol attitude.

Credit is due to the Japanese for their efforts to
counteract this campaign, and from what they have
accomplished the Mongols see that all is not well with
the Soviet and the doctrine of Communism, and even
if the atrocities in Russia have been exaggerated the
state of destitution, misery, and suffering has not,
whilst it is evident to the Mongols that a redistribu-
tion of this world's goods by the Soviet oligarchy
could only end in the goods taking wing and vanish-
ing for all time.

With the more educated Mongols the propaganda
might have some effect, were it conducted on sane
and ethical lines, for the memory of the Mongol con-
querors is still fresh, and the legend says that Jenghiz
Khan, the first of die Mongol Napoleons, lies buried
on the summit of the sacred mountain overlooking
the capital at Urga, a point to which access is denied
lest the famous warrior be disturbed in a sleep that
shall end in a second coming to renew his former
conquests.

With so little result to show for their efforts in

176 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

Mongolia the Soviet turned with added zest to Man-
churia. Tragedy grim and stark was moving through
the East, and, as we have already seen, refugees flying
from the horrors and political chaos of Russia sought
asylum in the promised land, flocking to the larger
towns such as Harbin, Kirin, and Mukden.

Russia having surrendered her extra-territorial
rights, the erstwhile order of things was reversed; the
yellow man lorded it over the white, with the power
of arrest and punishment. This gave a false sense of
proportion to the Chinese, which, coupled with the
economic bankruptcy of Russia and the internal con-
ditions prevailing in that country, has resulted in
the Bolsheviks gaining very little ground.

At the present time their activities are centered in
an organization in Northern Manchuria which num-
bers in its ranks the trade unions of Russian workers,
subordinated to the Third International, the latter a
part of the Soviet Government itself.

This organization, known as the Prof soyuz, is the
mainspring of Soviet activity in Manchuria, and
when the Soviet seized the Chinese Eastern Railway
as described in another chapter, they used its re-
sources and revenue to further the Red cause. The
application of the railway funds to the benefit of the
Soviet workers was bitterly resented by the Chinese,
for whom nothing is done and to whom no benefits
from the railway can accrue unless they are definitely
supporters of Red rule. Instead of being applied in
a legitimate way to the enhancement of the common

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 177

welfare the railway is regarded as a means of pro-
viding the Soviet with funds to develop the Red doc-
trine throughout Manchuria, leaving the Chinese, as
equal partners in the line, out of the reckoning.

The Bolsheviks have always regarded Asia as the
starting point for the struggle to precede the world
revolution upon which they have set their hearts.

As far back as 1900 Lenin and his satellites, who
were waiting the opportunity to destroy Czarism,
celebrated, with others of the anarchistic groups, the
murder by Chinese Boxers of scores of missionaries,
as the torch that proclaimed the lighting of the revo-
lutionary fire. Secure in their retreat in Switzerland,
as well as from London, various statements were sent
out to the world that the masses of enslaved humanity
of East and West must unite and make a clean sweep
of the whole world. Only by putting the massed
population of Asia in motion, an army representing
one half of the universe, eight hundred millions of
people, eager to burst the bonds of slavery, should we
see the Soviet form of government established in all
Asiatic countries.

The Communistic idea is so simple and easy, said
Lenin, so adaptable that it can take root anywhere,
and find favor as much amongst the Chinese as the
Hindus or Moslems. The wish here was father to
the thought, for from personal experience of the
Asiatic peoples, embracing more than thirty races,
none of them appears anxious to be "emancipated**
under Bolshevik auspices.

178 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

The Bolsheviks anticipate that all the Asiatic races,
irrespective of religion, will go forward as one united
whole. In this fallacy they display a poor knowledge
of the psychology of Eastern peoples. As an example
let us look at India, a land of almost infinite diversity
of religion. Hinduism numbers in its ranks about
two hundred and twenty millions in India alone, ac-
counting for one-eighth of the population of the
globe, and one-half of the total inhabitants of the
British Empire. It is a creed with a philosophy of
existence fundamentally different from that of any
in the West. It affects the ordinary acts of daily life
at every point, a religious system so ancient and so
powerful that it is the sheet anchor of indigenous
India.

It is to a certain extent a gloomy religion; for, with
the advancing centuries, the bright and cheerful
deities of the Veda have given way to the demons who
maintain a strangle-hold on the Hindus. These
demoniacal gods keep the people in a constant state
of terror; they are haunted by the memory of sins
which they are supposed to have committed in a
former state of existence, and worse danger ahead can
only be obviated by placating the priesthood with
monetary offerings. So the priest becomes a capital-
ist, and at once automatically places himself beyond
the Bolshevik pale. It is a long way to the Hindu
heaven, and the road to it is beset with difficulties, so
much so that the prospect of getting there is never a
bright one with the Hindu.

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 179

Although the British during their two hundred
years in India have endeavored to apply a policy of
tolerance and a benevolent attitude towards the man-
ners and customs, the creeds and prejudices, of Hindu
and Moslem alike, they, with all the tact and di-
plomacy which, admittedly, have been displayed in
India, could not in any wise affect or alter the vital
differences between Hindus and Moslems.

In a masterly summary of the causes of Hindu-
Moslem tension the Simon Commission report con-
siders that the strained relations between the two
religions provide one of the most serious complica-
tions for statesmanship, and that this question recurs
in different forms and degrees in almost every part of
India. The nature of these antagonisms which the
rival communities tend to develop, the extent to
which this tension is growing or dying away, and the
influence these considerations are bound to exercise
upon constitutional problems, are all-important if
there is to be any hope of bringing them in on the
side of Bolshevism.

So strong is the mutual dislike, and so improbable
the chance of any cooperation in the emancipation
scheme, that the opposition is intensified by religious
practices constantly provoking ill-feeling. For ex-
ample, the Hindu regards the cow as the object of
greatest veneration, whilst, on the other hand, the
ceremonial sacrifice of cows is a f eature of one of the
principal Moslem festivals. Hindu music played
through the streets when an idol is being taken out

180 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

for public worship, may happen to synchronize with
the call to prayer of the Moslem, with the result that
fierce resentment is shown, and a riot almost invariably
ensues. There is then a cat and dog fight, until the
British step in and separate the combatants, attend to
the wounded, and make earnest efforts on both sides
to reach a modus Vivendi. Despite the watchfulness
of the British, the immediate cause of communal
disorder is invariably the religious issue, whilst re-
ligious zeal is ever present to act as a stimulant what-
ever the nature or origin of the conflict may be.

To any one with experience of India the idea of co-
operation between Hindus and Moslems, on the lines
the Bolsheviks have mapped out, is fantastic, to say
the least of it*

Fierce disturbances are always arising between
Hindus and Moslems, especially in the turbulent parts
of Northern India, contiguous to the border line of
Central Asia, which the Bolsheviks consider such
fruitful ground. The wild Pathans come down from
the hills and valleys into Northern Hindustan, to kill
and raid among the fat Hindu lands of the plain.

Ordinarily these people are affable and hail-fellow-
well-met, but when it comes to a question of the
Hindu, the vile infidel whom the Quran ordains shall
be laid in wait for and slain wherever he shall be
found, it is astonishing the amount of murderous
energy the Moslem can put into his work.

By killing the Hindu, or any non-Moslem, he is
assured of paradise, with a passport to the favor of

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 181

Allah, and so these spells of fierceness and religious
fanaticism are by no means uncommon. When little
differences arise between the rival religions it is al-
ways the luckless Britisher who is called upon to re-
store peace and tranquillity. The first thing that the
Maharajah of Kashmir did in November 1931, when
his state became a fighting ground for Hindu and
Moslem, was to beseech the aid of British troops to
restore the status quo, as well as for a British official
to inquire into the causes of the unrest and endeavor
to solve a problem which was quite beyond the ca-
pacity of the Indian!

Then there is the question of caste, that terrible
incubus amongst the Hindus which is the root and
branch of their social fabric. It would be a formi-
dable stumbling-block to Bolshevism, for the rules and
regulations of this ancient social system grip the peo-
ple as in a vise, from which there is no deviation, and
still preserving, as it did four thousand years ago, an
unchanged outlook on life.

No matter how talented or wealthy a Hindu may
be, how gifted or energetic, he remains of the caste
in which he was born. He cannot marry outside that
caste, he cannot eat or drink from the utensils be-
longing to one of a lower or higher caste, for this
would bring pollution, and for most of the offenses
against the caste system he runs the risk of sixty thou-
sand years in hell.

His caste is known to his next-door neighbor, and
it keeps the man of low degree from rising in the

182 MANCHURIA. THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

social scale, and effectually stamps out the fire of am-
bition. At the head of the caste system are the
Brahmans, all-powerful, occupying the paramount
position, presiding over the destiny of two hundred
and twenty millions of people, retaining an absolute
monopoly as priests, and a claim to knowledge and
authority out of all proportion to their number.

This is a mighty obstacle to overcome, even to such
experienced propagandists as the Bolsheviks.

Then there are the Moslems; seventy millions in
India alone, whose spiritual head the Sheikh ul Islam
has declared that the doctrines of Bolshevism are at
variance with the tenets of Islam, and enjoining all
true believers to abjure such teachings as inimical to
their faith and precepts.

All over Asia one meets the same conditions; the
teeming life, the countless numbers of people of
every degree of social status who are absorbed in pur-
suing the traditional course of their daily lives.
"Whether it be India, China, the Malay Archipelago,
Siam, or Tibet, the population is largely rural, de-
pendent upon the crops for a livelihood, knowing
little or nothing of politicians, and not wishing to,
and ruled in their daily lives and actions by age-old
customs which it would take generations to modify
or alter.

In the Soviet campaign for emancipation Moslems
and Buddhists would have to play a part; but
Moslems and Buddhists regard one another with ill-
disguised hostility, an attitude that has always char-

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 183

acterized relations between these two great rival
religions. It is true that a certain amount of satis-
faction was evinced at the Japanese victory over the
Russians in 1905, due, however, to the antipathy
created by the Russians, who had ridden roughshod
over Chinese and Moslems alike in their endeavor to
monopolize the Far East. Encouraged by this display
of good will the Japanese essayed both secretly and
officially to gain touch with Constantinople, in the
hope of facilitating reciprocal action against Russia,
but the overtures failed to materialize.

Quite apart from the fact that a combination be-
tween these rival faiths is unthinkable, even were it at
all practical, the time required for such a mental
metamorphosis, and to attain a footing of equality,
would be generations, for both sides would have to
enter a completely new world, with new ideas, to cast
aside inherent beliefs and convictions, and revolution-
ize their mode of life, thought, and being, which has
taken centuries to evolve.

The Bolsheviks consider that Communism finds
favor among the Chinese. On the contrary, its prog-
ress is negligible, for its principles interfere with pri-
vate trade, which is vital to the Chinese, whilst they
strike at private liberty, a leading feature in the so-
cial life of the nation. Moreover, although it may not
develop, there is a feeling in favor of the restoration
of the monarchy on sound constitutional lines, for
a republican form of government is not suited to the
Chinese temperament. To create a republican spirit

184 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

there must be certain essentials on which to build up
the fabric. These are wanting, and until they are
created the form of rule must be oligarchic.

In dealings with the Chinese one always noticed the
consistent respect shown for the emperor as the tem-
poral and spiritual head of the nation, for under the
monarchy the family was the national unit, and the
emperor the father of all. With a republic there
must necessarily be a change of leader, and this in it-
self invests the head of the nation with transitory
power, and one without prestige, whilst it lacks the
main feature of imperialism, as the term is under-
stood in China, that of concentrating authority and
focusing the loyalty of the people.

Apart from this dislike of Communism, the ethics
of Confucianism, on which the entire life and being of
the Chinese have been based from time immemorial,
constitute the people anti-militarist; and in an ag-
gressive movement, such as the emancipation plans
demand, the pacifist nature of the Chinese, both by
instinct and training, would assert itself. They have
no aspirations in the required direction, and in case
of dispute, irrespective of the issues at stake, media-
tion, much more than any form of action, would at
once be the strongest point. With the establishment
of a sound constitutional rule, the Chinese would
take the path leading to peace and prosperity, for
they are certainly not partial to Soviet ideas.

China and Russia are the two principal landholders
in Asia and the East; each has a vast population, and

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 185

natural resources as yet undeveloped, that will render
them self-contained and independent of the rest of
the world. Their political, commercial, and economic
possibilities must influence the balance of power in
Asia, as well as that in Europe.

The various moves in Manchuria, of China, Russia,
and Japan, the studied restraint of the one, or the
forward march of the other, are therefore of para-
mount interest and throw much light on the relative
progress the Soviet plans are making. It also brings
out in strong relief the moot point whether China
will ever assume a place as a dominant power. For
this she fails in the main essentials of strength and
self-assertion. On the other hand, in population and
potential strength China is the first in the world,
and her natural, industrial, and economic resources
are such that she could be the richest country, and
her national debt would be trifling in comparison
with the revenue she could produce.

With this review of the Communist chances in the
East let us pass to the Soviet record and Communism
in general in Manchuria.

Having surrendered all the extra-territorial rights
formerly enjoyed by Russian subjects in China under
the "unequal treaties," Moscow's interests in Man-
churia, and in the crisis arising out of Japanese ac-
tions, appear to be limited to three aims: to maintain
the orderly working, free from political complica-
tions, of the Chinese Eastern Railway, under the joint
management of the Soviet and Chinese Governments;

186 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

to preserve the "open door" for trade between the
two countries; and, in the words of Molotov, 1 to ab-
stain from any action against the interests of the
Chinese people "striving for their independence and
national unity."

f There are no Soviet troops in Manchuria; the Chi-
nese Eastern Railway is guarded only by Chinese, and
while, naturally, Russia maintains an armed force
along the Siberian frontier, Moscow has stated defi-
nitely that "no Red troops or armaments were sent
East" during the tune that Japanese troops were lo-
cated over the greater part of Manchuria, up to
within a few miles of Soviet territory.

This restraint, for the situation was not without its
dangers to the Soviet, was in conformity alike with
the declarations of neutrality in the crisis, and the
avowed policy of Moscow to avoid any warlike ad-
ventures.

In truth, Russia had everything to lose and nothing
to gain by becoming actively involved in the Man-
churian embroglio. The appearance of the Bolsheviks
on Chinese soil would almost certainly have ranged
world opinion behind Japan and turned a situation
already delicate in the extreme into possible action
against Bolshevik designs in the Far East.

With world opinion mobilized by the League of
Nations, and tending to be highly critical of Japanese
action, the Soviet authorities were chary of becoming

i Speech reported in Moscow Pravda, November 12, 1931

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 187

involved to their own detriment in the Manchurian
adventure.

Contrary to their usual course Moscow pursued the
path of rectitude, which did not, however, prevent
the militarist Japanese, or their allies of the press,
from spreading rumors. They, no less than Moscow,
realized that with world opinion critical of Japan's
actions, there was no sounder policy than to counter-
mobilize the anti-Soviet Governments behind Tokyo
by revealing the influence of the "Red hand" in stif-
fening the Chinese resistance to Japan. There is evi-
dence for declaring that the Japanese Government
was opposed to this policy of intimidating Soviet
Russia, realizing it to be a two-edged sword, and that
the history of Japan's relations with China since 1915
would, if a comparison were made, compare unfavor-
ably with the conciliatory attitude of the present
rulers of Russia.

It seems the Japanese War Office was undecided
how far it was safe to play the anti-Soviet ace. But
the Japanese Generals in Manchuria who were setting
up pro- Japanese administrations in the Three Prov-
inces expressed themselves differently. Hence the
rumors concerning the presence of Russian officers
with the Chinese forces, of Russian ammunition being
supplied to them, of Russian corpses found on the
battlefields, of troop movements carried out on the
Chinese Eastern Railway with the permission and ap-
proval of the Soviet managers, but of which no
definite evidence is forthcoming* Hence, too, the

188 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

even more perilous gamble which caused the Japanese
to carry their advance to Tsitsihar, in the direction
of the Soviet frontier, and near enough to raise the
grave question of a Chinese retreat over the border,
with the possibility of Japanese pursuit which might
have forced the Soviet hand.

This danger of an invasion of Soviet territory was
averted, and the rumors of Soviet intervention which
served to quieten the Great Powers and the United
States, while the Japanese troops moved northwards,
were proved to have no foundation in fact. The
statements in the British and American press concern-
ing the presence of Russian advisers with the Chinese
armies, and Russian corpses after the fighting, were
subsequently denied by the Japanese High Command
in Manchuria, which issued a statement declaring that
further investigations had shown that the presence of
Russian officers with the Chinese forces was uncon-
firmed. The denial, however, was issued after the
Japanese movement into Northern Manchuria had
been completed.

The charge concerning the carrying of Chinese
troops and munitions on the Chinese Eastern Railway
was the subject of an interchange of Notes between
the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow and M. Litvinoff,
Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

The Japanese Government declared that it did not
believe that the Government of the U.S.S.R. sup-
ported or approved the use by Chinese troops of
the Chinese Eastern Railway, and emphasized that the

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 189

Japanese army had not the smallest intention of inter-
fering with the working of that line. But, the Note
added, the Japanese Government must insist upon the
strict neutrality of the Soviet Government and that
no Chinese troop movements be allowed to take place.
The Note further compared the situation in Man-
churia with the events of 1929, during the dispute
between the Soviet and Chinese Governments con-
cerning the administration of the Chinese Eastern
Railway, when many of the Soviet employees were
arrested and imprisoned by the Chinese, and a Russian
force entered Manchuria to secure their release and
enforce treaty rights as joint-owner and administra-
tor of the line.

Litvinoff replied a few days later (November 20)
at a meeting with the Japanese Ambassador at Mos-
cow. The Soviet Foreign Minister pointed out that
there was no analogy between the Sino- Japanese con-
flict and the Sino-Soviet disagreement of 1929. "The
Soviet Government never took advantage of their
power against the weakness of China at that time.
Our troops entered Manchuria only after the Chinese
and 'White* Russians (anti-Bolshevik exiles in Man-
churia) had twice invaded Soviet territory. As soon
as this threat had been liquidated, the Soviet forces
immediately left Manchurian territory.

"The South Manchurian Railway," continued Lit-
vinoff's reply, "is under the complete control of the
Japanese, who have military guards in the railway
zone. The Chinese Eastern Railway is under mixed

190 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

control of the Soviet and Chinese, and there are no
Russian military detachments to guard the railway
or enforce instructions regarding its use. Directly
the danger of the line being used for Chinese troop
movements arose and this only happened when the
Japanese armed forces were moving north an order
was sent to the Soviet representative on the railway
administration instructing him in no circumstances
to give his consent to the transport of any troops
Chinese or Japanese on the line. Up to date this
order has not been infringed.

"The previous assurance of your Government that
military operations in Manchuria will be limited as
much as possible is, however, not entirely fulfilled.
The military operations are spread over a territory
greater than was expected would be the case, and this
factor more than anything else gives us cause for
anxiety." *

It is probable that the Japanese military authorities
never seriously wished to add the grave risks of a
serious conflict with Moscow to their embarrassments.
None will deny that they made use, in their propa-
ganda, of the Russian menace to counter, during the
critical days when they were moving over most of
Manchuria, the activities of the League of Nations
and the protests of world opinion.

The well-informed diplomats at Tokyo could not
have overlooked the evidence which has accumulated
during recent years that the Soviet Government is

*Pravda, Moscow, November 21, 1931

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 191

averse to foreign adventures and has repeatedly de-
clared that it does not seek territorial aggrandizement
at the expense of China. Had Soviet Russia contem-
plated establishing a zone of influence in Manchuria
at the expense of Chinese unity, and as a counter-
balance to Japan, the dispute concerning the Chinese
Eastern Railway in 1929 would have afforded a suffi-
cient pretext to force the issue.

The Chinese Eastern Railway is Russian state
property. Marshal Chang-Tso-Lin seized the line in
1926 and arrested M. Ivanov, the Russian director of
the railway. As already related, strong representa-
tions to Mukden subsequently led to the release of
the imprisoned man and the restoration of the line to
its owners. In July 1929 came the second and more
serious crisis. Chang Hsueh-liang, the old Marshal's
son and successor, seized the railway, and hundreds
of Soviet officials and citizens in Manchuria were
arrested and thrown into Chinese prisons.

In our policy of studied impartiality we must note
the reasons behind this high-handed action, more vio-
lent than those incidents which the Japanese advanced
as justifying their military operations in September
1931, were not any disregard of treaty obligations by
the Soviet Government. "The real object in view,"
declared the Bulletin of International Affairs (Lon-
don) ,* "is to be found in the long-cherished desire of
the Chinese Government to obtain complete control

i Issue dated July 18, 1929.

192 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

of the Chinese Eastern Railway to the exclusion of
Russian influence."

The illegal seizure of Russian state property and
the unlawful arrest of Soviet citizens directly threat-
ened the existence of Russia's one substantial interest
in the Far East the Chinese Eastern Railway, which
under Russian administration had rapidly grown in
importance. The very real value of the interests at
stake in the dispute is shown by the fact that the
number of passengers carried more than doubled be-
tween 1925 and 1928, and freight rose from 3,000,-
000 tons to J ,459,000 tons in 1928. Millions of rubles
were expended on the renewal of equipment, the con-
struction of workers' homes, and new rolling stock.
Further, the Sino-Soviet treaties of 1924 provided
that the working staff of the line should be composed
of equal numbers of Russians and Chinese. To carry
this clause of the treaty into effect, the Bolsheviks
proceeded to train large numbers of Chinese in rail-
way work, and the number of Chinese employed on
the line in 1928 (17,841) was treble as great as three
years earlier, and in excess of the number of Russian
employees (13,300) at that date. 1

There was, therefore, no administrative excuse for
the action of the Chinese authorities in seizing the
railway; indeed, in the controversy which followed,
the Chinese authorities never once expressed any com-

*Dr. R Perech in the Berlin Vossische Zeitung, July 24, 1929, quoted
by Louis Fischer in The Soviets in World Affcars (Cape)

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 193

plaint concerning the joint management of the under-
taking.

The Chinese action profoundly disturbed the
Foreign Offices of the world, where it was recognized
as producing a serious situation, and one which, if
the U.S.S.R. had aims of territorial extension in the
Far East, provided ample justification for a Soviet
invasion of Manchuria. The crisis was, in short, an
acid test of the sincerity of Russian intentions when
abandoning treaty rights in China, and no nation
watched developments so closely, or learnt more from
what occurred, than Japan.

From the first moment, Moscow sought to localize
the conflict, and liquidate a dangerous situation with-
out recourse to arms. Plainly war with China was
the last thing Moscow desired. But following the
seizure of the line a new and more serious danger
appeared in the shape of thousands of anti-Bolshevik
Russian exiles, intent upon widening the Russo-
Chinese breach, and between July 18 and August 18
eight raids into Soviet territory were made by mixed
forces of Chinese and White Russians. Moscow held
its hand, hoping that the intervention of the United
States would bring a settlement of the dispute and
the release of the arrested Soviet citizens.

On September 9, the Soviets handed to the German
Ambassador at Moscow (Germany was attending to
Russian interests in China during the dispute) a sec-
ond Note calling attention to attacks by Chinese and

194 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

"White Russians upon Soviet steamers, frontier guards,
and Soviet territory, and the ill-treatment of Soviet
citizens. No satisfaction being forthcoming, and the
invasions of Soviet territory and torture of Soviet
citizens continuing, Russia's " patience became ex-
hausted. She had certainly behaved with moderation
in the face of repeated attacks and much provocation.
Moscow decided upon action, and on November 18,
1929, a Russian military force entered Manchuria.

China, faced with determined action, instantly
changed her tactics and came to terms.

"The news from Manchuria confirms the Japanese
anticipation that the Russians did not intend an in-
vasion," stated the Tokyo correspondent of the New
York Times (November 28, 1929). "The Russians
apparently have not occupied any Chinese towns and
are back on their own territory. They have given
the Chinese a severe slap, humiliated them by disarm-
ing 10,000 troops, and scared Mukden into a settle-
ment, all by a relatively small operation which led to
no entanglements/*

To which Mr. Louis Fischer has added:

"The moment the Red army marched in, the Chi-
nese and White Russians fled. Their commanders de-
serted, and the disorganized soldiers looted as they
ran. The looting was debited to the Bolsheviks. The
extent of the Chinese retreat was made out to be the
extent of the Red advance. According to a United
Press dispatch of November 26 from Harbin, the

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 195

Soviet forces actually halted thirty-eight miles from
the border, and then returned to their base." *

Following this show of force, outstanding issues
concerned with the Chinese Eastern Railway and with
Bolshevik propaganda in Manchuria were settled by
negotiation between the two Governments concerned,
the railway returning to joint Sino-Russian manage-
ment. It was not a completely successful settlement.
The joint management of this important line of com-
munication, and the necessity for consulting a foreign
Government on matters of administration, remains a
source of grievance to the present nationally-minded
Chinese Government at Nanking. But it is improb-
able, in the absence of political factors, that Moscow
will permit her interest in the railway seriously to
embroil her in the troubled waters of Manchurian
affairs. It is more probable, if that issue could be not
averted, that Russia would choose to sell her interest
in the line either to China or Japan, and thus free
herself from an embarrassing possession. Certainly
such a step would find favor in Moscow if any form
of armed intervention were the alternative.

The events enumerated above have for two reasons
an important bearing upon the recent history of Man-
churia. Not only did the dispute of 1929 show that
Moscow, at the moment at any rate, has no ambitions
of territorial conquest in that region. They also
formed a precedent for Japan two years later, if she
had been willing to restrict her display of armed force

1 The Soviets m World Aff<ws, p. 801

196 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

to securing the redress of grievances. Had the Japa-
nese authorities wished to make a demonstration, the
occupation of Mukden would have sufficed to impress
upon the Chinese authorities the need for compromise
and the settlement of outstanding issues. But in 193 1
the issues were not so simple, nor was honor so easily
satisfied.

It is possible, however, that Russian policy of non-
intervention in the Sino- Japanese crisis was dictated
by diplomatic considerations and the known re-
luctance of Moscow to rally the capitalist nations
behind Japan by taking action in the Far East which
might result in a Red scare.

Secret diplomacy is never so secret as when the
strings are pulled in Moscow, and here we enter the
realm of conjecture. But it is at least possible that
Russia saw in the Manchurian crisis an opportunity
to bring one stage nearer that alliance between Japan
and the Russian Soviet which has long been a cher-
ished dream of some Soviet diplomats. If such was
the case, it would account for the absence of criticism
of Japanese imperialism in the Soviet press, and the
mild terms of the pronouncements of Soviet Ministers
regarding Japanese actions on Chinese territory.
There is ground for the statement contained in ru-
mors circulating in Paris and elsewhere of under-
ground negotiations being conducted, during the
early days of the conflict, between the Soviet and
Japan, aiming at an agreement by which Russia would
be left free to "develop" her interests in Northern

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 197

Manchuria while granting Japan a "free hand" in
Southern Manchuria. They may have had more sub-
stance in fact than the reports that Russia was giving
material aid to the Chinese forces. There is nothing
inherently improbable in an exchange of views taking
place with this aim, for such an agreement, if effected,
would have formed the basis of an alliance between
the two nations against the "capitalists" of the United
States and Europe, and as such would not displease
the military party at Tokyo.

Further, the existence of such negotiations during
October and November 1931, would provide the only
logical explanation of the tone of comments appear-
ing in the Government-controlled Moscow press
concerning the Manchurian crisis. Molotov, for ex-
ample, surveying the relations of various countries,
and the League of Nations, with China, in a speech
reported in the Moscow Pravda of November 12,
1931, performed the amazing feat of discussing the
crisis at length without making a single reference to
Japan or Japanese actions in Manchuria! In that
speech Molotov criticized freely the "capitalist Gov-
ernments,** declaring that they were interested not in
finding a settlement of the dispute but in what each
could gain from the situation. That, he said, was
why the League of Nations had failed to find a solu-
tion. Yet, concerning the Japanese commanders
whose actions were partly responsible for the crisis,
he was silent.

Similarly, articles in the Russian press stressed the

198 MANCHURIA THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

existence of "antagonism" between the United States
and Japan, and added that all declarations of policy
made by Mr. Stimson which appear to be pro- Japanese
are no more than moves in a deep political game, aim-
ing at:

(1) To prolong the conflict as long as possible so

that Japan may become deeply involved in
Manchuria.

(2) To provoke a Japanese-Soviet conflict.

(3) To provoke a great war in the East in the

interests of international capitalism.

Allowing for Moscow's obsession concerning the
villainies of international capitalists, this and similar
articles may be reasonably designated as "kite flying"
in an effort to convince the Japanese that "Codlin's
the friend, not Short." As the American and Euro-
pean nations would shed no tears if Japan and Soviet
Russia engaged in a struggle which would leave them
weakened militarily and impotent industrially, mutual
interests obviously dictated that they should get to-
gether to spoil the capitalist game.

That a war between the Soviet and Japan would
not have been unwelcome in certain anti-Bolshevik
circles is clear when on December 26, 1931, the Mos-
cow press revealed the discovery of a plot, in which
a member of the Czecho-Slovakian diplomatic mission
was alleged to be concerned, to assassinate the Japa-
nese Ambassador at Moscow, and thus precipitate a
conflict. In the state of tension then existing in the

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 199

Far East, such a crime, had it been carried out, might
well have had tragic reverberations not only for the
Soviet but for the civilized world.

Prompt measures removed the danger, whether real
or imaginary, and left the relations between Moscow
and Tokyo unimpaired. But, obviously, as long as
Japanese troops remain in close proximity to the
Soviet frontier in Manchuria, and sit astride Soviet
commercial interests in that region, the possibility of
a "diplomatic incident" drawing the Soviet Union
into the conflict cannot be entirely eliminated.

Quite probably, however, the relations between
Moscow and Tokyo have yielded more understanding
o each other's point of view than the world realizes.
Whether or not Japan ever seriously considered such
an agreement as the above, is not known. But the
possibility of an entente cordiale between the two
nations was certainly kept in mind at Moscow, and
must have indicated to Tokyo how far the Japanese
advance could overrun Manchuria without the serious
danger of a conflict with Soviet Russia.

What is behind this moderation which the Soviet
has displayed at every step of a dangerous situation?
Has Bolshevik Russia renounced completely the
dreams of an ice-free port on the Pacific which for
generations exercised such an influence over Russian
thought? To say that Moscow kept several factors
in mind when deciding upon a policy of non-
aggression in the Far East is not necessarily to ques-
tion the sincerity of their desire that China should

200 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

remain united. Soviet Russia does not wish or intend
to take advantage of the present chaos in China to
advance any schemes of territorial or material ag-
grandizement, because her Government is opposed to
"Imperialist conquest." She also knows quite defi-
nitely that any move in that direction would pre-
cipitate the formation of an anti-Bolshevik bloc,
headed by the United States, France, and perhaps
Japan, against her, which would deny success. Wide
circulation has been given to rumors that Russians
were directing the Chinese opposition to Japan's ad-
vance, and a mistake in the Far East might jeopardize
the Soviet position. If the Great Powers are jealous
of each other, and bound by treaty not to secure
territorial concessions at the expense of China, they
are rightly united in their distrust of, and opposition
to, Russia. Any move by the Soviet might, there-
fore, only lead to the complete expulsion of Russian
interests from Manchuria. A further reason for Mos-
cow's attitude is to be found in the speeches of mem-
bers of the Russian Government.

"The Soviet has never concealed the fact that our
sympathy is with the Chinese people (not the anti-
Bolshevik Kuomintang Government, be it noted)
striving for their independence and national unity,"
says Molotov, in the speech already quoted. "The
Chinese peasants are looking for their own road to
liberty and believe that Russian methods are the best/*
Soviet Russia, which* declares itself to be the inspira-
tion and example of the "toiling masses" the world

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 201

over, has made one attempt to swing the Chinese
Revolution over to Bolshevism. That attempt failed,
but may not Moscow still believe that in China is the
most fertile field for Bolshevik ideas? One false step,
which might cause the Chinese proletariat to identify
Soviet Russia with the capitalist Governments, and
all that the Moscow propagandists have striven to
achieve in China would be lost. Hence Moscow's
policy of non-aggression is also a policy of self-inter-
est, or rather, is dictated by Russia's desire to see a
Communist republic on the Russian model established
in China. It remains the foundation of Russia's be-
nevolent attitude to China. And if Communism can
be made a growing force in that country, there will
be no change of policy at Moscow, unless it is accom-
panied by an arrangement with Japan which, by rang-
ing strong forces on the side of the Soviet, would
enable her to hold her winnings against the resultant
world action.

Dreams of a Russia dominant on the Pacific sea-
board have been merged into this greater dream of a
Red China. For Communism has learnt the lesson
that so long as Russia, a Communist state, gains equal
rights with other nations, actual ownership does not
matter. It may even, in the present state of world
feeling, become a liability. With a Bolshevized China
looking to Moscow for inspiration, Russian influence
in the Far East would reach its highest point, and
Moscow would secure a position of dominance which

202 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

no amount of land-grabbing or concession-seeking
could secure.

This brings us to a third reason dictating modera-
tion at Moscow. The Soviet rulers have learnt well
the lesson that the pen is mightier than the sword.
Their successes at home and abroad have been the
fruits of the propagandist, not the soldier. And
while the path of the Communist orator in China has
not been a smooth one, still they have persevered,
and are disinclined to take any action which would,
by antagonizing the de facto Chinese Government,
jeopardize their freedom to continue propaganda in
the Far East.

For ten years the diplomacy of the United States
and Western Europe has been matched by that propa-
ganda from Moscow, with the laurels going to Mos-
cow. Russia having surrendered the "unequal treaties"
and seeking no privileges is in a favorable posi-
tion and has a good case for claiming the sympathies
of a newly-awakened China. By moderation in the
face of breaches of treaty rights by the Chinese, that
position has been still further strengthened, until to-
day she points to her own record in contrast to the
attitude of others.

Add to these reasons the further fact that a foreign
war would be disastrous to the Five Year Plan, and
that a war in Manchuria, with insufficient transport
and a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the great mass
of Russian citizens, and it will be realized that Mos-
cow has shown not only diplomacy but wisdom in

COMMUNISM THE UNKNOWN FACTOR 203

declining to become embroiled in a conflict, entry into
which, however great the provocation, would find
ranged against her the anti-Bolshevik forces of the
world.

The Bolsheviks appreciate the difficulties that would
confront them in a campaign in the Far East. More
than five thousand miles from the seat of their power,
in a distant land with a hostile environment, imper-
fect machinery with which to wage the war, and the
fundamental principles of command and direction
lacking, the venture could only result in failure.

Officially, Soviet Russia supports the policy of the
"open door" and identifies itself with the great trad-
ing nations, who view with some misgiving the action
of Japan in establishing a virtual protectorate over
Manchuria. Unofficially, Communism bides its time;
but the time is not yet. For that reason at least, any
settlement in the Far East tending to curb the power
of Japan will be acceptable to Moscow, which will
continue to support the Chinese demand for national
unity, irrespective of any opposition or lack of en-
thusiasm on the part of China herself.

Meanwhile, it may be noted that Russia is the one
nation which, probably owing to preoccupation
within her own borders, has not enlarged her share of
Far Eastern trade during the past decade. By "liqui-
dating" most of her interests in the Far East, Soviet
Russia has turned herself from what the Japanese re-
garded as the "Muscovite menace" into the "dark
horse" of the Pacific a force which, while inscru-

204 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

table, cannot be left out of account, if only because
of the fact, which must not be forgotten, that next
to China herself, Soviet Russia holds sway over a
greater area of Asia than any other Power.

CHAPTER VII

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST

t | ^HE United States share much of the limelight
I playing upon the various nations of East and
West, for they were the first to draw the Japa-
nese in 18*3 from their islands of seclusion and the
policy of aloofness that had characterized them, whilst
the first treaty that Japan ever concluded with a
Western nation was that of March 31, 18J4, with the
United States.

By a policy of peaceful penetration the Americans
brought about a new Japanese outlook, culminating
in the opening up of the country to the commercial
enterprise of the world. Whilst the foundations of
progress and friendship were being laid, the years of
isolation had been put aside, and the enterprising and
imitative Japanese began to tour abroad and see some-
thing of the great world beyond their own shores.
Missions set out to investigate the wonders of the
West, the creation of armies and navies was gone into
and how they might be adapted to Japanese needs.
They studied the building up of a nation and its ordeal
by battle, recognizing that there might come a time
when questions would have to be answered by a tribu-
nal to which all nations have, at one time or another,
inclined the assize of war.

205

206 MANCHURIA- THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

The searchlight of investigation was turned on to
the best that Europe could produce for the study of
the art of war, the supreme touches, in so far as con-
cerned the army, being given by Germany. To the
German military professors fell the task of implanting
the science of command, of how to create and organ-
ize, of how to utilize the resources of Japanese terri-
tory and its population during any war that might
arise, with the minimum of sacrifice in time of peace.

For the creation of a fleet, that was later on to prove
its worth, the British Navy was chosen as the model,
and never had teachers a more attentive or eager
audience than the pupils from the new Far East.

Between the scientific conception of a rising nation,
with all its concomitant parts, and the art of direc-
tion and administration, there is a vast difference.
The stages are long and arduous, and the road is beset
with many obstacles. Each demands the application
of definite principles to concrete cases, which it has
taken much time, labor, and patience to ascertain.
The Japanese appreciated these simple facts; they
knew that only after this process had been gone
through could they hope to possess the talent and skill
for running the civil and military machine in all its
phases and under all conditions.

From the West they brought the traditions of per-
manence and unity, together with stability and a
system of economy in their creative work, welding the
whole into one driving force most suited to the moral
and political temperament of Japan. In the feudal

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 207

system and ethics of the old samurai Japan possessed
a great moral force which had no parallel elsewhere,
coupled with resolution and an abiding spirit of pa-
triotism, the highest ideal that inspires Japanese con-
duct.

The years went on and missions and investigators
catne and went. The tide of emigration increased,
and the pressure of expanding population became so
pronounced that Japanese attention was focused on
the lands adjacent to the home country which were
temperamentally and climatically suited to them.
These emigrants voyaged to Australia and America,
to Europe and Africa, the reception they met with
varying in accordance with the national character-
istics, and the bias or antipathy towards the East.

In America the newcomers were far from popular;
they brought a lower standard of life and wages, they
worked long hours and displayed extraordinary pa-
tience and industry, they kept very much to them-
selves, and it was not long before they excited violent
dislike, and a serious prejudice against all Japanese
sprang up in the United States, especially in California
and along the Pacific coast where they were most
numerous.

They were regarded as a danger to the States, an
inscrutable folk, full of surprises and contradictions,
assuming the outward signs of Western civilization,
yet still remaining of the East, with its weird beliefs,
its unintelligible manners and customs, and its anom-
alies, so alarming to the New World.

208 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

Those Americans who had in the early days seen
the Japanese at home, in their picturesque and roman-
tic surroundings, thought them an artistic people,
acutely imitative, incapable of any great intellectual
efforts, and devoid of constructive ability. "When the
Japanese came to America and settled alongside the
American citizen there was a complete change of
opinion and American imagination was startled.

Similar uneasiness was being expressed in Australia,
so that the Americans were not alone in their mis-
givings.

This racial problem also affects Australia, where
there is a certain apprehension of a yellow inroad and
a colonization of the northern territory by Chinese
and Japanese immigrants. The question as to whether
Australia should be white or yellow opens up a vast
field, and the time is not far distant when the subject
must inevitably assume world-wide importance.

A former Commonwealth Prime Minister recently
put a question as to how long Australia could hold
back the flood, and that unless she were prepared to
move forward at a pace never previously contem-
plated, a situation might arise the very contemplation
of which would make Australians shudder; he de-
clared that he was not an alarmist but was merely
stating facts.

Ethnically the lands lying between Northern Aus-
tralia and Japan are suited to the Asiatic, and offer
the best solution of the problem of accommodating
the surplus population of Japan.

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 209

With ambitions towards hegemony in the Pacific,
Japan contemplates a colonial empire similar to our
own, for the creation of which she has worked, but
at the moment is marking time on her course. Part
of the field of action for the building of a greater
Japan lies within the area comprised by Northern
Australia, the East Indian islands, such as the Celebes,
Java, Sumatra, and the Malay Archipelago. These
are vital from the productive standpoint and of first-
class importance in naval strategy and the mastery of
the Pacific. If Japanese naval strength goes on in-
creasing at the present rate it jeopardizes the safety of
the Australasian colonies, and in the event of our
being involved elsewhere, and unable to dispatch a
sufficient force to meet potential danger to Australia
and New Zealand, those dominions would probably
lose their independence and pass under Japanese
control.

It is recognized in naval and military circles that
Australia is open to naval attack, whilst its capitals
contain the majority of the population and so come
within range of enemy action from the sea.

As regards Northern Australia, and any pretensions
Japan may have in that direction, reliable estimates
affirm its ability to support one hundred and eighty
millions of Asiatics, in addition to providing large
supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials, of which
Japan stands in need. The climate is not suited to
the European constitution, but agrees with the Japa-
nese, and everything points to Northern Australia

210 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

being the scene of action in future population prob-
lems as affecting Japan. That is evident to those who
have traveled in Northern Australia and over the
areas in question.

To return to the American attitude in the racial
problem. As time went on economic and social diffi-
culties became more and more complicated; hostile
legislation ensued, and laws were passed discriminating
against Japanese as compared with immigrants from
other countries. Japan protested that her people were
being excluded from privileges granted to all other
nations, and a grave international issue appeared to
be in the making.

American influence and interest in China became
more definite in the years following the Chino-
Japanese War of 1894-95, when there was a seizure
by all the Great Powers of land in China, in the form
of leases of territory and spheres of influence. The
United States was the exception to the general rule;
she took no territory, but, on the contrary, endeav-
ored to stem the tide and prevent the threatened dis-
memberment of China. This period of grab reached
its climax in 1898, and it was a curious coincidence
that it should synchronize with the taking of the
Philippines and Guam by America after the war with
Spain. It certainly appeared to the Japanese as
though the Americans intended definitely to establish
themselves in the East.

The Chinese, as always, were impotent, and only
Japan could make any sort of remonstrance, not that

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 211

one was needed, viewing the matter in the light of
after events. For the Chinese there were several
courses open; they could individually turn the rush
for concessions to profitable account, they could raise
difficulties, and by promoting international rivalry
and jealousies play off one nation against another, or
organize a general massacre and get rid of the foreign
devils, as they styled them. For various reasons they
did not adopt any of these courses outright; they
determined to bring about the desired expulsion of
the foreigner by a rising of the Boxers, a militant
society that, like the followers of the Soudan Mahdi,
declared themselves immune from all forms of foreign
attack.

The moment this plan was decided upon in 1900
the Boxers laid siege to the Legations in Peking, and
launched attacks on the mission stations, a large num-
ber of missionaries and others being killed in the rising.
With the arrival of an international force under the
command of a German field-marshal, the tide turned,
the Boxers were defeated and scattered like chaff,
and the status quo ante restored.

During the Russo-Japanese War, America was, if
anything, in favor of the Japanese, who, as a result
of their victory over the Russians, developed a par-
donable and at the same time somewhat aggressive
spirit. This new attitude had its repercussion in
America, and eyes were turned towards the East and
American possessions, since the Japanese had resented
comments that were general in the United States as to

212 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

the legality of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.

The next decided move on the American- Japan
board was the dispatch of an American battle fleet by
way of the South Atlantic into the Pacific, and so to
Japanese ports, where it met with a cordial reception.

There came a rift in the lute in 1910 when the
American Secretary of State Knox proposed that the
railways in Manchuria under Russian and Japanese
control should be merged into one organization and
administered by an international board, the requisite
finance to be found by that body. In putting for-
ward this suggestion the American Government con-
sidered x it would obviate friction and the menace of
war, and give the railways in general, and Manchuria
in particular, a neutral and far more satisfactory
aspect than would be the case were the lines to remain
under exclusively Russian and Japanese control.
Japan took the proposal in a spirit of resentment;
she entirely failed to see what right America had to
formulate the suggestion, and rejected it with a cer-
tain degree of contumely.

There were varying degrees of tension between
America and Japan, arising out of international
rivalry in financing China, procuring concessions, and
securing rights for construction of railways. The
British Government, foreseeing a possible rupture
between the two nations, and having itself a treaty
of alliance with Japan, notified the latter that in the
event of any outbreak of hostilities between her and
the United States the British Government would not

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 213

consider itself called upon to participate. This state-
ment marks an important period in Far Eastern his-
tory, for it conveyed in clear-cut terms that an
Anglo-Saxon nation would not range itself other than
on the side of its kith and kin.

The atmosphere was still a trifle explosive just prior
to the war, when the Americans introduced the Bryan
arbitration treaty, which was rejected by the Japanese,
who did not agree with its pacific ideals; the military
party was in the ascendant and its influence para-
mount. The atmosphere was Prussian and warlike
in tendency, and an appeal to arms in case of dispute
affecting the welfare of the country appeared more
acceptable than anything that might be attained
through the channels of arbitration.

On the other hand, almost immediately on the out-
break of war in August 1914 Japan, in view of her
alliance with Great Britain, and desirous of giving
full and cordial effect to the provisions of that agree-
ment, declared war on Germany, and assisted in
driving the Germans out of Tsingtao and Kiachou,
which, acquired in 1898, had been converted into a
model German colony with all the thoroughness of
the Teuton.

Other events in the Pacific followed with dra-
matic swiftness; there were the Marshall and Caroline
Islands which Germany had purchased from Spain at
the close of the Hispano- American War in 1898. On
these the Japanese fleet now descended and took pos-
session. It brought Japan in close proximity to the

214 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

American dominions in the Pacific, and the fear that
they might ultimately pass to Japan alarmed Ameri-
can political and military circles, who were appre-
hensive of the potential menace and inclined to the
view that it constituted another milestone on the road
to eventual conflict.

The recurring racial controversy has not been con-
ducive to the growth of cordial relations between the
two peoples, added to which, as we have seen, Japan's
action in China during the war called forth much
hostile criticism in America. Only the visit of a tact-
ful Japanese mission to the United States allayed this
irritation. Matters improved in 1924 with an agree-
ment setting forth that the United States and Japan
had no designs upon the territorial integrity of China,
that they would remain true to the principle of the
"open door," with equal opportunity for all in trade
and commerce, but recognizing that Japan had spe-
cial rights and interests in China, especially in those
regions adjacent to the Japanese mainland.

This agreement came as an antidote, and there was
a marked improvement in mutual relations and un-
derstanding, although the original causes of disagree-
ment between the two nations still existed.

The varying atmosphere of cordiality and distrust
underwent another change during the Great War
period with its manifold and bewildering contro-
versies. Japan wished to inherit German rights in
China, and establish a footing in the province of
Shantung, which German resource, method, and

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 215

money had made one of the best settlements in the
East, but from which they had been evicted with the
help of the Japanese. Japan took over the adminis-
tration of Shantung, to all intents and purposes it
became a Japanese colony, the depth and thoroughness
of procedure there so alarming the Chinese that they
protested in the strongest terms against the Japanese
action as incompatible with their assurances of tem-
porary occupation and a step demanded only by the
exigencies of the war.

It was a great opportunity for Japan, and the
favorable position in which she found herself led to a
large share in control of Far Eastern trade and en-
hancement of Japanese reputation and prestige. Ger-
man influence had been entirely eliminated, and
Britain was so closely occupied in a hfe-and-death
struggle in the West that she had little time to devote
to matters so far beyond the immediate theater of
war.

The result was that the trade of the East fell almost
entirely into Japanese hands; and everything was de-
veloping in favor of Japan. Japanese shipping and
commercial companies were declaring exceptional
dividends, foreign indebtedness was vastly reduced,
and the additional wealth, acquired by industrial and
commercial efficiency and a dominating influence in
Asiatic markets, grew to a phenomenal figure.

With this rise in the national assets came a more
pronounced and aggressive policy towards China;
Japan did not wait long to make a bold bid for pre-

216 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

dominance in the Far East. In 1915 she presented
the famous Twenty-One Demands, to which refer-
ence has been made in a previous chapter, so drastic
and grasping that had they been conceded no shred
of sovereignty would have been left to China.

As we have remarked, when the extent of these
demands became known to the "Western world they
excited highly adverse comment and did much to
alienate sympathy for Japan. It was an ill-timed and
unjustifiable attempt to take advantage of Allied em-
barrassments in Europe, and secure a footing on the
mainland of China which other times and circum-
stances would certainly have denied.

American attitude over the Shantung question was
intensely distasteful to the Japanese; they considered
that their rights in Shantung were at least as justifi-
able as the American occupation of the Philippines,
especially as Britain and France had agreed to the
transfer of all German rights, title, and interest in
Shantung to Japan, which arrangement had been rati-
fied by the Peace Conference in Paris, a proceeding
that came as a great shock to the Chinese.

When the Chinese joined the Allies they did so in a
spirit of optimism, hoping that victory might enable
them to recover what they had been compelled to cede
to various Powers in the past. These hopes were rudely
dispelled at the Conference and a shattering blow was
dealt by which Japan was to step into the place for-
merly held by the Germans. It led to the flat refusal

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 217

of the Chinese to sign the Peace Treaty and increased
the antipathy towards Japan.

So strongly did America oppose the surrender of
these rights to Japan that, largely due to her attitude
and feeling on the subject, the Japanese withdrew
their claims and Shantung was restored to the Chinese.
But that was only one of the points at issue in which
America and Japan did not see eye to eye. The United
States spoke somewhat forcibly with regard to Japa-
nese action in Korea, and the severity of the measures
adopted in that country to put down a revolutionary
movement. This plain and outspoken attitude had a
good effect, and thenceforth Japanese administration
took on a more benevolent aspect.

Other and graver causes of irritation followed; in
1924 an Exclusion Law was passed, one of the clauses
of which settled the quota of immigrants from the
various countries of the world. This was objection-
able to the Japanese, in that it excluded Asiatics from
becoming eligible for American citizenship, whilst the
Japanese quota was not determined on the same basis
as those of other countries.

The Japanese resented the passing of the bill, show-
ing their dislike in no uncertain fashion. American
interests were threatened, and the Japanese Govern-
ment had all their work cut out to curb the tide of
anger and hostility that arose throughout the country
at what was considered an affront to the nation.

The pith of the Japanese argument was that they
should not be discriminated against, and that the

218 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

treatment meted out to them should be in all respects
similar to that accorded to European nations. It is
not for us to say whether this law is ill-advised or
unsympathetic to a nation that owes its first appear-
ance to America; it may be that America fears a wave
of Asiatic immigration that would place the Ameri-
can worker, as well as trade and commerce, at a seri-
ous disadvantage, so low is the standard of life and
being in Japan as compared to their own.

The Anglo-American people are apt to regard all
Asiatics as ignorant and superstitious; they find them
fearful and uncanny, and their ways fill them with
alarm. This in some cases is justified, and an Asiatic
influx other than Japanese might well be viewed with
alarm. It is, however, open to question whether the
Japanese wish to emigrate in any considerable num-
bers to the Pacific coast of the United States, so that
the wisdom and necessity of the discriminations are
at least open to doubt.

This friction between the two nations has led to
the oft-expressed opinion that sooner or later war
must ensue, the influence that America is extending
in the Far East and the volume of trade, both of im-
ports and exports, affording the material for potential
dispute.

There is, however* no logical reason why there
should be war between America and Japan; the for-
mer is most unlikely to take the initiative, and Japan
recognizes that it would be her economic ruin.
"Wealth, and the means to provide for the expense of

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 219

a campaign, are the pivot on which success or failure
turns. The mainspring of Japanese credit is in Amer-
ica; her supplies of raw materials come from overseas,
oil is imported in vast quantities from America, and
Japanese natural resources are quite insufficient to
meet requirements, as we have shown.

Once the full resources of America were mobilized
in men, money, and material, she would be in a posi-
tion to retake any ground lost, and could transfer the
war to Japanese waters. The struggle would be eco-
nomic, and Japanese vital dependence upon exports
would force things rapidly to an issue. The latent
hostility which the Chinese have always shown to-
wards Japan would manifest itself as defeat became
more obvious, and indispensable markets would be
denied, contributing still further to a complete and
disastrous breakdown.

At present Japan is the industrial Power of the
East, a position that has been won with 70 per cent
of the population engaged exclusively in agriculture.
She must surely seek to improve, not retard, it.

In so far as aggressive intentions might be in the
American mind, and there is no evidence that any
exist, we may briefly refer to the naval and military
dispositions of the United States in the Philippine and
Hawaiian Islands. The latter came under the Ameri-
can flag in 1898, drawing forth a protest from Japan,
who had possibly marked down these islands as her
own in the future. The Hawaiians include all the
islands in that area, the capital and center being

220 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

Honolulu, distant 2000 miles from San Francisco, the
base of the American Pacific fleet.

They constitute a strategic position of great value,
all the main trans-Pacific steamship lines call there,
and as a base for a powerful striking force it is the
best in the Pacific. The naval and military garrison
now numbers 16,000 men, and the harbor accommo-
dation has been much improved.

The Philippines include all the islands of the archi-
pelago, with headquarters at Manila, under the com-
mand of a major-general with staff and supply serv-
ices, a total combatant strength of 11,500 men, of
whom 7000 are native Filipino troops.

The garrisons of both groups can, of course, be ex-
panded in case of necessity, whilst in the Philippines
there is for internal security a constabulary force of
about 7000, occupying 162 stations throughout the
islands, strategically placed for the preservation of
law and order.

Of great importance to the United States is Guam,
one of the Marianas or Ladrone Islands, which became
United States property after the war with Spain in
1898. The remainder were originally sold by Spain
to Germany, and since the Great War have been ad-
ministered by Japan under mandate. Guam, of much
strategic value, is the largest of the group, with an
area of 225 square miles and distant 1500 miles from
Manila, 1700 miles from Sasebo, the naval port in
Japan, and 5000 miles from San Francisco.

The United States originally intended to enlarge

JAPANESE TROOPS ENTRENCHING AT SHAN HAI KWAN, THE GATE-
WAY FROM MANCHURIA TO CHINA PROPER

k t

*%

A PRISONER OF THE MANCHXJRIAN "WAR"

A soldier of Chang Hsueh-hang's army, wearing civilian dotjung, arrested by
the Japanese forces during their advance north of Mukden

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 221

the harbor at Guam sufficiently to take the entire
American Navy, and a large sum had been earmarked
for that purpose, but the Washington Conference,
with its limitations for constructional activity in the
Pacific, made this impracticable.

So important is Guam in Pacific naval strategy that
it would be an easy matter for a hostile fleet holding
it to threaten the Philippines, if the island could be
adequately fortified and put on a footing commensu-
rate with its value. This is admitted by the Japanese,
who recognize that its possession would be an asset
to them.

The relative positions of the United States and
Japan have undergone considerable modification since
the Washington Conference, and warship construc-
tion has been restricted by the London Naval
Conference of 1931 as well as by other limitations.
Nevertheless, the United States Navy has more men in
service than the British, whilst the present strength of
the Japanese Navy is 88,000 men.

Regarding the strength of the American Navy it
should be noted that in number of ships, and aircraft
accompanying each warship, it is ahead of the British,
whilst in the development of naval aircraft remark-
able progress has been made. Every device known to
science has been applied in the efforts to produce a
naval force that, in personnel and materiel, shall be
predominant over all possible rivals.

Under a recent act passed by the American Senate
provision is made for one thousand aeroplanes to be in

222 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

a state of constant readiness for action, whilst a fur-
ther total of 1947 'planes to be constructed shows that
full advantage is to be taken of the power and range
of naval aircraft.

A like activity has been displayed in Japan, where,
after allowing for the limitations imposed by the
treaties already referred to, a first-class naval fighting
force has been evolved, thoroughly up to date in all
its aspects, with a naval air force of eight hundred
machines, this number to be increased so as to eventu-
ally bring it into line with that of America.

A casus belli, as between Japan and the United
States, would be the definite rejection and flouting of
the Open Door policy, and a Japanese hold over China
such that no other Power would have any say in the
Chinese destiny, nor participation in the wealth and
resources of the country.

Foreign capital and scientific aid are essential for
the development of China; until she is advanced in-
dustrially her trade cannot develop, and in all this
great work America rightly claims a share.

To sum up, the disparity in economic and financial
resources between the two nations is so striking that
the result could not be in doubt. With a population
of 123,000,000, and an area of nearly 4,000,000 square
miles, productive of everything requisite to the sus-
tained life and well-being of the nation, free from the
necessity of importing material from overseas for
the creation and equipment of its armed forces; with
almost unlimited financial resources, and a highly or-

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 223

ganized industrial system capable of wide expansion
and adaptable to circumstances, the United States
would have little to fear from a collision.

On the other hand, Japan gained but slightly dur-
ing the war from the stoppage of trade amongst the
Allies and its partial diversion to Japan. In iron,
steel, and chemical products, she can barely supply
herself, there is the strong antipathy to Japan in
China, and the necessity, spread over a number of
years, of devoting all available products and manufac-
tures to the work of reconstruction owing to the
immense damage caused by recent earthquakes and
upheavals must act as a restraining influence.

Japan's total population, including Korea and For-
mosa, is 84,000,000, with a combined area of only
260,000 square miles. Her resources are limited, vast
sums have been expended on the navy and army, and
the resources, both economic and financial, are quite
inadequate to meet the demands of a possibly long and
costly war, such as would be the case were she to enter
the arena with the United States. Temporary suc-
cesses would no doubt be scored with the capture of
the Philippine and other groups, but the main issue
would be a foregone conclusion.

Now as to American ideals regarding China and
the Far East.

It is clear from the statements of successive Ameri-
can administrations that the United States demands
only the Open Door in China, equal opportunities

224 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

and privileges for al! 3 with no desire for political ad-
vantages.

In this studied policy towards China the United
States has fallen foul of Japan, who, as we indicate
later, intends to enter into full possession of Man-
churia, whatever may be said to the contrary, in
which virtual annexation the United States cannot
willingly acquiesce.

The United States Government took decisive action
with regard to the Open Door policy in 1928, when
Secretary Knox proposed that a sum of one hundred
million dollars should be provided by British and
American bankers to enable China to control the
South Manchurian Railway and administer it under
international direction.

Japan intimated that the suggestion was one she
could not entertain, in view of the sacrifices made in
Manchuria and the vast sums expended on the railway
and its associated interests. The United States, not to
be checkmated without another effort, put forward
an alternative arrangement that a parallel line from
Kinchow to Aigun, on the Amur River in the north,
should be constructed, which was equally unaccept-
able to the Japanese. The disinterested efforts of
America were regarded as unwarrantable interference,
and gave the Japanese the impression that trouble
might be forthcoming from that quarter in the
future.

Finally the schemes were abandoned owing to the

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 22 J

retirement of the British banking group, and to the
hostility aroused by the idea in Japan.

Japanese policy vis-a-vis the United States un-
doubtedly shows a desire to establish an economic and
political hold over Manchuria, if not over part or the
whole of China. The famous Twenty-One Demands
sufficiently indicate that, as well as the naval and mili-
tary agreement of 1918, under which Japan was, to
all intents and purposes, to have complete control of
the entire forces of China. This agreement has since
lapsed, but it is of importance as indicating the line of
thought and action.

Standing thus for equal rights America wishes to
keep China as an intact entity, and to lead her people
along the path of progress. American explorers have
done much geographical research in remote parts of
the Chinese empire, results of great scientific, his-
torical, and geological import have been achieved by
their exploratory enterprise, and American mission-
aries with their schools, medical institutions, and up-
to-date hospitals have been a lasting boon to Asia in
general.

There will always be international rivalries so long
as human nature remains what it is. The dawn of the
millennium is still a long way off , and until it appears
nations will safeguard their own interests 3 and see
that others do not steal a march on them.

Since Japan assumed the leadership of the Far East
the Western world has developed a strong and abiding
interest in that nation as the champion of civilization

226 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

there, an advocate of all forms of progress, and the
first Asiatic people to blend to a harmonious and suc-
cessful degree the qualities of East and West, whilst
at the same time preserving those of the Japanese
people, with their ancient institutions and spirit.

When a nation has such a phenomenal career as the
Japanese, such an amazing transformation in a period
of sixty years, there are sure to be moments of na-
tional stress when it is running counter to the ideas
and ambitions of other states, and problems arise of a
political or economic nature.

Japanese progress in the East has brought her into
close touch with Britain and America, particularly
with the latter since the departure from the Monroe
Doctrine and the adoption of an overseas policy. The
various factors we have noted, such as the acquisition
by the United States of the Philippines and Guam
adjacent to Japan, the passing of the Immigration
Exclusion Law of 1924 barring Asiatics from access to
the United States, and the American naval challenge
for supremacy in the Pacific, have given color to the
widely expressed opinion that the future struggle for
mastery in the Far East and Pacific might be between
Japan and the United States.

That there is rivalry between the two nations no
one will dispute, nor at the same time can it be denied
that an essential to the peace and tranquillity of the
Far East is cordial cooperation between the United
States and Japan. Both are vitally concerned in de-
velopment of the great markets of China, to say

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 227

nothing of the task, in which all Europe must partici-
pate, of restoring political stability there. Japan re-
quires American raw material to enable her to supply
the wants of the Chinese market, whilst America
needs Japanese good will in China for the sale and
distribution of American goods. Only by working
together can they achieve success; instead of friction
over the growing trade of the two countries there
will be a more complete understanding and friendship,
and although both may differ as to the best method of
assisting the Chinese in establishing political and eco-
nomic stability, their basic aims are identical the
creation of a prosperous and united nation, a colossal
task when one considers the factors involved, and the
heterogeneous and diverse nature of the Chinese
people.

We have said that when the Japanese presented the
famous Twenty-One Demands to China in January
1915 the Americans used their moderating influence
to bring about an amendment of these drastic requests,
which were subsequently modified at the Washington
Conference of 1921; then followed the Nine-Power
Treaty in which Britain, France, Japan, China, Bel-
gium, Holland and Portugal agreed to maintain the
policy of the Open Door, and to give mutually full
and frank communication when any question came
up for discussion involving the application of the
treaty. By this agreement and the Covenant of the
League of Nations the Japanese committed them-
selves to the necessity of conferring with the other

228 MANCHURIA- THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

signatories to the treaty, and the Covenant, before
undertaking any armed action in Manchuria.

The moment that the United States extended their
possessions overseas it brought them into contact with
the Japanese, and, as already remarked, this, coupled
with the racial restrictions and American views re-
garding China, and the clash of opinion, created a
certain anxiety in political circles. The necessity of
maintaining a naval and military force to hold the
new acquisitions on the Asiatic side of the Pacific
gives rise, as such things always do, to suspicions on
the part of Japan, although American participation
in the affairs of the Far East and China has been uni-
formly beneficial to the Chinese, as it was in the early
days of Japan, and uniformly on the side of peace and
friendly cooperation with China and other nations
concerned.

At the same time, champion though she is of the
Open Door and equal opportunities, the United States
has not yet relinquished extra-territorial rights in
China, by which American subjects, in common with
British nationals, are immune from Chinese law. This,
in the present state of the country, is as it should be.
The vital question of extra-territoriality was precipi-
tated by the Bolsheviks, who relinquished Russian
rights in that connection in 1924, and thereby con-
demned Russian subjects to all manner of abuse and
injury at the hands of Chinese law as it is to-day.

It is, therefore, fitting that we should comment on

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 229

a vital issue in international politics, since it affects
Europeans and Americans alike.

This abrogation of rights, essential to the welfare of
Europeans and Americans in Manchuria, is of such
vital importance that a brief explanation of its scope
and meaning is necessary.

As previously remarked, the principle of extra-
territorial privileges was first recognized by the Chi-
nese in their treaty with the Russians at Nerchinsk in
1 689, the first treaty China had ever concluded with
a foreign Power. It was reiterated in two subsequent
treaties, and British subjects definitely acquired the
right to be amenable only to British law, as adminis-
tered by British consular authorities, under the Gen-
eral Regulations- for British Trade promulgated in
1843.

In the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1902 it was
stipulated that China, desiring to reform her judicial
system and bring it into line with that of Western
nations, should receive assistance from Great Britain
to that end, who, when satisfied that the state of
Chinese law and the arrangements for its proper and
honest application warranted her in so doing, should
renounce her extra-territorial privileges. The Chinese
have several times raised the question, but although
thirty years have passed they 1 have made nothing
whatever of the opportunities offered them; of
progress there has been none, and the task of govern-
ment is not undertaken with the idea of promoting

230 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

the public welfare, but for the sake of self -enrichment
and the increase of purely personal power.

For the past five years there has been increasing
disorder in Manchuria, with a corresponding decrease
in the authority of the government, together with a
much greater assumption of power by local war lords
and governors. They refuse to recognize the author-
ity of any central government, and show an utter
disregard for the administration of civil justice.

Manchurian courts are similar to those in China
proper; in criminal cases they move slowly, obstacles
are cast in the path of justice, and the flimsiest excuses
are given for the non-fulfillment of ordinary legal
forms. The law of Habeas Corpus is unknown, and
a person may be in jail indefinitely awaiting trial.
Indeed, with the frequent change of officials a man
might be there for so long that no record of his crime
exists; the why and the wherefore have been forgot-
ten, only the man himself is extant, still undergoing
the punishment of his lost crime.

The condition of the prisons is deplorable; there
reality can be studied with effect. Little or no tend-
ance is given the prisoners, and often food must be
found by friends or relatives. The date of trial in the
so-called courts is vague, an appeal is of little avail,
whilst justice and mercy may be alike denied.

A glaring example of inefficiency and the entire
absence of proper inquiry or justice was given in the
recent case of the unfortunate Thorburn, whose fate

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 231

was only discovered after the most persistent inquiry
on the part of the British Minister.

The sacrifice, therefore, of extra-territorial rights
would be a fatal mistake on our part, exposing our
nationals to grave injustice and indifferent treatment
at the hands of Chinese judiciaries and police.

Extra-territoriahty has been retained owing to the
corruption and malpractices prevalent, and the com-
plete failure of officials to carry out the functions of
their office, coupled with the disorder which precludes
all hope of impartial justice. Not one of the twenty-
two provinces of China is free from rebels, disbanded
soldiery, and bandits, whilst piracy on the coast and
along the rivers is common, with the onus of protect-
ing foreign merchants and their trade and commerce
devolving on the international body, since it is quite
beyond the Chinese authorities to assume so respon-
sible a task.

The Powers enjoying extra-territorial rights in
China should see to it that ample assurance is given
before they are relinquished, and that the local au-
thority in each province is both able and willing to
apply the law speedily and impartially, devoid of the
delays and procrastination which at present are so
glaring a feature.

So far as the administration of Manchuria is con-
cerned the Chinese are incapable of undertaking it,
or, indeed, in any part of China. They have not yet
attained to an ordered and systematic form of govern-
ment; the republic exists in name only, with a meager

232 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

authority over a limited area. The head of the so-
called Government is a president self-appointed from
one of the war lords, who controls the military and
financial resources, and has, in the majority of cases,
graduated in a school of brigandage. No constitution
directs the form of rule or assures a hearing to the
people, there is no elected body or parliament, and the
one or two individuals constituting the de facto
authority may be deposed at any time by rivals, for
their lease of official life depends upon the military
activities of their opponents.

The Chinese have produced masters in the arts and
in philosophy, no one questions their capacity for
work and their title to be one of the world's most
industrious races, but they are living in a past age,
their material progress in recent years has not been
marked, and their philosophy of life is opposed to
change or energetic action. Life in China proceeds
along lines clearly indicated by authority and age-old
tradition; the Chinese are paying the penalty of
neglect of modern ideas and to adjust themselves to
modern conditions.

A national feeling does not exist in China, although
amongst the students educated along European and
American lines it begins to make itself felt. Never-
theless, not more than 3 per cent of the people are
the least interested in politics, and, until the student
and the emissary from Moscow appeared on the scene,
political agitation had no place in the Chinese mind.

In the course of many years, as the wave of ad-

RIVALRIES IN THE FAR EAST 233

vanced thought and ideas passes over China, political
organizations, coupled with secret societies and guilds,
will exert more influence, until eventually they blos-
som forth into parties, with definite aims and objects,
but that laudable end will certainly not be attained
within the lifetime of the present generation. Eco-
nomic development is impossible whilst the existing
anarchy and chaos continue. Moreover, to build up
a permanent, constructive, and stable government is
a gigantic problem for a people torn with internal
dissension, lacking all sense of duty to the common
good, and imbued to such a large extent with the mo-
tives of personal advancement and gain. It is a task
which the Chinese must obviously be left to hammer
out for themselves.

CHAPTER VIII

WAR CLOUDS OVER ASIA

IN the opening chapter we saw how Japan rose to
her high level, to become the leading power in the
Orient, and the recital brought us up to the Great
War. We have also seen how Japan wrought great
economic changes in Manchuria, mainly, of course,
to her own benefit.

With the civil war which has raged in China for
the past twenty-one years, the rise and fall of Govern-
ments, the coming and going of presidents, and the
kaleidoscopic changes which have characterized the
situation in China over this period, with the resultant
chaos and confusion, it would serve no useful purpose,
and merely confuse the reader, to recount all that has
happened during these hectic years. The general
public the world over has become sufficiently bewil-
dered by the maze of military governors, war lords,
marshals, and armies, flitting hither and thither, up
one day and down the next, vying with each other in
the scramble for loot and power.

Within a space of eighteen years more than fifty
Governments have been set up and deposed in China, a
dozen presidents have come and gone, and China is
still without a ruling authority worthy of the name.
The present Government functions only within a

234

WAR CLOUDS OVER ASIA 235

limited radius of its capital at Nanking > a unique
situation for a nation boasting the largest share of
the land surface of the globe, and the greatest popu-
lation.

It is our aim to present the Manchurian situation
in the clearest light, shorn of all unnecessary detail,
and stating the case as it is.

There had from 1930 been increasing friction be-
tween the Chinese and Japanese, and the situation was
full of dangerous possibilities; the Chinese had ex-
erted efforts to restore order, but they were incapable
of asserting their authority, the country beyond the
railway zone and the area controlled by Japan was
out of hand, and given over to brigands, disbanded
soldiery, and hordes of military adventurers.

The immediate cause of the present crisis, as already
stated, was the destruction of the railway line near
Mukden on September 18, 1931, but the affair that
forced matters rapidly to an issue was the treatment
of Koreans and the murder of Chinese subjects in
Seoul and Chemulpo. There are approximately half
a million Koreans in Manchuria, Japanese subjects,
and entitled to consideration. Exasperated at the
treatment their countrymen were receiving at the
hands of the Manchurian local authorities, they at-
tacked the Chinese in the above two towns.

The principal grievance was that they had been
dispossessed of their land, always a delicate topic; the
Chinese are sensitive where the possession of land is
involved, and the local authorities often show lam-

236 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

entable ignorance of the extent and area of state
property, and what is going on in their midst.

We had a striking example of this in a town where
a Chinese was arrested for being in possession of gov-
ernment land and selling the produce therefrom. He
had acquired the ground many years before when it
was under the city walls, extending along a road con-
structed in that direction. In order to meet traffic
difficulties, this highway had been diverted, and the
old road became part of the moat under the battle -
mented walls. At this stage the landholder took the
opportunity of a favorable sale, and presented him-
self at the yamen with the title deeds. This was the
first intimation the local authority had that there was
any cultivated land at all in the moat, and it led to
the discovery that the produce had been disposed of
to a foreign mission. The District Magistrate became
seriously alarmed for his own safety, so promptly
declared the deeds to be false, and the unfortunate
man was indicted for being in possession of govern-
ment land, although when he took it over some years
previously, it was not actually state property. How-
ever, despite that convincing fact the matter was
closed by the man being taken out and shot.

Land throughout most of the provinces of China
yields a substantial revenue, the system is governed by
the same principles, and there are no restrictions on
its sale and transfer, provided the transaction does not
involve dealings with a foreign subject. It was on

WAR CLOUDS OVER ASIA 237

this fatal proviso that the unfortunate man came to
grief.

Apart from the land dispute, these Koreans laid
claim to extra-territorial privileges, arguing that as
Japanese subjects, and, therefore, foreigners, they
were entitled to them.

Lengthy diplomatic negotiations had ensued on
these points, there were the usual interminable delays
at which the Chinese are adepts, and strongly worded
Notes had been sent from Nanking to Tokyo and
Tokyo to Nanking. The Japanese demanded repara-
tion and a proper inquiry into the murder of Naka-
mura; the Chinese, on the other hand, declared they
could only negotiate after the Japanese had quitted
Manchuria, an obviously impossible condition. The
methods of the Chinese resolved themselves into a
course of action calculated to annoy the Japanese;
there was violation of the treaties and agreements on
a wide scale as already shown.

Settlement of the more vital cases had been prom-
ised, but in China the ratio between a promise and
its fulfillment is so indeterminate that there is often
time for misunderstandings to grow into grave inter-
national problems before satisfaction is secured.
Obstacles are put in the way; no opportunity is
neglected that may help to delay the issues and, if
allowed, a case may go on indefinitely until prospects
of a settlement become merely a pious hope.

Matters had been aggravated by another case the
Wanshaopan in Korea some months previously,

238 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

where the attitude adopted led to anti-Chinese rioting,
but even then the case reached only a partial con-
clusion.

The Chinese are slow to act, but once their inertia
is overcome, they move with dramatic promptitude.
When the firebrand of riot blazes up they become
yelling demons, intent on murder and rapine; they
have been touched to the quick by a spark, and from
the simple, affectionate, and often benevolent nature,
which is the normal characteristic, they change into
beings full of treachery, and aglow with the fire of
hate.

So it was on the night of September 18, when, as a
Japanese newspaper picturesquely expressed it, "A
violent eruption disturbed the stillness of the Man-
churian night." The outbreak started, according to
the Japanese version, in a curious way. A detachment
of Japanese troops was patrolling the line near Muk-
den when they observed a number of Chinese soldiers
disappearing from a point on line where an explosion
had just taken place. The patrol thinking that the
runaways were directly connected with the blowing
up of the line, pursued them, and they were sur-
rounded in a building. The Japanese summoned re-
enforcements, a cordon was drawn round the place,
and a severe fight ensued, in which some three
hundred Chinese were killed, and a large number
taken prisoner, the remainder effecting their escape.

Once action had been taken, events moved rapidly.
The Japanese occupied Mukden and took over the

WAR CLOUDS OVER ASIA 239

civil administration, disarmed the Chinese police and
such military forces as they found within the city,
and to some extent calmed a startled public.

Credit is due to the Japanese organization and state
of preparedness which enabled them to act rapidly
and with good effect, obviating what might easily
have been a riot and general massacre.

Coupled with their action at Mukden they placed
Southern Manchuria under military control, and took
steps to safeguard Japanese nationals and their prop-
erty. A meeting of the Cabinet was hastily convened
at Tokyo, whilst the Nanking Government also met
and passed resolutions condemning the Japanese action
and throwing the blame for all that had happened on
Japan.

The Japanese preparations were thorough and
formed the logical sequence in the chain of events
affecting Manchuria.

Their main base was established at Dairen, the fa-
mous port on the Talienwan Bay that is a monument
to Russian constructive ability, and marked the sum-
mit of Russian progress in the Far East in the early
days of the present century, when the carefully pre-
pared plans for Eastern dominion seemed so certain of
fulfillment.

Dairen is an ideal base for a force operating in
Manchuria; it has fine docks and breakwaters, ample
room for the world's largest liners, and quays to ac-
commodate the supplies of all kinds sufficient to last
the army for an indefinite period. Here the Japanese

240 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

transports can arrive to discharge their cargoes of
provisions and forage, and the battalions of cheerful
little men in khaki and steel helmets all eager to pro-
ceed to the scene of action.

As has been stated, from Dairen the trade lines
radiate to all parts of the world; eastwards across the
wide Pacific to America, southwards to Australia, and
southwest through the China Sea to the Dutch East
Indies, Singapore, India, and Europe. In a little over
two decades this tiny fishing village of Dairen has
developed into one of the world's busiest ports, due
to the immense growth of traffic over the South Man-
churian Railway and the opening up of the country
traversed by that line.

It is an imposing base, with its spacious squares and
plazas, laid out on the American principle, the wide
avenues radiating from the city center like the spokes
of a wheel.

By Dairen passes the army of immigrants, Japanese,
Chinese, and Korean, at the rate of six thousand a
day, a ceaseless wave through the gateway to China's
land of promise.

It is well equipped with everything requisite to the
modern army and navy; patiently elaborated plans of
the Japanese General Staff have provided for every-
thing by which an army moves and effects its objects;
from Dairen forces can be put into motion by a few
simple commands, and by road and rail transferred
to any desired point within the Manchurian theater.

From Dairen the Japanese movements can be veiled

WAR. CLOUDS OVER ASIA 241

in more or less secrecy; there is a strict censorship
when circumstances demand it, so that nothing leaks
out that may disclose the plans, or the position and
movement of the naval and military forces. These
precautions are thorough in Manchuria, with the re-
sult that the Chinese are in constant doubt and never
know from one day to another what may eventuate.
Order, counter-order, and disorder, follow in quick
succession, as Moltke once said, when there is no news
to be gained of the other side. With the Japanese
the art of keeping the opposition in a state of uncer-
tainty has been highly developed.

The essence of the Japanese plan was to move with
swiftness and secrecy, the censorship casting a pall
over the scene, and giving no indication of the com-
pelling motives actuating the advancing force. In
face of the brigandage and chaos that must ensue
from contact with, and retreat of, the Chinese forces,
the rapid occupation of Manchuria would be urgent
for Japan. On that vital factor the plans were
elaborated.

The lines of communication of the forces operat-
ing in Manchuria have been arranged in accordance
with the teachings of the best European models. A
well-organized system of communications is all-im-
portant, as every soldier knows, and the Japanese
have been at pains to insure that nothing shall be
lacking to assist the army in its definite aims. Pro-
vided as they are with an admirable railway and its
subsidiary lines, a number of points adapted for all-

242 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

round purposes have been fixed for the supply depots,
where the columns can fill up and make good any
deficiencies.

Provision has also been made for the construction
of light lines should occasion arise, and at the impor-
tant strategic points are the advanced bases complete
with everything the army may require, from shells
to canned rations, the whole of the line of communi-
cations coming under the command of a general
officer, and safeguarded by special troops.

With their well-equipped advanced bases in Man-
churia the Japanese are able to pass from a defensive
or quiescent attitude to one of attack, secure in the
knowledge that they can do so with ease and cer-
tainty, without running the risk of starvation or being
held up for lack of munitions.

Moreover, in Manchuria the army can to a large
extent live upon the country, unless it is actually
operating in the mountainous regions where move-
ment and supplies are alike restricted. The Japanese
columns are mobile, and do not require the infinity
of things demanded by a large and cumbersome army,
which is dependent almost wholly upon the railway
and the supplies it receives through that medium.

For the successful prosecution of a plan of cam-
paign in Manchuria the basic principle has been to
utilize as far as possible local resources, and to accumu-
late supplies at each of the advanced bases up coun-
try. A thoroughly efficient and working reserve is
thereby created, the strategic direction and movement

WAR. CLOUDS OVER ASIA 243

of the columns are guaranteed, and indiscriminate
requisitioning of supplies, and turning a prosperous
country into a desert is avoided.

The Japanese know full well the value of prepa-
ration to enable them to hold the initiative in all their
operations, and they have left nothing undone in their
civil and military program which shall contribute, as
far as is humanly possible, to the retention of Man-
churia as the pivot on which turns the life and welfare
of Japan.

As a preliminary it will be necessary to clear the
country of bandits, and for this highly mobile
columns of mounted men are essential, but the Japa-
nese are indifferent horsemen, and their cavalry is the
weakest arm. Something in the nature of the Russian
Cossacks is indicated; the bandits are not to be beaten
by modern drill methods, nor by the application of
principles that apply to highly trained civilized units.
They can be rounded up by a combination of Boer
and Cossack tactics, whilst the bands of discharged
soldiery operating in the plains away from the hilly
districts, can be accounted for by a series of sweeping
movements and drives organized on the lines adopted
in the South African War. From recent reports it
would appear that the Japanese intend to follow this
plan.

Let us now follow the Japanese in their movements
subsequent to the incident at Mukden.

At this time their forces, totaling about 10,400,
were distributed over the railway zone, the apparent

244 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

plan of the commander being to hold the important
strategic points on and adjacent to the railway. The
troops formed a mobile striking force, with artillery
and airplanes, the staff work was good, and the mili-
tary machine operated like clockwork. Owing to the
superiority in organization, direction, and morale, it
is not possible to compare the merits of the rival com-
batants; but it is certain the Japanese have the genius
for modern operations of war.

If we compare Chinese with Japanese strategy the
balance of merit is overwhelmingly with the Japanese,
since the Chinese have not added to their experience
by study and reflection, the principal distinction be-
tween trained and untrained armies.

From the taking of Mukden the steady progress of
the Japanese operations continued, aiming at the re-
striction of the zone occupied by the Chinese and
control of all important points as a measure of self -
protection.

Early on the morning of the 19th General Honjo,
Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in Man-
churia, arrived at Mukden to direct operations. The
advance was swift and steady, and by five o'clock that
morning Kwang-chengtze had been occupied, an im-
portant junction of the South Manchurian Railway,
the Chinese Eastern and the Karin-Changchun Rail-
way.

The Japanese held in readiness a division in Korea,
and widened the scope of their plans by an occupation
of Newchwang and Kaopangtse. These movements

WAR CLOUDS OVER ASIA 245

proceeded concurrently with repairs to the railway,
which was reopened for traffic in the afternoon; this
eased the situation and the orders for the division from
Korea to move into Manchuria were canceled.

Meanwhile in Tokyo there was friction between the
Foreign and War Offices as to the scope and extent of
military activities, the civil authorities wishing to
localize the issue and avoid anything in the nature of
a campaign. The Japanese had shelled the Mukden
arsenal, in which many Chinese had been killed, and
there were other instances of shell fire and bombing
which embarrassed the Foreign Office in Tokyo.

On the 22nd the Japanese were moving towards
Harbin, meanwhile consolidating their hold on Kirin
and points within that province, the operations being
marked by bombing from airplanes which the Japa-
nese considered they were justified in undertaking
against bodies of Chinese troops wherever they were
encountered. These indiscriminate attacks do not ap-
pear in every case to have been warranted, especially
as harmless villages were sometimes involved.

There was a renewal of these bombing operations
on October 2, when airplanes out reconnoitering
bombed a number of Chinese troops along the Harbin-
Mukden Railway, whilst on the 8th they dropped
bombs on Chinchow, which, after the taking of Muk-
den, had been made the headquarters of the Man-
churian Government.

The Japanese put forward as their excuse for this

246 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

that the Chinese had fired on the airplanes, a state-
ment denied by the Chinese themselves.

A reenforcement of 4000 had now arrived from
Korea, and by the end of October the Japanese had
established themselves in the south, and completed
their preparations for the advance on Tsitsihar.

With these movements the situation assumed a fur-
ther, and more alarming phase. Soviet Russia de-
clared that if the conflict was to extend they might
be compelled to intervene, on which the Japanese
stated their action was merely intended as a safeguard
against attack and spoliation of their nationals, and
that no acquisitory tactics were contemplated.

Four days later Taonan, the most important point
on the Chinese Eastern line, was taken over; there was
considerable banditry in this district, which brought
about the spreading of Japanese forces, not in large,
but none the less effective numbers, to other strategic
points in Manchuria that were undoubtedly Chinese
territory.

Coincident with the Chinese attacks and insecurity
of the railway zone, an anti- Japanese boycott set in,
stormy meetings of students were held at Nanking,
and great efforts were made to force the Government
there into precipitate action.

The Nanking Government next appealed to the
League of Nations, giving it the hardest proposition
it had yet encountered.

The Japanese argued that there are some 200,000
of their nationals, and approximately one million Jap-

WAR CLOUDS OVER ASIA 247

anese subjects of Korean origin, who are directly
affected by the South Manchurian Railway, the cause
of the dispute. In their opinion it is of vital im-
portance to these people that the terminal link of the
Trans-Siberian Railway running down to Dairen,
should remain inviolate. They again disclaimed all
territorial ambition, adding that Japan has all she
needs and desires in her present treaty rights, and
asks only that these rights shall be internationally
respected.

The official communications of the Japanese Gov-
ernment did not reveal to the outside world the
strength or weakness of their case, nor the depth of
the national feeling. It came as a surprise when the
intervention of the League was more or less resented,
the argument being that any interference might make
matters more difficult and inflame Japanese public
opinion.

Meanwhile, concurrently with the efforts of the
League, and the diplomatic contest going on, sepa-
ratist and independent movements were attempted in
the North and Inner Mongolia which there forms the
Manchurian boundary, to which the Japanese gave no
encouragement. The Mongolian effort was an echo
of previous years, when there had been much dissatis-
faction with China. It arose over Russia, who had
always taken a special interest in Mongolia. With the
fall of the Chinese monarchy in 1911 and the subse-
quent revolution, she thought the moment opportune
to create a buffer state between herself and China,

248 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

as well as to secure commercial advantages. Russia,
therefore, supported Mongolia in its resistance to the
Chinese, supplying arms, ammunition, and military
instructors. This was followed by the recognition of
the independence of Outer Mongolia lying beyond the
Great Wall, and the appointment of a Russian Min-
ister to the Mongolian capital at Urga.

The Chinese tacitly agreed to the autonomy thus
won, not being in a position to combat it, harassed as
they were by domestic difficulties and foreign and
political embarrassments.

With the coming of 1917 and the advent of Bolshe-
vism the tide turned, for the Mongols were dependent
on Russia for material, and particularly money, the
ruling factor in most disputes.

The Chinese dispatched a force to Urga, which
the ill-trained and numerically weak Mongol army
was unable to resist, Mongolia being compelled to re-
linquish her newly-found independence and resume
her place under Chinese rule.

These events are of psychological interest, in that
they throw light on the decadence of the race. In the
heyday of their fame the Mongols were Moslems, and
had they remained so, instead of embracing Lamaism,
the perverted form of Buddhism, they might easily
have maintained their place as one of the greatest
nations of the East. Lamaism was introduced from
Tibet after the death of the Mongol conqueror Kublai
Khan in 1295 ; it is a branch of Buddhism differing in
details from that founded by Buddha, who was re-

WAR CLOUDS OVER ASIA 249

garded as the incarnation of the divine essence, and
numbers among his followers a quarter of the human
race.

Then came in Tibet the creation of a hierarchy in
the person of a Dalai Lama, the Sea of Wisdom, whose
judgment in all things is supreme. The second in this
hierarchy is the Tashi Lama, the Hutuktu of Mongolia
or Pope of Lamaism, completing the triumvirate.
None of these pontifical lamas dies; he merely discards
the mortal envelope and is rejuvenated, his spirit
appearing in the person of an infant, and thus he is
reborn into the world to continue his earthly ex-
istence. The selection in Mongolia is confined to a
number of infants, whose names are written on scrolls
and deposited in a golden urn, from which the slips
are taken as in a lottery, the child thus drawn being
adopted as the reincarnation of the deity.

It may be said that a separatist movement in Mon-
golia has little hope of success; the tenets of Lamaism
stifle all ambition, they are opposed to war or the
taking of life, the prolongation of the latter being a
virtuous act. Sometimes two and more sons in a
family are dedicated to the lama calling, amongst
which celibacy is enjoined, so the birth rate is corre-
spondingly low. Education is unknown among these
lamas, and they lead a life of indolence and ease, with
no incentive to work when all that is requisite can be
had for the asking, whilst in addition they extort a
considerable amount by preying on the superstitious
fears of the people.

250 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

For centuries the spell of Lamaism has gripped
Mongolia, its progress has been arrested, and a great
nation has degenerated from the sapping of its virility
and self-respect. Nearly fifty per cent of the men
are lamas; it may be even more, and the number is on
the increase, for the lama is supported by his lay
brethren and exempt from government or military
service.

It explains the reason why the Chinese authorities
have fostered Lamaism as the best means of restricting
the population, and obviating a resuscitation of the
race.

So much then for separatist tendencies in Mongolia.
With these and other obstacles hampering the Japa-
nese in the task of restoring tranquillity, came grave
economic conditions, the closing of banks, and a period
of panic which paralyzed trade and threatened disaster
to the community.

By the end of September 1931 the situation was
sufficiently well in hand to allow of the Chinese police
resuming their duties in Mukden; this, with other
signs that the danger period was past, leading to a
return to normal conditions.

Matters were, however, pursuing a different course
within the area of the Nanking Government; large
bodies of students, the product of Europe and Amer-
ica, carried away by ideas of equality with Western
nations, were clamoring for determined action. Al-
ways ready to fan the fire of discontent and anti-
foreign feeling, they are apt material for a

WAR CLOUDS OVER ASIA 251

revolutionary campaign, devoid of any constructive
acumen, and lacking the balance and sense of pro-
portion so vital to the molding of a new nation.

Wang, the Chinese Foreign Minister, endeavored to
pacify these hot-heads, but they would have none of
it, and demanded only the unconditional expulsion of
the Japanese, a course of action the Chinese were
manifestly incapable of taking. Wang suffered se-
verely for his moderation; he was seized by the irate
students and so badly mauled that it was necessary to
appoint an acting Minister in his place. The post was
offered to Dr. Sze, the Chinese Minister in London
and representative at the League's meeting in Geneva,
but he declined the honor, preferring the safety and
comfort of Europe to the vagaries of a Chinese student
mob.

The tide seemed to set against the Chinese, for dif-
ferences then arose between the party at Canton and
its rival in Nanking, serious floods occurred at
Hankow and in the Yangtze Valley, and famine and
distress menaced the country to a greater extent than
the Japanese. The organization for coping with such
disasters was, as usual, non-existent, and but for the
aid rendered by foreigners the death-roll would have
been far heavier.

Since the original outbreak in September the
trouble has developed by stages, the opening phase of
which we have dealt with.

After the seizure of the civil, and its replacement
by a military, administration, local councils were

252 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

formed, these subsequently giving way to an im-
provised provincial government for each of the three
provinces, comprised principally of local Chinese.
This would appear to demonstrate that the Japanese
desire the Chinese to run the machinery of govern-
ment as far as possible, but to be effective it must
have sound political direction, which the civil service
is unable to give until the military relinquish control.

The Manchurians themselves appreciate the sense
of security and orderly administration prevailing,
which, to a people threatened with growing misrule,
must appear as a dream. The Japanese have certainly
shown restraint, and the discipline of the troops,
coupled with their attitude towards the inhabitants,
is at least an item in their favor.

In the meantime there were several dramatic moves
in the military sphere. In their retreat the Chinese
had damaged several bridges across the Nonni River,
and a mixed Japanese force was detailed to effect re-
pairs, preceded by airplanes which carried out bomb-
ing operations on sundry towns and villages, inflicting
many casualties, the necessity for which is at least
open to doubt.

It was determined to repair and occupy these
bridges over the Nonni, the Chinese being warned not
to approach within six miles of them. In spite of
this, however, fighting ensued, and the Japanese by a
series of outflanking movements effected their object
and established themselves up to Anganchi, the June-

i

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g*

H fa

1

I

WAR CLOUDS OVER ASIA 2 S3

tion of the Chinese Eastern with the South Man-
churian line.

The Japanese declared that it was not their inten-
tion to advance to Tsitsihar, and that the troops
would be withdrawn as soon as the repairs to the
bridges had been completed.

Nevertheless, they occupied Tsitsihar unopposed on
November 18, the Chinese General Ma withdrawing
to Taerha, thirty miles to the north. At this stage
the American representative at Geneva expressed in
severe terms his strong disapprobation of the Japanese
procedure in occupying Tsitsihar after an undertak-
ing not to do so.

From now until the end of December 1931 Japa-
nese operations were confined to consolidation, and
the maintenance of law and order.

Marshal Chang Hsueh-hang had decided to with-
draw the Chinese forces within the Great Wall, which
was effected by the 29th, and on January 3, 1932,
the Japanese 20th Division occupied Chinchow, thus
acquiring virtual mastery in Manchuria. The retire-
ment of the Chinese forces had been insisted upon by
the Japanese commander-in-chief, who considered
that their presence in the Chinchow area was highly
provocative.

With the evacuation of Chinchow came the end of
the brief connection between Manchuria and the
Nanking Government, and the provincial govern-
ments which recognized Japanese rights were able to
extend their authority over Manchuria.

254 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

But if the so-called regular forces of the Chinese
had departed, the country was still overrun with
bandits, who on January 4 attacked Sinmin and were
only repulsed after reinforcements had arrived from
Mukden. They followed this up on the 10th by an-
other success. A Japanese cavalry detachment was
operating west of Lienshan, in the Chinchow district,
when they encountered a large force of bandits.

A hasty reconnaissance revealed to the Japanese
commander that the enemy were in overwhelming
numbers, and he issued orders for an immediate re-
tirement. But it was aready too late. The bandits
were moving to right and left of him, and the net
they had cast around his force rapidly closed. No
other troops were near enough to interfere. Yet the
Japanese were not to be denied, and with half their
force killed and wounded they still held on until relief
arrived in the evening.

The disaster to this detachment revealed to the Jap-
anese that the bandit organization was a more serious
one than even they had imagined, and it led to greater
caution on the part of columns, and numerically weak
detachments, in their operations against the brigands
and hordes of undisciplined Chinese irregulars.

The reverse in question was, however, merely a
minor occurrence having no bearing on the main
issues; organized resistance to the Japanese ceased with
the evacuation of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's forces
south of the Great Wall, and it remains only to clean

WAR CLOUDS OVER ASIA 255

up the country of the unorganized and robber ele-
ments.

So far as the general military situation in Manchuria
is concerned, the Japanese are in a strong position.
They have command of the sea, and the line of com-
munications with their home base assured. They are
quite at home in the Manchurian theater of opera-
tions, and are able to reenf orce units at the front with
rapidity and ease, regulating their actions by those
of any potential enemy, apart from the Chinese,
whilst at the same time they can anticipate such action
by moving into Manchuria superior forces with
greater facility and speed, as well as in a highly
efficient condition.

The military operations have proceeded with se-
curity and dispatch; but the movements subsequent
to the occupation of Chinchow, during the first week
of January, are now devoted, as already remarked, to
sweeping up.

By January 15, 1932, the whole of Southern Man-
churia, with the exception of the Jehol district, has
been occupied by the military, the civil administration
being confided to the Chinese local authorities under
Japanese supervision.

It was not deemed necessary to occupy the Jehol
district, since such Chinese irregulars and bandits as
were reputed to be in that area were peaceably in-
clined and unlikely to give trouble.

In the region north of the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way the Japanese garrison at Tsitsihar has been

256 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

reduced to approximately two hundred men, and the
situation underwent a distinct change for the better
on January 21, when the Chinese General Ma with
one thousand and fifty men came into Tsitsihar with
the approval of the Japanese. This has apparently
had a good effect, and their cooperation in the civil
administration has resulted in an improved atmosphere
of mutual reliance and trust, at any rate so far as
can be seen at present.

The Japanese garrison at Mukden is approximately
six thousand of all arms, the various towns through-
out Manchuria being garrisoned in accordance with
their relative importance, and the necessity for con-
ducting operations in their vicinity.

Summing up, we may say that as regards the mili-
tary factor in Manchuria, both before and after the
crisis, the Japanese have had a definite plan the occu-
pation of the country until such time as their
demands, both economic and political, have been ful-
filled.

The military policy of Japan during the past few
years has concentrated on making a certainty of the
retention of Manchuria, which, as we have shown, is
of such consequence to the very existence of the island
empire. Taking all the factors into consideration
Japan has made her calculations accordingly, and
whether they be correct or incorrect, they represent
the studied views and policy of the nation.

When the moment arrived for the armed forces to

WAR CLOUDS OVER ASIA 257

move, the organization was found complete, the ma-
chine worked with a thoroughness born of careful
preparation, and the occupation developed according
to plan.

CHAPTER IX

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS

NO aspect of the Manchurian crisis occasioned
such widespread and bitter controversy as
the attempts of the Council of the League of
Nations to effect a settlement of the dispute.

Both China and Japan are members of the League,
both are signatories of the Washington Nine-Power
Treaty and of the Kellogg Pact renouncing war.
Judged only by superficial facts, the problem con-
fronting the League Council when China appealed
to that body under Article XI of the League Cov-
enant to "safeguard the peace of the nations/' was
simple. China, with her resources exhausted by civil
war and disastrous floods and her armies incapable of
putting up any real resistance to the advancing Jap-
anese forces, requested the League of Nations to
arbitrate in the dispute, thereby placing herself
technically in the right. Japan, on the other hand,
continued to invade ever increasing areas of Chinese
territory, while her representative at the League
Council paid lip service to the deliberations of that
body and delayed any decision by every means in
his power.

That the task confronting the statesmen of the
League was not so easy to solve as many critics of

258

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 259

that body imagined, however, was proved by the fact
that the Chinese Government itself deprecated any
attempt on the part of the League to coerce Japan,
believing that such action, even if agreement could
be achieved among the Great Powers, would do more
harm than good. Further, while the Japanese had
undoubtedly been guilty of flagrant breaches of
solemn treaty obligations, and her troops had seized
a wide stretch of territory belonging to a fellow-
member of the League, usurping the functions of
government within that area, the Chinese Govern-
ment, as has been shown in an earlier chapter, was
also guilty of repeated breaches of treaty rights, in
many cases rights gained by the Japanese at the ex-
pense of a prolonged and costly war with Russia.

Nevertheless, the Chinese Government sought, at
a late hour, to base its actions upon its treaty obliga-
tions, and, in addition to appealing to the League
Council, gave immediate orders that Japanese resi-
dents in China were to be protected and that no
resistance was to be offered to the Japanese advance
in Manchuria.

The League Council first considered the dangerous
situation which had arisen at a session held from
September 22 to 30, 1931. At this time the infor-
mation available at Geneva suggested that the Jap-
anese army in Manchuria had got out of hand, and
that the Japanese Government was striving to regain
control of the situation and to "liquidate" the results
of the excessive zeal of their military commanders,

260 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

for which reason Tokyo was anxious not to be em-
barrassed by any precipitate action by the League.

This view was strengthened by hints from Jap-
anese sources that it was the policy of that Govern-
ment to evacuate its subjects from outlying areas
in South Manchuria during the following two or
three weeks, in order to localize the trouble and ease
a difficult situation.

Accepting this view of the situation, the Council
passed a non-committal resolution taking note of the
Japanese Government's declaration that it had no
territorial aims in Manchuria, and that the with-
drawal of the Japanese troops about to begin would
be completed as rapidly as was compatible with
safety of Japanese lives and property. The resolu-
tion further noted the Chinese Government's under-
taking to safeguard Japanese lives and property in
the areas evacuated by Japanese troops. No sugges-
tion was made of any neutral investigation, nor was
any time-limit mentioned two points which the
Chinese delegate at Geneva had pressed for but did
not insist upon. China accepted this resolution,
though not without misgivings which were later to
be fully justified.

The next chapter in the League's handling of the
dispute began on October 13, when the Chinese
Government made an urgent appeal to the Council,
on the ground that instead of withdrawing, the Jap-
anese army had extended and consolidated its occu-
pation, and committed further acts of a definitely

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 261

warlike nature, culminating in the aerial bombard-
ment of Chinchow, the temporary headquarters of
the Chinese Government in Manchuria, causing
heavy damage to property and loss of life. The city
of Chinchow was situated some distance from the
area occupied by the Japanese troops, and the twelve
bombing 'planes responsible for the damage dropped
proclamations addressed to the inhabitants of Chin-
chow. The text of this proclamation, later commu-
nicated to the League Council by the Chinese
Government, was as follows:

"Chang Hsueh-liang, that most rapacious, wan-
ton, stinking youth, is still failing to realize his
odiousness and has established a Provisional Muk-
den Government at Chinchow to plot intrigues in
the territories which are safely under the rule of
the troops of the great Japanese Empire; when the
heart of the Manchurian mass is no longer with
him, his ground is lost and the four provinces of
the Northeast are going to revolt against him.
The Imperial Army, which, in accordance with the
principles of justice, is endeavoring to safeguard
its interests and to protect the masses, will never
recognize the Provisional Government of Chang
Hsueh-liang at Chinchow, and therefore it is
obliged to take drastic measures to suppress such
a Government.

"The people of Chinchow should submit to the
kindness and power of the army of the great Jap-

262 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

anese Empire and should oppose and prevent the
establishment of Chang Hsueh-liang's Govern-
ment, otherwise they will be considered as decid-
edly opposing the army of the great Japanese
Empire, in which case the army will ruthlessly
destroy Chinchow. The people of Chinchow are
hereby enjoined carefully to consider their situa-
tion and to take such decisions as they will deem

wise."

At the meeting of the Council held to consider
these serious developments, the Foreign Ministers of
the Great Powers were present, an indication of the
growing concern which the Japanese actions were
causing in Europe. A representative of the United
States Government was also present at the Council
table, and the statesmen who thus debated the grave
position were further encouraged by a Note from Mr.
Stimson, American Secretary of State, in which he
urged the League "in no way to relax its vigilance and
in no way to fail to assert all the pressure and authority
in its competence with a view to regulating the action
of Japan and China in the premises."

The Japanese continued to delay any decision by
every means possible, objecting to the presence of an
American representative on the Council, and refer-
ring back to Tokyo for instructions. Finally, the
preliminary objections of the Japanese delegate were
overcome and the Council got down to business.

All the resources of League diplomacy were

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 263

brought into play to arrange a compromise, it being
felt that any suggestion of coercion in a dispute so
involved and entangled would only cause a split in
the League itself. At one point, according to ob-
servers, the Council came near to accepting a com-
promise which would have obliged the Powers to
urge the Chinese to agree to direct negotiations on
the question of security, while Japanese troops still
occupied the greater part of Manchuria. The Coun-
cil were saved from such a position at that juncture
in the negotiations by a sudden stiffening on the part
of the Japanese, who, perhaps feeling that the hesi-
tancy of the Council made any "surrender" unneces-
sary, refused to accept even the minor concessions
proposed. Japan refused to help the Council to find
a compromise, and insisted that issues concerning rail-
ways and existing treaties should be included in any
negotiations with the Chinese Government and set-
tled to the satisfaction of Tokyo before the Japanese
army withdrew to the railway zone.

Faced with this demand, the Council, on October
24, abandoned its efforts to find an agreed compro-
mise and tabled a resolution which revealed a certain
access of courage and helped to clarify the real issues.
This resolution requested the Japanese Government
to withdraw all troops before the Council met again
on November 16, invited the Chinese Government
to afford facilities for neutral observers to be present
when the areas evacuated by the Japanese were taken
over, and again took especial note of Japanese declara-

264 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

tions that they had no territorial aims in Manchuria,
and the Chinese counter-statement guaranteeing the
lives and property of Japanese subjects. This resolu-
tion the Chinese delegate immediately accepted,
promising to afford all facilities for neutral observers,
and to make any other arrangements that would sat-
isfy Japanese fears regarding the lives and property
of their subjects in the areas evacuated. At the same
time the Chinese delegate reiterated that it was the
unlawful occupation of Chinese territory by the
armed forces of a foreign Power which had created
the conditions of insecurity which were being ad-
vanced by Tokyo as an excuse for continuing the
occupation. Further, the Chinese delegate pointed
out that his Government regarded withdrawal from
the occupied regions as the first and only issue before
the League, and that only when that evacuation had
been effected could other issues be discussed, includ-
ing fixing responsibility and assessing damages, which
the Chinese Government was willing to leave to the
League itself. But, added the Chinese delegate, his
Government would never consent to discuss out-
standing issues with any Power while the military
occupation of any part of its territories by the armed
forces of that Power continued. And, finally, he
stated that in taking up that attitude China was
taking its stand on the Covenant of the League and
the Peace Pact, and considered that she was entitled
to the unqualified moral support of every member of
the League and signatory of the Kellogg Pact.

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 265

The reply of the Japanese delegate to this declara-
tion was a flat refusal to evacuate Manchuria until
China had negotiated an agreement with Japan on
certain "fundamental principles.** Although pressed
by M. Briand, Lord Cecil, and other members of the
Council, to reveal the nature of these "principles,"
the Japanese delegate refused to do so, leaving the
Council with a distinct impression that some at least
of these principles were concerned, not with the
question of security for Japanese subjects and prop-
erty, but with the complicated and highly conten-
tious issues of Japanese relations with China over
Manchuria questions which Japan had attempted
on more than one occasion previously to solve by
armed force

Attempts to get the Japanese delegate to moderate
his attitude having failed, the Council put both the
Japanese counter-proposal and then its own resolu-
tion to the vote. Both votes showed world opinion,
including America, to be ranged solidly against the
Japanese attempt to maintain a military occupation,
with all its dangers, as a means of settling civil
disputes.

Shortly after the taking of this vote on October 26,
1931, the Japanese Government issued the text of the
points styled in Tokyo the "Five Fundamental Prin-
ciples" to which Chinese agreement was demanded
before evacuation would be even discussed.

These five points were:

266 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

(1) That an agreement shall be come to whereby
Japan shall not entertain any aggressive de-
signs*

(2) That the territorial integrity of China shall
be respected by Japan,

(3) That China shall cease anti- Japanese propa-
ganda such as boycotting Japanese goods in
commerce, and schoolbook propaganda incul-
cating national hatred against the Japanese.

(4) That Japanese lives and property shall be
safeguarded and Japanese allowed to follow
their lawful pursuits peaceably.

(5) That China shall be compelled to observe
Treaty obligations.

These five points form the basis of Japan's case as
presented at the League meetings, and as prosecuted
by armed force in Manchuria. There is a consider-
able measure of justice in Japan's demand for the
observance of treaty rights and security for her citi-
zens, as we have shown. What China would not
agree to was any compromise whereby these issues
were to be discussed prior to the evacuation of Chi-
nese cities by the Japanese armed forces, the attempt
to enforce these essentially political demands by
the establishment of an armed protectorate over three
Chinese provinces, and the expulsion of the Chinese
governmental authorities from Manchuria.

In the Chinese view, the boycott of Japanese
goods, which has wrought such havoc to Japanese

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 267

trade with China recently, is itself the result of the
national anger at Japan's actions in Manchuria, and
that no Government could suppress it until the cause
is removed. The Chinese Government offered,
rather belatedly it is true, to honor faithfully its
treaty obligations under international law and the
existing treaties, to protect Japanese lives and prop-
erty, but it refused as impossible to force its citizens
to buy Japanese goods while the armies of that Power
were engaged in assaulting Chinese cities and fighting
the Chinese national army.

With the passing of the League Resolution in Oc-
tober, the Council was committed to a demand for
the complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops to
within the railway zone before its next meeting in
November that was, within three weeks. And the
Council, by its action, had made it clear that it did
not consider it necessary to consider any other aspect
of the crisis until this withdrawal had been effected.

During those crucial days, however, instead of
withdrawing, the Japanese occupation was extended
northward as far as Tsitsihar, without any protest
from the Great Powers or from the League, and when
the Council met again, at four o'clock on November
16, 1931, in the Salon de 1'Horloge at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Paris, it was recognized that the
situation was critical and that nothing less than the
prestige of the League itself was at stake.

Before the meeting of the Council information had
been received that the Japanese were deposing the

268 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

local authorities throughout Manchuria and replac-
ing them with "puppet" administrations of their
own choosing, and, further, that Japan was prepar-
ing to set up a new Manchurian Government under
its own control. There had been, moreover, no slack-
ening of military effort and visible preparations were
proceeding for a winter campaign. If "war" was
not spoken of, it was only because the Chinese forces
were being withdrawn without fighting, while China
looked to the League for a settlement she was too
weak to enforce against superior forces.

The first reports of the Paris meeting indicated
that the Council recognized its impotence before the
firm action taken by Japan, and was inclined to bring
pressure to bear upon China to agree to negotiations
regarding outstanding questions without waiting for
a Japanese withdrawal, and without insisting upon
the fixing of a date within which period the evacua-
tion was to be completed.

At this meeting M. Briand stated, with reference
to the "Fundamental Principles" set out above, that
the first four of them were embodied in the draft
resolution of October 24 (which Japan alone had
refused to accept) and that disagreement was con-
fined to the fifth "principle," Japan declaring that
a Chinese undertaking to respect her treaty rights
was one of the essential conditions of security,
whereas China held the view that this did not come
within the scope of negotiations regarding security,
but would involve long and protracted inquiry

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 269

which could not reasonably take place while a Jap-
anese army occupied Manchuria.

It speedily became clear that the real battle was to
be waged over this fifth "fundamental principle,"
concerning the recognition by China of Tokyo's
particular interpretation of its treaty rights in Man-
churia. And concerning those "rights" there existed
differences even in matters of fact. For instance, the
Chinese denied that the treaty of 1915 had ever been
ratified by any Chinese Government. Yet they
were being asked to admit the sanctity of that treaty,
and to be bound by its provisions, as an alternative to
losing three of their provinces. And Japan now con-
sidered her position to be strong enough to openly
defy the League on this point.

Concerning this demand Dr. Sze, the Chinese dele-
gate to the League, communicated to the Secretary-
General on November 19 a letter in which he stated
that "it is impossible for any Government in China
in any circumstances to accept a settlement that
involves direct negotiation on the five points under
the pressure of military occupation for two reasons.
In the first place because the fifth point has nothing
to do with security, and all the points together would
swiftly grow into a political and economic pro-
gram for establishing a Japanese protectorate in
Manchuria if negotiations on them were in any way
linked up with evacuation. In the second place be-
cause the Chinese will not, and cannot, accept the
position that they should re-sign the Twenty-One

270 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

Demands as a condition for Japan fulfilling her
treaty obligations under the Covenant and the Paris
Pact."

The letter continued: "This is a life-and-death
struggle for the Chinese Government, which has
staked its political existence on the policy of relying
on the League. It is therefore bound to push this
policy to its conclusion and test the competence of
the League to the utmost. If the League fails the
Chinese Government will be forced to put the blame
publicly where it belongs namely, on the unwilling-
ness of the Great Powers to lift a finger in defense of
the Covenant, which they are solemnly pledged to
defend. The matter is therefore also a lif e-and-death
issue for the League and for the Disarmament Con-
ference. The temper of the Chinese people is rapidly
hardening and their patience is becoming exhausted.
The situation in my view is extremely grave.**

On the same day the Japanese delegate handed a
Note to M. Briand which reiterated that Japan would
not evacuate the occupied area until a new treaty,
confirming all present treaties, had been negotiated
direct with the Chinese Government. The Note
further added that even should the security of Jap-
anese lives and property in Manchuria appear to be
assured, Japan intended to maintain the military oc-
cupation, believing that the Nanking Government,
representing the Kuomintang, an anti- Japanese or-
ganization, was powerless to insure order in Man-
churia. Further, the Japanese Government declared

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 271

that it could not accept any compromise involving
negotiations which would coincide with evacuation.

Thus the Council found itself faced with a com-
plete deadlock China refusing to discuss treaties
until evacuation of the territories illegally occupied
had been carried out, and Japan refusing to withdraw
her armed forces and, indeed, still extending the
occupation until all political issues outstanding be-
tween the two Governments had been settled to the
satisfaction of Tokyo.

It is easy to declare that the League Powers, faced
with this situation, should have adopted some form of
direct pressure upon Japan such as the severance of
diplomatic relations. But the issues were extremely
involved, and especially must it be remembered that
there was some justice in the Japanese claim that the
League was dealing with a territory in which great
industries were at stake, and over which the Chinese
Government had proved itself unable to maintain ef-
fective control. The Japanese further pointed out
that there were "acts of war without arms" and that
the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods amounted to a
definite act of aggression against a nominally friendly
Power. The information reaching the League also
suggested that some form of policing Manchuria was
urgently necessary if widespread extension of brigand-
age was to be avoided, and it was difficult to see what
Power, other than die Japanese, could supply the
necessary force to maintain law and order.

This point of view might have impressed the Coun-

272 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

cil more strongly had Japan adopted a less intransigent
attitude to the League and followed a policy of closer
cooperation with the Council. As it was, the Japa-
nese mood was one of obstmancy and delay, while her
armed forces completed the conquest of the country.

The Japanese representatives did, however, propose
a compromise, and out of this proposal eventually ma-
terialized the one achievement which the League con-
tributed to the crisis. This was a suggestion that the
League should send a commission to Manchuria to
study the local conditions on the spot. The Japanese
proposal was, however, so hedged round with stipula-
tions and qualifications intended to restrict the power
of the commission that the suggestion appeared to be
of little value.

In its original form the Japanese proposal was that
the purpose of the commission should be not to ex-
press any opinion regarding the method of evacua-
tion of the Japanese forces, or the measures necessary
to protect Japanese lives and property, but only to
inquire into the "fundamental causes" of the dispute
i.e., into conditions in Manchuria before the Japa-
nese advance, and also in China generally. On the
other hand, the Japanese no longer insisted upon direct
negotiations with China simultaneously with the dis-
patch of the commission, nor upon immediate ac-
ceptance by China of the "Five Points." But Tokyo
insisted upon the continuance of the military occupa-
tion, and, further, refused any guarantee that that
occupation would not be further extended. The

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 273

Japanese implied that whatever the commission might
think, the Japanese troops would remain in Man-
churia until China had negotiated, to the satisfaction
of Tokyo, upon all the five points at issue. In some
quarters this suggested compromise was declared to
be an offer by Japan, which having occupied Man-
churia had nothing to lose, to save the face of the
League before the world.

The Great Powers, on the other hand, preferred
that any commission of inquiry should follow the
precedent of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute in 1925,
when a League Commission, headed by Sir Horace
Rumbold, visited the scene of the conflict and drew
up a report on the rights and wrongs of the dispute
and the methods to be adopted to avoid any recur-
rence.

Both China and Japan accepted "in principle*' the
suggestion that a League Commission should investi-
gate the situation on the spot, the Chinese representa-
tive qualifying his acceptance of "a step which might
well have been taken two months ago had not Japan
refused to entertain the suggestion" by declaring, in a
memorandum circulated to the League Council, that
"inquiry without at the same time providing for im-
mediate cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal
of Japanese forces . . . becomes a mere device to
condone and perpetuate, for a more or less indefinite
period, the unjustifiable occupation of Chinese
territory by an aggressor who has already virtually

274 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

accomplished his unlawful objective while these dis-
cussions have been going on."

Having regard to this acceptance, at least "in prin-
ciple/ 3 the twelve members of the League Council
(other than the Chinese and Japanese delegates) set-
tled down to the task of drafting the terms of the
proposed inquiry. That it was not likely to prove an
easy task was shown by the fact that the Japanese
representative on the Council, Mr. Yoshizawa, was
being sharply attacked in Tokyo for accepting the
suggestion as worthy of investigation, and hastened to
inform the Council that Japan assumed that the in-
quiry would have no power to supervise the move-
ments of military forces. The importance of this
reservation was emphasized by news from the Far
East reporting that fresh Japanese reinforcements
were being sent to Manchuria, and that, in the face of
the League's appeal for an "armistice," there were
distinct fears of an extension of the fighting in the
direction of Chmchow, the seat of the Chinese Gov-
ernment of Manchuria, and the last corner of the
Three Provinces unoccupied by the Japanese armies.

The text of the resolution drafted by the Council
was certainly not unfavorable to Japan. It requested
both sides to refrain from any action which would ag-
gravate the situation, and to suspend hostilities. It
asked both China and Japan and also all members of
the Council to give to the Council all information
available regarding the precise position. It provided
for the appointment of a Commission of three one

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 275

American, one Englishman, and one Frenchman
who were to be assisted by Chinese and Japanese as-
sessors. And it declared that the sending o this Com-
mission to Manchuria, and the preparation of a report
which would necessarily involve some time, could not
be allowed to delay the evacuation of the occupied
territory.

Assuming that the Japanese Government had any
faith in the League of Nations, of which it is a mem-
ber, or attached any real importance to the obliga-
tions undertaken when it signed the Covenant of the
League or the Kellogg Pact renouncing war as a
means of settling political disputes, there was nothing
in this draft resolution to which it need have objected.
On the contrary, a considerable body of opinion held
the view that the draft resolution amounted to an
almost complete acceptance of the Japanese condi-
tions, and the Chinese Government, as we have shown,
protested energetically against the Commission as a
device to delay evacuation.

The Japanese had, indeed, revived the proposal for
a League Commission at a favorable moment for
themselves. Their military operations in Manchuria
had been completely successful. The whole country
apart from the area around Chinchow had been oc-
cupied at an insignificant cost, and without any
protest from the Powers which Tokyo need regard as
serious* Complications with Soviet Russia in North-
ern Manchuria, whether in reality courted or feared
by Tokyo, had not materialized. On the other hand,

276 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

the anti- Japanese economic boycott in China had been
unexpectedly successful, and Nanking had made it
clear that this boycott, which was strangling Japanese
trade during a year when trade difficulties loomed
large on the horizon, would not be withdrawn until
the Japanese forces had returned to the railway zone.
Direct negotiations forced upon China would not
have ended the boycott, and it seemed probable, there-
fore, that the Japanese might consider it worth while
to come to some arrangement for a withdrawal of
their troops under League supervision, in order to
minimize the risks of sporadic civil warfare resulting
in the evacuated territory when the "puppet" Gov-
ernments placed in office by the Japanese military
commanders disappeared, as they obviously would do
when their Japanese protectors withdrew.

Those who took this view proved to be too optimis-
tic. Persistent efforts by the League Council, con-
tinued during the closing days of November and the
early days of December, to draft a resolution accept-
able to both China and Japan, only resulted in dead-
lock after deadlock. At the beginning of December,
the position was that the Chinese still insisted upon
the suspension of hostilities without reservations an
attempt to save the Chinchow area from Japanese
hands while the Japanese declared that they must
have a "free hand" to deal with "bandits'* after the
suspension of hostilities "bandits" being an elastic
phrase which, as events proved, was employed to cover
operations against regular Chinese forces thirty thou-

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 277

sand strong. Further, the Japanese declared that they
could not consent to the intervention of third parties
(i.e., the League Commission) in a dispute capable
of direct settlement between China and Japan and
that they alone were competent to decide whether the
lives and property of Japanese subjects were suffi-
ciently secure to permit withdrawal. The hitches,
therefore, at this point in the prolonged negotiations,
were concerned with three points the suspension of
hostilities, the conditions of evacuation, and the ar-
rangements for a neutral zone around Chinchow.

This last proposal to form a neutral zone between
the rival forces was embodied in a suggestion that
those Governments which sent observers to the Chin-
chow area should give them instructions that they
should, in concert with one another, examine the pos-
sibility of establishing as between the Chinese and
Japanese troops a neutral zone or any other system
calculated to prevent any collision between the troops
of the two parties.

This proposal was fiercely contested by the Japa-
nese representative, who declared, on behalf of his
Government, that Japan would not tolerate the inter-
vention in the military sphere of "third parties," but
offered an undertaking that the Japanese forces would
not enter the zone around Chinchow unless excep-
tional circumstances necessitated an advance in that
direction. Not content with this protest, the Japa-
nese Government demanded further that the Chinese
Government of Chang Hsueh-liang, the Governor of

278 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

Manchuria whose territories they had occupied,
should be withdrawn from Chinchow and any neutral
zone placed under the control of the puppet admin-
istration set up by the Japanese themselves at Mukden.
In a word, the Japanese Government demanded the
complete evacuation of Manchuria by the Chinese
authorities, and made their acceptance of the pro-
posal for a League Commission conditional upon that
evacuation being effected.

The deadlock continued throughout the first week
of December, the only point on which it seemed pos-
sible to secure agreement being that a League Com-
mission should be sent to Manchuria. Upon such
questions as the cessation of hostilities, the fixing of a
neutral zone, and the withdrawal of the Japanese
troops, Tokyo was adamant. Meanwhile, public opin-
ion in China, where bitter disappointment was felt at
the failure of the League to either force a cessation of
hostilities or arrange for an evacuation, was stiffening,
and making any further concessions by the Chinese
delegates improbable. Further, while the members
of the Council, or most of them, held the view that
Japan had placed herself technically in the wrong
by occupying the territory of another Power, it
was felt that there were mitigating circumstances in
the spread of chaos in China, in the inability of the
Chinese Government to prevent lawlessness in Man-
churia, and in the continuance of the anti- Japanese
economic boycott. If the issues seemed simple on the
surface, they were in reality too involved to permit

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 279

the League to bring direct pressure to bear upon
Tokyo, always remembering that once such a policy
had been adopted questions of prestige would necessi-
tate the League pursuing a policy of "reprisals" to the
end.

Fresh progress was made at a meeting of the League
Council on December 7, but it was a move backwards.
The scheme for a neutral zone was dropped entirely,
following a Japanese demand that the neutral zone
should begin immediately to the west of Chinchow
and extend as far as the Great Wall a line which
would have left Chinchow outside the zone and
enabled the Japanese forces to occupy the last Man-
chunan city held by the Chinese. The Council re-
fused to consider this suggestion seriously, and did
not consider it worth while to communicate it to the
Chinese representatives, more especially as it con-
firmed the reports from Manchuria that the Japanese
army was, despite formal undertakings given to the
American, British, and French Governments, prepar-
ing to occupy Chinchow as soon as the session of the
League Council was ended.

The Japanese Government also finally refused to
accept Clause V of the draft resolution, referring to
the power of the Commission of Inquiry to report
on the situation upon their arrival in Manchuria.

Despairing of securing agreement on these points,
the League Council, at a special session held in Paris
on December 10, unanimously adopted a resolution
which, while by no means considered satisfactory by

280 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

supporters of the League of Nations, embodied the
utmost concessions to the League point of view which
Tokyo was prepared to yield. This resolution read:

The Council

(1) Reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by
it on September 30, 1931, by which the two parties de-
clare that they are solemnly bound. It therefore calls
upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all
steps necessary to assure its execution so that the with-
drawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone
may be effected as speedily as possible;

(2) Considering that events have assumed an even
more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October
24, notes that the two parties undertake to adopt all
measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of
the situation and to refrain from any initiative which
may lead to further fighting and loss of life;

(3) Invites the two parties to continue to keep the
Council informed as to the development of the situation;

(4) Invites the other members of the Council to
furnish the Council with any information received from
their representatives on the spot;

(5) Without prejudice to the carrying out of the
above-mentioned measures, desiring, in view of the spe-
cial circumstances of the case, to contribute towards a
final and fundamental solution by the two Govern-
ments of the questions at issue between them, decides to
appoint a Commission of five members to study on the
spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance
which, affecting international relations, threatens to dis-
turb the peace between China and Japan, or the good

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 281

understanding between them, upon which peace depends.

The Governments of China and o Japan will each
have the right to nominate one assessor to assist the
Commission. The two Governments will afford the
Commission all f acihties to obtain on the spot whatever
information it may require. It is understood that should
the two parties initiate any negotiations these would
not fall within the scope of the terms of reference on
the Commission, nor would it be within the competence
of the Commission to interfere with the military ar-
rangements of either party. The appointment and de-
liberations of the Commission shall not prejudice in any
way the undertaking given by the Japanese Government
in the resolution of September 30 as regards the with-
drawal of ,the Japanese troops within the railway zone.

(6) Between now and its ordinary session, which will
be held on January 25, 1932, the Council will continue
to have the matter in hand, and invites its President to
follow the question and to summon it afresh if
necessary.

Following the adoption of this resolution, mild
enough in the circumstances, both the Chinese and
Japanese representatives made further reservations,
while certain members of the Council, including Lord
Cecil on behalf of Britain, made it clear that they
had voted for the resolution only because it repre-
sented the sole hope of a satisfactory solution of a
most involved and difficult situation.

Continuing to stress their differences to the end, the
Japanese representative made a reservation upon one
vital point the Japanese right to take military action

282 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

against "bandits'* when the lives or property of Japa-
nese subjects were in jeopardy, while Dr. Sze, the Chi-
nese representative, in a long declaration, declared the
only way to insure peace was by the withdrawal of
the Japanese troops. He added that the Chinese Gov-
ernment could not permit these troops to exercise
police functions, and that China would consider the
promotion by the Japanese of any so-called inde-
pendent movement in Manchuria an aggravation of
the situation contrary to the League resolution.

Speaking after the adoption of the resolution, M.
Bnand, President of the League Council, declared that
"war had threatened and had been averted."

"If the Council has not fixed a period for the com-
plete withdrawal of the Japanese forces it nevertheless
holds firmly to the view that their withdrawal to the
railway zone should be carried out as quickly as pos-
sible/* said M. Briand, adding that "it is essential
that fresh incidents should be prevented. The Coun-
cil has the right to assume that the cessation of
hosilities will continue and that even without the
definition of a neutral zone the formal engagements of
both parties will be enough to prevent any further
clash."

M. Briand continued: "At this solemn moment,
with a contract of good faith and honor by us,"
turning with emotion towards the representatives of
China and Japan, "I should feel that I was not doing
full justice to two great nations, members of the
League of Nations, if I did not strongly affirm here,

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 283

both personally and on behalf of my colleagues, our
confidence in the fulfillment of our desire."

If M. Briand, Lord Cecil, and other members of
the League Council really believed that the adoption
of the resolution would mark a cessation of military
action by the Japanese in Manchuria, their hopes were
speedily shattered. Hardly had the Council concluded
its session before the Japanese forces were advancing
upon Chinchow, the last Manchunan city of any
importance left in Chinese hands, and by the end of
December 1931, the Japanese troops had reached and
captured the important railway junction of Kao-
pangtze and the city of Tahushan, the occupation of
these two points being preceded by aerial bombard-
ments and conflicts between Chinese forces and Japa-
nese armored cars. This advance towards Chinchow
had, indeed, clearly been foreshadowed by Japanese
reservations during the protracted negotiations in Paris
concerning a neutral zone, it being impossible to be-
lieve that any member of the League Council could
have had any illusions regarding Japanese intentions.

While this advance was in progress, the Japanese
Government forwarded to the Council of the League
of Nations a declaration which described the situation
in the Chinchow area as one of anarchy and declared
it would have been a breach of duty for Japan to have
left the population a prey to anarchy, deprived of all
the apparatus of civilized life.

"Therefore the Japanese forces have, at considerable
sacrifice, expended much time and energy in securing

284 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

the safety of persons and property in districts where
native authority had become ineffective," stated this
Note. "This is a responsibility which was thrust upon
them by events, and one which they had as little desire
to assume as to evade."

The Note continued: "Certainly the Japanese
forces, in deference to the resolution of the Council
of the League of September 30 and December 10, are
not in the field against regular Chinese forces; but
in the present abnormal conditions in Manchuria they
are compelled to continue their operation against the
lawless elements. So long as the Chinchow military
authorities, while simulating an unaggressive attitude,
continue to instigate and manipulate movements of
bandit organizations against the Japanese army, as
well as Japanese and other peaceful inhabitants, and
so long as officers and men of the Chinchow army
mingle in large numbers with these bandit groups
and so render it impossible to distinguish the latter
from regular troops, so long must the responsibility
for the consequences of any action which may be
entailed upon the Japanese army in self-defense rest
entirely with the Chinese." *

Simultaneously with this declaration, which reveals
so clearly the convenient Japanese habit of declaring
any opposition to be composed solely of "bandits,"
Mr. Inukai, the Japanese Prime Minister, gave an in-
terview to foreign journalists in which he declared
that Japan would not accept Manchuriaeven as a

1 The Times, December 30, 1931.

r v-

' * * * ^ ^

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 285

gift owing to the enormous expenditure that would
be entailed in defending its extensive frontiers.

Upon the intention of the Japanese forces to oc-
cupy Chmchow becoming clear, the Governments of
Great Britain, the United States, and France ex-
pressed to Japan their "serious concern" at the pros-
pect. Japan, m reply, emphasized her determination
not to tolerate the existence of the Chinchow Gov-
ernment nor to recognize the difference between Chi-
nese soldiers and bandits, thus making it clear that
Japanese military activity would continue until both
had been swept beyond the Great Wall. Even if the
advance stopped there, for, as the Chinese Govern-
ment pointed out, if the Japanese captured Chinchow,
there was no reason why they should cease their ad-
vance short of Peking.

Faced with this new threat, Marshal Chang Hsueh-
liang notified the Japanese authorities that he had or-
dered the Chinchow garrison to withdraw south of
the Great "Wall, thus completely evacuating Man-
churia. This step was decided upon in order to re-
move any pretext under which the Japanese forces
could have carried the invasion into China. Later,
this order was countermanded, and it was announced
from Nanking that the Chinese army would receive
reinforcements, and had been ordered to hold Chin-
chow at all costs, while the Chinese Government, in
a letter dated December 26, 1931, reported upon
these events to the Council of the League of Nations
and made an urgent appeal for the "immediate adop-

286 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

tion of effective measures to deal with the situation."

It was, however, too late. The League Council
showed no inclination to meet again before January
25, 1932, the date previously fixed for its next meet-
ing. This is scarcely surprising, for that body had
had ample warning of Japan's designs upon Chinchow
before it adjourned in December. Some observers,
indeed, had wondered whether the Japanese would
hold their hand until the Council had safely dispersed,
and its members were immersed in other matters.

The warnings proved well-founded. Japan was not
to be denied. It was the Chinese who eventually
changed their minds once more and withdrew from
Chinchow, which by January 2 was in the hands of
the troops of the "great Japanese Empire." And with
the fall of this city, Chang Hsueh-hang, Chinese
ruler of Manchuria, was thrust back over the Great
Wall into China proper.

The League's attitude to these developments, car-
ried out in open defiance of its own resolutions, was
to accept the fait accompli, for the moment at all
events, and to await the report of the Commission of
Enquiry, which could not be available for some
months at the earliest, meanwhile leaving Japan in
possession.

That, without injustice, may be held to be the view
advanced by M. Bnand in a letter to the League Coun-
cil dated January 14, in which he stated that "in
view of the solemn undertakings embodied in the two
resolutions of the Council^ which form a definite

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 287

guarantee against the pursuit of any territorial aims
in Manchuria, we may regard the exceptional situa-
tion as a strictly temporary one which must in normal
circumstances end as rapidly as possible in conformity
with the conditions laid down in the resolution of the
Council of September 30."

The United States Governments alone among the
Great Powers, felt impelled to protest against Japan's
cynical flouting of her own pledges and world opin-
ion, and, as we shall show, in a strong note to Tokyo,
drew attention to the provisions of the Nine-Power
Treaty, of which Japan was a signatory.

How, in the light of these facts, should the results
of the intervention in the dispute of the League of
Nations be regarded? Did the Council of the League
fail, and seek to hide its failure in the setting up of a
Commission without real powers to curb either Japa-
nese militarism or Chinese anarchy, while leaving,
Japan free to complete the virtual conquest of Man-
churia, or can that body justly claim, in Lord Cecil's
words, that "we have prevented war, have made some
attempt to secure justice and have laid the foundation
for what we believe to be a better state of things"?

It is a simple matter to decry the results secured
by the Council after so much effort, to point out
that the Japanese, while paying lip-service to Geneva,
in reality snapped their fingers at the Great Powers
and continued their aggression undisturbed by the de-
liberations of the distinguished statesmen at Geneva
and Paris. It is even possible to argue, by drawing

288 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

an analogy with 1895, when the European Powers
forced Japan after her victory over China to disgorge
some of the spoils of victory, that the League has let
China down, and she would have been better off had
no League existed, and Nanking been forced to rely
upon international rivalries and jealousies for assist-
ance in warding off a Japanese challenge which she is
clearly too weak to oppose without aid.

But to argue thus is to deny the facts of history.
As Lord Grey has reminded us: what happened in
1895 was that "when Japan, as victor, had settled the
terms of peace, certain European Powers came upon
the scene and cynically deprived Japan of some of the
things she had gained by war. Then one Power after
another extorted something from China." And he
added that in the present dispute any proceedings of
that kind had been averted by the League of Nations,
which had exercised a restraining influence in Man-
churia, and had kept together the parties not inter-
ested in the dispute, so that not one of them was
thinking of fighting for its own purpose.

Lord Grey, in this speech, 1 went on to outline four
favorable results that the League had brought about.

"First, the influence of the League had prevented
the dispute from spreading. Secondly, other Powers,
instead of possibly playing each for its own hand,
had been working together with the League to pro-
mote peace. Thirdly, before the Great "War, when a
dispute arose between Powers, it was often regarded

1 Reported in The Times, December 12, 1931

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 289

as infringing the honor of one of the parties to the
dispute for any outside Power to interfere or mediate.
The League of Nations, however, had changed all
that, and to-day it was an infringement of the honor
of a Power if it did not accept mediation. All
through the Manchurian dispute neither Japan nor
China had said 'Hands off'; both had admitted the
right of the Council of the League to investigate and
mediate, and by each putting its own case before the
world it had tried to get the good opinion of the
world. That was an entire reversal of the position
before the war. Fourthly, the Manchurian dispute
had brought out the fact that the Kellogg-Briand
Pact was entirely in line with the Covenant of the
League of Nations. The United States had taken an
active, and so far as he could judge, a beneficial and
helpful hand in this dispute, not on behalf of the
Covenant of the League, but on behalf of its interest
in the Kellogg Pact, which was due to American ini-
tiative. The United States Government, therefore,
had been taking parallel action with the Council of
the League. That was worth knowing, for it showed
the value of the Pact of Peace."

Summing up, Lord Grey declared that judged by
the standard of comparison with the past, the League
of Nations and the work it had already done could
perhaps be described as the greatest landmark of
progress in the history of the world.

The satisfaction expressed by Lord Grey was, how-
ever, by no means universal. Others, including many

290 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

supporters of the League, were bitterly disappointed
at what they termed the "capitulation" of the League
before Japanese aggression, and the failure of the
League Council to protect Chinese territory from
invasion after that nation had placed the defense of
its territories in the hands of the League. The critics
did not rest content with the blunt statement that,
in a clear case of the use of military force for political
ends, the League had failed. They declared that if the
Council had never considered the Manchurian prob-
lem, or had issued a blunt announcement that the
attitude of the Japanese Government made any action
on its part impossible, the position resulting after the
passing of the resolution of December 10 would have
been "less helpless and depressing than in fact it is." x

It was further declared that if, as M. Briand had
suggested, a war between China and Japan had been
averted, it was only because the Council conceded
everything to Japan that would have made a war
worth while for that nation.

Behind all the criticism showered upon the states-
men who had labored so long and, let it be admitted,
on the whole so fruitlessly in Paris, was a widespread
feeling that the League should have sought to mobi-
lize the moral force of world opinion against the
aggressor, in this case, against Japan. But was the
world ready to support such a moral appeal? If not,
if international dissensions would have prevented any
real pressure being brought upon Tokyo, or if there

1 Manchester Guardian, December 8, 1931.

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 291

was any belief existing in the justice of Japan's claim
that the alternative to the occupation of Manchuria
was a relapse into the anarchy and banditry which
has been the curse of China during recent years, then
such an appeal could only have ended in failure. Nor
should it be forgotten that the Chinese Government
itself deprecated any attempt to coerce Japan, believ-
ing that such action would only intensify the crisis.

No one in close touch with the facts can doubt that
a "League war" upon Japan, or any attempt to en-
force sanctions which few members of the League
were ready to apply, might well have ended the pres-
tige and usefulness of the League of Nations for many
years, if not permanently.

For, as Mr. W. S. Rowntree has pointed out, it
would be just as mistaken a diagnosis to pronounce
the League a failure "because it has not, like Minerva,
sprung 'fully armed from the head of Jove' as it
would have been to stigmatize the first King's Courts
as useless because they took a much longer time to
establish the full 'reign of law* throughout our own
small island." x

To declare that the League "failed" because it did
not adopt "big stick" methods in a situation of great
complexity is to pass a judgment which a close exami-
nation of the facts does not support. As Lord Grey
has stated, the League is not superhuman, and it is
true that in the present conditions in Manchuria, and
the present temper of the Japanese Government, com-

1 Manchester Guardian, December 28, 1931.

292 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

plete success was not attainable. Yet we believe that
the League accomplished enough to justify Lord
Grey's fervent remark, "Thank Heaven there has been
a League of Nations since the war."

Accurately to assess the real achievement of the
Council of the League, it would be necessary to have
knowledge of the real intentions of Japan when her
troops began their advance after the alleged attack
upon the South Manchurian Railway on September
18, 1931. There is considerable evidence that the
occupation was planned well in advance. The ex-
treme rapidity with which the Japanese army acted
suggests a prepared plan. (Seven hours after the
attack upon the railway Mukden and four other cities
were in Japanese hands.) Previous to September 18
also, the Japanese garrison in Korea had been re-
enforced, while a speech is on record, made by the
Japanese General Honjo on September 13, which fore-
told the events which immediately followed.

The really important question, therefore, is whether
the Japanese had decided upon a permanent or a tem-
porary occupation of Manchuria? Their action in
setting up "puppet" governments which are certain
to be dismissed as soon as any evacuation is carried
out, is strong presumptive evidence that a permanent
occupation, in some form, was the Japanese intention.
And if this is so, then it may be held that the League
has performed a valuable service, for Japan remains
pledged by the resolution of September 30 to with-
draw her troops "as soon as the security of Japanese

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 293

subjects and property is assured." It may be argued
that the promise will not be kept, but owing to the
existence of the League it can only be broken at the
cost of lasting damage to Japanese honor and credit
in the eyes of the whole world.

On the other hand, it may be that the occupation
was only planned to last until Japan had been able
to secure a settlement of the outstanding issues de-
tailed in Chapter V, and until the menace of banditry
had been overcome. If this was so, the efforts made
by the League have not been conspicuously success-
ful, for Japan, despite the League, is to-day in control
of the whole of Manchuria and the League's Commis-
sion of Inquiry has no right to intervene in the
direct negotiations which the Japanese demand and
which the Chinese Government wishes so much to
avoid. It seems probable that in the absence of any
more forceful protest by the United States or other
Powers, China may be compelled to accept the condi-
tions laid down by Japan, however far they may go,
and even if those conditions involve surrendering
effective control over the Three Provinces, and in
such circumstances the best that can be said for the
League is that a certain amount of bloodshed was
avoided by China choosing to rely upon the Council
rather than upon her armed forces, and that Nanking
would have been compelled to submit more speedily,
and probably to still harsher terms, had the League
not existed.

The point stressed by Lord Grey is also of impor-

294 MANCHURIA. THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

tance. Had the League not existed, the Great Powers
would have been faced with a situation just as dan-
gerous and anxious, and the temptation to seek some
special advantage from Japan as the price of agreeing
to her action in Manchuria, or to seek "compensa-
tions" from China as the price of supporting her pro-
test, might well have been too strong to be resisted.
And with nations ranging up on either side in return
for such concessions, the conflict might well have
extended and expanded into a serious war, as has hap-
pened so often in the past. The existence of the
League machinery enabled all nations with interests
in the Far East to cooperate to a degree that would
scarcely have been possible without the League. In
a word, therefore, although it may be admitted that
Japan has succeeded in securing her aims despite the
League, that body has in turn succeeded completely
in localizing the dispute, in issuing reliable informa-
tion concerning events to steady world opinion, and
in making the Japanese Government sufficiently un-
comfortable during the last three months of 1931, to
deter other nations from lightly following her ex-
ample.

The Commission of Inquiry goes to Manchuria
with vague terms of reference, deliberately drafted
to avoid offending Japanese susceptibilities, but this
very fact may add to the value of the Commission's
report when it is available. The presence of an in-
fluential Commission of the League on the spot must
act as a check to irresponsible action or the dissemi-

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 295

nation of baseless rumors designed to justify military
action already decided upon.

While it is true that the Commission has no power
to interfere with the military arrangements of either
side, it is charged with the duty of reporting "on any
circumstance which threatens to disturb the peace
between China and Japan/ 5 In that fact is a guarantee
that the pressure upon Japan to evacuate Man-
churia will continue unabated, a fact of great impor-
tance when it is remembered that as long as Japanese
troops occupy cities like Tsitsihar, the risk of a clash
with Soviet Russia cannot be said to have passed.

One further result of League intervention is im-
portant. If the Japanese intention was to obtain defi-
nite control over Manchuria, it was vital to the plan
that military action should have been followed imme-
diately by a political agreement giving the Japanese
all they demanded even if the enforcement of those
demands necessitated extending the occupation to
Peking* Obviously, one of the most important fea-
tures of any agreement so gained would have been
an undertaking on the part of the Chinese Govern-
ment to end the anti- Japanese economic boycott, a
demand which China would have had no choice but
to accept. Thanks to the League's existence, how-
ever, not only is the fate of Manchuria still unsettled,
but the Japanese Government is still pledged to evac-
uation "as soon as may be/* Failing a Japanese with-
drawal, the boycott will continue, while any attempt
by Japan to obtain an unjustifiably wide measure of

296 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

control over Manchuria will be hampered, or at least
exposed, by the League Commission, with its wide
terms of reference.

Perhaps the most solid achievement of the League
Council is to be found in these two facts the weapon
of the boycott, which the Japanese army is powerless
to stop, coupled with the restriction on the use of
force which is implied by the presence of the Com-
mission, afford China chance of meeting Japan almost
on level terms. Any final settlement between two
countries of equal power is obviously more likely to
be just than a settlement dictated by a strong and
well-organized nation to another weak state rent by
internal dissension.

If, therefore, the League has not succeeded in im-
posing its own conditions upon Japan, and has hesi-
tated in so involved a dispute to denounce Japan
before all the world as a criminal among the nations,
it yet has a more solid achievement to its credit than
many of its critics admit. Whatever the terms of
the final settlement, they will scarcely be as harsh
or sweeping as those which would have been forced
upon a defenseless China unable to appeal to the con-
science of the world. It is, indeed, highly probable,
that, thanks to the League and taking all the factors
into account, including the numerous breaches of
treaty rights by China in Manchuria before the crisis
arose, that China will secure a settlement at least as
generous as her own record entitles her to expect, and
one that may be more in the interests of Manchuria

THE LEAGUE AND THE CRISIS 297

as the Promised Land of Asia than an unqualified
return of that land to a Chinese Government which
is notoriously unable to maintain within its territories
the conditions of law and order without which no
region, however rich in opportunities, can prosper.

CHAPTER X

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA

K STORY, which decreed that Manchuria
should remain an almost empty domain, rich
in natural resources, in juxtaposition to an
overcrowded and ambitious Japan, has condemned the
land of the Manchus to be the cockpit of Asia. Dom-
inated first by the Russians, during the era of Czarist
expansion in the Far East, the Three Provinces to-day
represent a field of colonial and economic expansion
for the Japanese to which Tokyo, entering the field for
"zones of influence" late in the day, considers she
possesses a better title than any one else to develop.
As we have shown, economically Manchuria is vital
to Japan. The day may come when the mineral
wealth of the region, the food drawn across the Sea
of Japan, and the footing on the mainland of Asia
will mean the difference between her survival and
extinction as a Great Power.

Tokyo knows this, and plans its actions accord-
ingly. It cannot afford to permit international jeal-
ousies, or the moral conscience of nations which
already possess abundant territories elsewhere, to rob it
of the fruits of a costly war and a quarter of a century
of treasure and labor. The economic needs of Japan
tend to blind her statesmen to other considerations

298

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 299

arising out of a "forward" policy in Manchuria or
it may well be that Japan has counted the risk and is
prepared to face it. If the accident of history left
Manchuria an almost undeveloped region up to the
days of the meteoric rise of Japan to the status of a
world Power, the equally inexorable accident of geog-
raphy determined that the region should become an
integral part of China, and that the Chinese should
be weak at the very moment when the industrializa-
tion of the Far East caused Manchuria to appear in
its most alluring guise. No great trading nation can
afford to be indifferent to the fate of this tempting
bone, least of all China, who owns it; Russia, which
still possesses substantial interests there; and Japan, the
nation which can point with justifiable pride to the
vast increase in trade and importance which has fol-
lowed Japanese penetration in the region.

For Great Britain and the United States, the issues
are simpler. The "Open Door" and "Equal Oppor-
tunity for All" are the twin pillars supporting the
policy of both Washington and London, and with a
determination to maintain that policy goes a lively
appreciation of the dangers inherent in any breach
of those treaties expressly designed to curb the for-
ward thrust of Japan in an area where "all may
cooperate but none dominate/ 5

Statesmen may assess the economic blessings which
Japan has brought to Manchuria at their true worth,
and even agree with the opinion of European business
men in China exasperated by the chaos and misrule

300 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

existing in that country who declare: "It is a thou-
sand pities that Japan did not annex Manchuria in
1905 and thus have settled the matter once and for
all." But self-interest and maintenance of the
"balance of power" in the Far East prevent any re-
sponsible Foreign Minister from admitting that his
Government would accept the fait aecomph which
the Japanese army has presented to the world. Hence
the degree of official sympathy and support extended
to China. To the official mind the issue may thus be
simplified: Shall Manchuria remain in the possession
of a weak and divided China, to be developed by the
trading nations of the world, or shall it come under
the direct control of a dominant Japan, which once
installed, it might prove impossible to dislodge?

In fairness to the Japanese, it must be admitted
that were political considerations eliminated, their
claim to prior rights even monopoly rights in
Manchuria is a strong one. That industrial conditions
in Manchuria are much in advance of China proper
is entirely due to Japanese initiative and foresight.
They may safely be trusted to maintain law and order
within a region which, in the interests of the world,
should not be allowed to relapse into barbarism. An
appeal by the Japanese Government to the League of
Nations, in the first instance, for permission to police
Manchuria in the interests of orderly trade and secu-
rity, might very well have been granted. The strategic
position of the Three Provinces, however, and the
policy pursued by London and Washington in China

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 301

during the past twenty years, alike make it impossible
to disentangle strategic and economic considerations.
Manchuria developed under the jurisdiction of Japan,
with its people contented and prosperous, would be
a greater cause for anxiety to the Powers than a Man-
churia in which all might scramble for such conces-
sions as China was disposed to concede. Next to the
Monroe Doctrine, there is no point of policy in inter-
national diplomacy so sacred as that of die "Open
Door" in the Far East.

Both China and Japan realize this fact. Hence the
repeated pronouncements issuing from Tokyo that
Japan has no intention of annexing Manchuria and
reaffirming the sanctity of the "Open Door/* But
it is significant that the Japanese Prime Minister, in
reply to a protest tendered to him by Mr. Forbes,
American Ambassador at Tokyo, on December 24,
1931, declared that Japan would "welcome foreign
participation and cooperation in Manchurian enter-
prises as soon as normal conditions were restored."

China sees in that same policy of free international
competition her hopes of countering Japanese ambi-
tions. In an official statement issued on December 21,
1931, by Dr. Wellington Koo, the Chinese Foreign
Minister, and aimed particularly at American public
opinion, he declared that Manchuria forms an indis-
pensable link between East and West, and that any
change in control would upset the balance of power
and stimulate Japanese military ambitions to dreams
of world empire, thus jeopardizing world peace.

302 MANCHURIA- THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

"That this was fully realized in the past," declared
Dr. Koo, "is fully borne out by the 'Open Door*
declaration of John Hay, the American Secretary of
State, in 1899, by President Roosevelt's pressure to-
wards the conclusion of the Portsmouth Treaty in
1905, by President "Wbodrow Wilson's protest to
Japan in March 1915, and by the Nine-Power Treaty.
The very danger that these distinguished American
statesmen sought to forestall is now looming large
through the forcible occupation of Manchuria by
Japan."

In support of that demand for the maintenance of
the territorial integrity of China, the Chinese point
out that in contrast to an overwhelming Chinese
population of thirty millions, the Japanese population
of Manchuria, including Koreans, numbers only 650,-
000, 96 per cent of whom are living within the leased
territory and the railway zone. Other Europeans in
the Three Provinces comprise 80,000 Russians and
5000 of other nationalities.

It is further claimed that Chinese colonization of
Manchuria antedates the Christian era. By 1900, 80
per cent of the population of Manchuria, then esti-
mated at 14,000,000, were Chinese, while as late as
1905 there were only 5000 Japanese living in the area.
Manchurian prosperity and its large share in the total
foreign trade of China has been brought about, say
the Chinese, by the perseverance and industry of mil-
lions of Chinese agriculturists, who have covered every
part of the country.

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 303

International disputes regarding largely undevel-
oped territories cannot always, however, be settled by
population figures. If there are admittedly less than
one million Japanese subjects in Manchuria to-day,
that one million has miraculously changed the impor-
tance of Manchuria as a trading nation within the last
twenty-five years. If China appeals to sentiment,
Japan counters with an appeal to material facts.

"In 1907, the first normal year after the Russo-
Japanese War, foreign trade in Manchuria totaled
52,727,475 Haikwan taels and the imports exceeded
the exports by 8,642,829 taels," states Baron Takuma
Dan, president of the Japan Economic Federation.
"Within three years the position had changed, the
balance of trade having become favorable to Man-
churia. A steady increase was thereafter maintained,
trade in 1929 reaching 755,255,360 taels; that is,
nearly fifteeen times greater than in 1907. Since
1919 the balance of trade has never been unfavor-
able."

Accepting Chinese statements regarding population
figures, Baron Dan continues: "Thus it is the Chinese
who have benefited most by Japan's constructive
labors in Manchuria. Japan's investments, aggregat-
ing 2,000,000,000 yen, have created commercial and
industrial machinery which has enabled the popula-
tion, predominantly Chinese, to make good use of the
land and available energy. In contrast, there has been
no corresponding development, or even anything ap-
proaching it, in China in the last twenty years.

304 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

"For a time Japan was able to minimize handicaps
of the Chinese civil war in Manchuria because of one
fortunate privilege that of maintaining armed
guards along the railway zone. These guards were
necessary when the treaty which sanctioned them was
signed in 1905, and to-day that need is as present as
ever.

"As the wealth of Manchuria increased, the Chinese
war lords extorted more and more of it from the
people, lavishing it upon themselves and on armies
numerically larger than the region required or could
properly afford.

"Because of Japan's economic activities in Man-
churia having become vital to the welfare of the
country, as well as to Japan, it was out of the ques-
tion that Japan should relinquish her rights there
and withdraw. The only alternative now openly to
defend those rights. The sole desire of Japan in re-
gard to Manchuria is to create there peaceful condi-
tions so necessary to insure the prosperity of her
interests and the existence of sane and healthy neigh-
bors able by cooperation to contribute towards the
ideal of world welfare."

The statement concludes with a hope "for the con-
clusion at the earliest possible moment of a fair and
equitable settlement through direct negotiations be-
tween Japan and China. Such a settlement, however,
can be possible only when there have emerged con-
ditions insuring security of Japan's rights and inter-
ests in Manchuria, Mongolia, and, above all, when

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 305

China's leaders have abandoned their misconceptions
of Japan's motives and their present mistaken poli-

cies." 1

Chinese propagandists have exploited to the full the
action of the Japanese army in setting up "puppet"
governments in the Three Provinces, as revealing Jap-
anese intentions not to withdraw from Manchuria.
It may well prove, as we shall show, that the Chinese
interpretation of Japan's action in this matter is cor-
rect. But it remains equally true that the Japanese
have never concealed their desire for a change in the
nature of the government in Manchuria, for reasons
fully set out in Baron Dan's statement. Japan's ac-
tions may also be legitimately explained by their de-
sire to see in office governments which will eliminate
wasteful and repressive taxation by stopping excessive
military expenditure and devoting public funds to
social purposes. Certainly the Japanese have set their
faces inflexibly against any settlement which would
enable Chinese militarism once more to raise its head
in a region where they have such vast investments
at stake.

The difficulty which is immediately apparent when
an attempt is made to forecast the probable course
of events in this region is a double one the well-
known disinclination of the Chinese to face the reali-
ties of the past in Manchuria, and the equally strong
disinclination of the Japanese to state precisely their
aims and intentions for the future.

* The Tvmes, December 10, 1931.

306 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

Remote as Manchuria may seem to be when viewed
from London or New York, this area yet represents
the greatest political riddle still unsolved in the mod-
ern world. To Japan dominance in the Three Prov-
inces means economic survival, and it may truly be
stated that no alternative concessions which might
conceivably be offered to her elsewhere would provide
adequate reparation for a set-back in the richest sup-
ply field of natural wealth in Asia. To the Great
Powers, on the other hand, a settlement which tight-
ened the grip of Japan upon that region would mean
nothing less than a diplomatic defeat, and the first
extension of Japanese power in the Far East for a
quarter of a century. The realization of this fact
may very well have prompted the action, under the
Nine-Power Treaty, taken by the United States Gov-
ernment on January 8, 1932. For the peace of the
Far East has been an uneasy one for many years, and
any change in the balance of power raises questions
which the Powers cannot view with indifference.

Two generations of statesmen have labored to pre-
serve that status quo, now challenged by Japan more
directly than at any time in the past. One can only
admire the astuteness with which the Tokyo diplo-
mats, or their generals, chose their moment. Japan's
reiterated statement that "as China could not guar-
antee security and peaceful life, we had to step in and
run the country" is a moderate and just claim as far
as it goes. Law and order, a respect for life and prop-

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 307

erty, are matters cear to the hearts of Europe and the
United States.

But nevertheless, such claims are dust thrown in the
eyes of the world. The mainspring of Japanese ac-
tions was a determination, when the right moment
came, to so tighten her grip at least economically
and industrially upon Manchuria that her prior
claim to develop that region could not thereafter be
disputed. Chinese civil war, the extension of dis-
order north of the Great Wall, and the tortuous and
deliberately intimidating delays of Chinese diplomacy
concerning outstanding issues of dispute gave the Jap-
anese the chance they sought. The challenge pre-
pared long since was launched. Swiftly and orderly
the Japanese forces took one objective after another,
the only surprising factor about their speedy occupa-
tion of the region being the degree of ruthlessness
exhibited, such as the aerial bombardment of cities
far from the "fighting line." The Chinese forces were
impotent from the first shot; they withdrew to seek
refuge behind the League of Nations and a flood of
appeals for moral aid. Japan remained the master of
Manchuria.

It is important that Japanese statements concerning
security and the suppression of brigandage should not
obscure the real issues raised by her recent actions.
Japan knows none better that whoever owns this
region, rich in mineral and natural resources, will
dominate Asia during the next half -century. She
knows, too, that whereas many of her present sources

308 MANCHURIA- THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

of raw materials needed for her factories would be cut
off in the event of a war in the Far East, the Japanese
navy is powerful enough to keep intruders out of the
Sea of Japan, and thus maintain intact her communi-
cations with the Manchurian coast. The possession
of that coast would enable her to convert Hulu-tao
into a strongly fortified naval base and coaling station.
Once this was accomplished, the flood of iron, coal,
oil-cake, and, above all, food, from the Manchurian
plains to the over-populated centers of Japan would
flow unchecked in war and peace. A nightmare of
successive Japanese Governments, faced with a popu-
lation which will increase by at least sixteen millions
during the next twenty years, and for which already
one-fifth of the food necessary for life must be im-
ported, would be dispelled at last. In control of Man-
churia, or at least in a position of dominance there,
Tokyo would feel that the first step towards averting
a possible national catastrophe had been averted.

More than that, with her position in Manchuria
strengthened, and perhaps a garrison at Mukden,
Japan would be in a position to exert very definite
pressure upon China in the event of any recurrence
of the economic boycott, or a challenge to her treaty
rights in China proper. For whatever view may be
taken in London or Washington of China's proposal
for the abolition of extra-territorial privileges and the
return of the concessions to Chinese control, Japan is
unlikely to yield up either the one or the other, and
for good reason. What is a matter of trading rights

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 309

to Great Britain or the United States is a vital political
principle to Japan, ordained by fate to remain a great
Power only so long as there is uninterrupted control
over the raw materials she needs.

It is reasonable to assume that these considerations
have never been absent from the minds of Japanese
statesmen since 1905; indeed, Chinese complaints of
repeated attempts at aggression by Japan are evidence
of the continuity of Japanese policy in face of the
obvious demands of the situation.

It is not improbable indeed, it would be surprising
were it not so that Japan's plan of action in Man-
churia was pigeon-holed in the archives of the War
Department at Tokyo for years before the favorable
moment arrived to put it into operation. With the
arrival of 1931, and the impending breakdown of
orderly government in the Three Provinces, Japan
may well have considered her case sufficiently strong
to accept the risk involved in the technical breach of
the League Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, and the Nine-
Power Treaty involved in the occupation of the coun-
try. Having decided upon action at a moment when
the Great Powers were struggling with the economic
and financial difficulties arising out of the world slump
in trade, Japan could not withdraw without confess-
ing failure, and probably only the dispatch of a
League army to Manchuria a contingency Tokyo
was justified in dismissing as too remote to merit seri-
ous consideration would have stayed her hand.

Having embarked on the policy of expelling the

310 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

remnants of Chinese control from Manchuria, Japan
had the satisfaction of seeing events proceeding "ac-
cording to plan." The difficulties facing the League
in attempting to adjudicate in a region where there
was considerable evidence to show that the nominal
owners could not maintain orderly government, were
obvious from the beginning. The real risk which
Japan took was of a serious challenge from the Great
Powers under the Nine-Power Treaty which guar-
anteed the "Open Door" policy in Manchuria, and
Tokyo may well have been relieved when no steps
were taken to invoke respect for that treaty until
January 1932, when the occupation v/as complete.
On January 7, the United States Government dra-
matically intervened in the dispute by presenting the
following Note to the Chinese and Japanese Govern-
ments, at the same time handing copies to the repre-
sentatives of the nine Powers who were signatories of
the Treaty of 1922, and "expressing to them the hope
that they would send Notes to China and Japan in
the same sense": *

""With the recent operations about Chinchow the
last remaining administrative authority of the Gov-
ernment of the Chinese Republic in Manchuria, as
it existed prior to September 18, 1931, has been de-
stroyed. The United States Government continues
to be confident that the work of the neutral com-
mission recently authorized by the Council of the

1 The Times, January 8, 1932,

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 311

League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solu-
tion of the difficulties now existing between China
and Japan.

"But in view of the present situation, and of its
own rights and obligations, the United States Gov-
ernment deems it to be its duty to notify both the
Imperial Japanese Government and the Govern-
ment of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit
the legality of any situation de facto, nor does it
intend to recognize any treaty or agreement en-
tered into between those Governments or their
agents which may impair the treaty rights of the
United States or its citizens in China, including
those which relate to the sovereignty or independ-
ence or territorial and administrative integrity of
the Republic of China, or their international policy
relative to China, commonly known as the Open
Door policy.

"The United States Government does not intend
to recognize any situation or agreement which may
be brought about by means contrary to the Cove-
nants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August
27, 1928, to which treaty both Japan and China,
as well as the United States, are parties/*

In view of strongly held beliefs concerning
Japan's real aims in Manchuria, the significance of
this communication needs no stressing. The United
States Note was regarded as technically an invoca-
tion of the rights of the United States and her people

312 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

under the Nine-Power Treaty, under which both
Japan and China pledged themselves to respect the
sovereignty, independence and administrative integ-
rity of China, and agreed to maintain the principle of
equal opportunity in China for the commerce and
industry of all nations, and to refrain from taking
advantage of conditions in China to seek special
privileges that would interfere with the rights of
citizens of friendly states.

The United States Note, while technically invok-
ing rights secured under the Treaty and the Kellogg
Pact, was not regarded as the prelude to any demand
for a conference of the signatory Powers. To the
Japanese, however, it came as a warning that the
United States was in no mood to accept any settle-
ment military aggression might wrest from China. 1

After considering the United States Note, the
British Government decided not to forward any
similar communication to Tokyo, and explained its
attitude to this new development in the following
communication issued by the Foreign Office on Janu-
ary 9:

"His Majesty's Government stand by the policy
of the Open Door for international trade in Man-

i On January 27, 1932, the United States Government published cor-
respondence between the United States and Japan, revealing that earlier
protests against Japan's actions in Manchuria had been made, especially
concerning the bombing of Chmchow, regarding which incident Mr. Stim-
son, United States Secretary of State, declared "the explanation of the
Japanese military authorities seems quite inadequate"

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 313

churia, which was guaranteed by the Nine-Power
Treaty at Washington.

Since the recent events in Manchuria the Jap-
anese representatives at the Council o the League
of Nations at Geneva stated on October 13 that
Japan was the champion in Manchuria of the
principle of equal opportunity and the open door
for the economic activities of all nations. Further,
on December 28, the Japanese Prime Minister
stated that Japan would adhere to the Open Door
policy and would welcome participation and
cooperation in Manchurian enterprise.

In views of these statements His Majesty's Gov-
ernment have not considered it necessary to ad-
dress any formal Note to the Japanese Government
on the lines of the American Government's Note,
but the Japanese Ambassador in London has been
requested to obtain confirmation of these assur-
ances from his Government."

Commenting upon this decision, The Times (Jan-
uary 11) stated that it did not seem to be the imme-
diate business of the Foreign Office to defend the
"administrative integrity" of China until that integ-
rity was something more than an ideal.

"It did not exist in 1922, and it does not exist
to-day. On no occasion since the Nine-Power
Treaty was signed has the Central Government of
China exercised any real administrative authority
over large and varying areas of its huge territory.

314 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

To-day its writ does not run in Yunnan and in
other important provinces, and, while its sov-
ereignty over Manchuria is not disputed, there is
no evidence that it has exercised any real admin-
istration there since Nanking became the Chinese
capital."

The Japanese reply to the American Note was
handed to Mr. Forbes, United States Ambassador at
Tokyo, on January 16. Couched in reassuring
terms, the Note opened with a brilliant example of
Oriental diplomacy in its most adroit mood:

"The Government of Japan," it began, "were
well aware that the Government of the United
States could always be relied on to do everything
in their power to support Japan's efforts to secure
the full and complete fulfillment in every detail
of the treaties of Washington and the Kellogg
Treaty for the outlawry of war. They are glad to
receive this additional assurance of the fact."

Further statements in the Note were:

"It may be added that the treaties which relate
to China must necessarily be applied with due
regard to the state of affairs from time to time
prevailing in that country and that the present
unsettled and distracted state of China is not what
was in the contemplation of high contracting par-
ties at the time of the Treaty of Washington. It
was certainly not satisfactory then, but it did not

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 315

display that disunion and those antagonisms which
it does to-day.

This cannot effect the binding character of the
stipulations of treaties, but it may in material
respects modify their application, since they must
necessarily be applied with reference to the state
of facts as they exist. . . .

While it need not be repeated that Japan enter-
tains in Manchuria no territorial aims or ambitions,
yet the welfare and safety of Manchuria and its
accessibility to general trade are matters of the
deepest interest and of quite extraordinary im-
portance to the Japanese people."

The Note ended in a more promising vein:

"At the present juncture, when the very exist-
ence of our national policy is involved, it is agree-
able to be assured that the American Government
are devoting in a friendly spirit such sedulous care
to the correct appreciation of the situation."

The Chinese Government, in its reply to the
American Note, contented itself with an assurance
that it had "absolutely no intention of concluding
any treaties or agreements of the categories de-
scribed," and accused Japan of the violation of not
only the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact,
but also of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

There the protest rests, in being believed that the
original American Note was intended as a statement

316 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

of policy and a needed reminder to Japan that the
United States would watch carefully any develop-
ments in the light of her interests in China and Man-
churia, and the obligations imposed upon Japan by
her signature to the Nine-Power Treaty.

The United States declaration, indeed, despite its
diplomatic suavity, must have left an uneasy feeling
in the minds of the Japanese Government, for it
clearly indicated that the United States might not
prove so complacent as had the League of Nations in
the face of Japanese aggression, and it further intro-
duced a new and important factor into the dispute
by proclaiming that Washington reserved to itself
the right to refuse to recognize any treaty negotiated
between China and Japan which violated interna-
tional treaties already existing. In this respect, the
American Note was the most important diplomatic
utterance produced by the crisis, and one that may
yet have dramatic repercussions upon the fortunes
of Japan, and even modify the terms of the final
settlement of the existing situation.

Is Japan strong enough to carry out her real aims
in Manchuria if these conflict with the interpretation
placed upon the "Open Door" reservation by Wash-
ington and London? It is by no means certain that
any change in Japanese policy in Manchuria will fol-
low this protest, or, indeed, that any change is neces-
sary. For the "Open Door" can remain just as wide
open with the Japanese the virtual masters of Man-

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 317

churia as it was when Marshal Chang-Tso-Lin ruled
at Mukden.

If Japan secures a dominant position in that region,
she will be well able to afford that gesture to inter-
national sentiment^ as is clear from even a cursory
study of the past. For it must be borne in mind that
it was under the era of the "Open Door" that Japan
has established for herself a virtual monopoly of
Manchurian trade, in so far as that trade is necessary
to her industrial supremacy in the Far East. The
"Open Door'* has not prevented her from financing
railway construction, establishing power plants, own-
ing or controlling coal and iron mines, engaging in
forestry operations, erecting and operating cotton
mills or tapping the resources of Manchuria in any
direction. Nor need it in the future. Geographi-
cally, Japan is so favorably situated that she can
accept a policy of "all comers" and still tighten her
grip upon Manchuria with every passing year.
Neither Britain nor the United States can compete
with her, however equal theoretically the "op-
portunities" may be. How otherwise explain the
remarkable fact that Japan, a poor nation, has
financed virtually nine-tenths of the development of
Manchuria, despite the fact that Britain and the
United States are reputed to be the great creditor
nations of the world? The explanation is that Jap-
anese enterprise and initiative have been concentrated
upon Manchuria for the past twenty-five years to a
degree unique even in the history of Asia. Indus-

318 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

trially, the Three Provinces are in pawn to Japan,
who has established a strong title to continue the de-
velopment of the region for the common benefit of
all trading nations.

What, then, are the real aims of the Japanese Gov-
ernment in Manchuria? Those intentions cannot be
revealed in detail until direct negotiations between
Japan and China have opened and Tokyo shows its
hand. But we are able to set down in outline certain
principles, devided from an authoritative source,
which will guide Japan in any settlement of the dis-
pute. These may be taken as the irreducible mini-
mum to obtain which Japan has occupied Manchuria
and risked the weight of world opinion being thrown
against her.

Japan never had, and has not now, any intention of
leaving Manchuria. That is to say, of relinquishing
her dominant position there. To do so would mean
the economic extinction of Japan as a world Power.

Nor has she any intention of confining her interests
to South Manchuria, short of counter-availing ad-
vantages being offered by Soviet Russia. Northern
Manchuria is favored by the Chinese and Koreans
and is as rich in natural resources as the south, and
with the needs of her factories for raw materials in-
creasing every year, nothing less than the right to
draw upon the whole mineral wealth of Manchuria,
and perhaps Mongolia, will satisfy Japan*

Politically, the Japanese intend to insist upon the
observance of all rights conferred upon them by

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 319

treaties, and, incidentally, upon the right of Japanese
subjects to own land, a vexed question which must
be included in any general settlement of outstanding
issues in Manchuria. They will further regard the
preservation of law and order and the security of
life and property a sme qua non which any govern-
ment of Manchuria must give guarantees to observe
before evacuation of the Japanese forces now outside
the railway zone is carried out.

Regarding the actual future of Manchuria, and
the form of government there, the alternatives are
annexation, a Japanese mandate, an independent Chi-
nese Government having close relations with Japan,
or return to the control of Nanking. Of these possi-
bilities the first and the last may be ruled out as unac-
ceptable to Tokyo. The Japanese have no wish to
incur the responsibilities and hostility which annexa-
tion would bring upon them. Nor are they pre-
pared, at least according to the definite statements of
their spokesmen, to contemplate evacuation, fol-
lowed by a return of the country to the tender mer-
cies of an ineffective government, and a lapse to
lawless conditions, excessive taxation, militarism, war
lords, and other impediments to peaceful trading.
On this the present mood of Tokyo is adamant.

There remain the alternatives of a Japanese man-
date over the region, exercised under the possible
control of the League of Nations, or the setting up of
a Chinese administration independent of Nanking

320 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

and dependent upon the good will of Japan for its
peace of mind.

The possibility of Japan one day securing manda-
tory powers over the Three Provinces is a develop-
ment which has been foreseen as within the range of
practical politics by close students of Manchunan
affairs.

"Arrangements ought to be possible for satisfying
what, after all, would be fairly moderate demands or
requirements on the part of Japan,*' states Mr. W. R.
Crocker, with reference to Japan's urgent need of
outlets to ease her pressing population problem. 1 "A
possible arrangement that occurs to one who has
worked on the matter is that Japan, in the event of
a Manchunan crisis arising, might be given a man-
date over Manchuria or at least a part of Manchuria
from international society; or, if a mandate be
not possible, then a protectorate under guarantees.
By the end of the century, probably neither the
internal stability of Manchuria itself, nor the security
of Japan's economic interests, would longer need
such a contrivance, and the Manchurians could run
their own government as they chose."

Japan never having seriously considered the col-
onization of Manchuria with her own people, would
be inclined to accept a mandate if such a solution
were desired by an impartial international body, such
as the League Commission, or the signatories to the
Nine-Power Treaty, as the most satisfactory method

1 The Japanese Population Problem (Allen and Unwin),

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 321

of placing Manchurian affairs upon a stable basis.
Such a solution would undoubtedly satisfy Japanese
demands except in one particular the Japanese have
never taken kindly to suggestions that their material
interests should be dependent upon international
opinion. Even a mandate would not give them that
complete control over Manchuria which they see the
possibility of gaining by a more devious method.

Japan's real aim when her troops advanced in Sep-
tember 1931 was undoubtedly the expulsion of the
Nanking-controlled Government at Mukden, and
the setting up, after a period of occupation by the
military, of an independent Manchurian Government
with Japanese advisers, and if not actually under the
control of the dominant partner, strong enough to
guarantee the continuance of orderly progress. From
the achievement of that ambition Tokyo has never
swerved through all the months of diplomatic nego-
tiation and outside pressure which have since elapsed.
Hence the insistence of her spokesmen on the purity
of their intentions, denials of any plan to annex Man-
churia, protestations that the "Open Door" will still
be open when the smoke has cleared away. Hence,
too, her repeated statements that only a strong gov-
ernment can safeguard Japanese interests in Man-
churia and restore law and order.

To accomplish those objects, Tokyo desires the
formation of a strong independent Chinese public
opinion in Manchuria, and a clean sweep being made
of the delays, intimidation, and uncertainties which

322 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

existed while Manchuria was under the control of
China.

It was a bold stroke of Nippon to use her army to
enforce such a change, for the risks were very real.
With Japanese troops in control from Tsitsihar to
Chinchow, and the Japanese flag planted on the
Great Wall itself, these remain Japan's minimum de-
mands a sound and competent Government at
Mukden, guided by foreign advisers, preferably
Japanese, but some at least of whom might be British
or American. This question of advisory control (the
actual Japanese phrase) is regarded as important,
because it would guarantee the industrial interests
of Manchuria against a further period of lawlessness.
While Tokyo may not consider it wise to insist upon
an advisory council being composed exclusively of
Japanese, it hopes to be in a position to call the tune
played by any Chinese Government placed in office.

Can Japan enforce such a settlement? Undoubt-
edly, she will try to do so. Equally certain is it that
China will oppose the loss of three of her richest
provinces in every possible way short of actual war.
In the end China will probably have to agree, with
what grace she can muster, to a position which will
not be very different from that of 1926, when Mar-
shal Chang-Tso-Lin was virtually independent of the
rising power of the Kuomintang, and held sway over
Northern China.

The attitude of Soviet Russia towards whatever
form of government follows the evacuation of the

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 323

Japanese forces will obviously be important. How
would such a settlement be viewed by Moscow? As
we have stated, relations between Russia and Japan
are at present on a basis of "friendly neutrality."
Negotiations are proceeding between the two nations
for a new convention regarding fishing rights on the
coast and for the adjustment of other minor matters.
Soviet and Japanese statesmen have met and discussed
amicably the points at issue.

It seems probable that if Soviet Russia is left in
peace to develop her zone of interest composed of
the Chinese Eastern Railway and the territory north
of that line, that she in turn will not dispute any
settlement Japan may secure in South Manchuria,
more especially as Soviet Russia is intent upon com-
pleting undisturbed the first Five Year Plan, and
launching the second installment of her industrializa-
tion program due at the end of 1932, upon the
success or failure of which so much depends.

Of more immediate importance is the likely effects
of such a settlement upon China. It is certain that
the setting up of an independent government at
Mukden, under Japanese pressure, will fan the flames
of Chinese hatred of Japan to a whiter heat, but
Japan has taken that into account. The anti- Jap-
anese economic boycott has proved a damaging
weapon in the hands of Nanking, and will doubtless
be continued. While Japan has kept the question of
that boycott largely separate from any consideration
of the Manchurian question, her attitude has been

324 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

that these are both aspects of one problem the prob-
lem of safeguarding Japanese rights in China. Hence
Japan's action in sending naval forces to Shanghai
following attacks upon Japanese subjects and her
reported threat, which may or may not be carried
out, of blockading Chinese ports as a protest against
this form of economic warfare.

Once secure in Manchuria, the paramount interests
of Japan in Asia will have been placed upon a firm
basis, and she will be in a stronger position to exert
pressure upon China in other matters. On the other
hand, observers on the spot believe that control of
Manchuria purchased at the price of losing the bulk
of her Chinese trade will prove a Pyrrhic victory for
Japan. Certainly the boycott is China's most power-
ful weapon, and now that she is practically out of
Manchuria and unlikely to have it restored to her
without qualifications insisted upon by Tokyo, China
may well be persuaded that she has everything to gain
and nothing to lose by inflicting all the damage pos-
sible upon her neighbor. For if the Japanese did not
hesitate to advance in Manchuria, they would prob-
ably think not twice but many times before invading
China proper with all the possibilities, even certain-
ties, of international complications which such action
would entail* It remains, therefore, profoundly true
that the very weakness of China is her main strength.
The Great Powers may be induced to accept -a Jap-
anese-inspired Government at Mukden, but no one
in touch with international affairs will be rash enough

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 325

to sponsor the view that either Great Britain or the
United States would stand aside were any extension
of aggressive action into China proper begun by the
Japanese troops.

Regarding the eventual repercussions of this acci-
dent of history which has brought the two yellow
races face to face upon the mainland of Asia, the
issues thus raised are pregnant with the destiny of
nations not only of China and Japan, but the Great
Powers also. No end is in sight. Assuming that
Japan retains virtual control over the richest regions
of the Far East, and pursues there a policy of inten-
sive peaceful development for half a century, both
the strategic and industrial position in the Pacific will
undergo profound changes favorable to Japan, always
providing that meanwhile the pressure of population,
the food problem, and urgent need for some outlet
for her surplus millions have not produced any social
upheaval in Japan itself.

Knowing the very real dangers which Japanese
Governments must face at home during the next
thirty years dangers which if not averted by wise
statesmanship may bring the onward march of Japan
to a full stop one cannot but admire the courage
with which the Government seeks, while there is
time, to provide "safety valves'* for the future. Of
all the possibilities in sight, apart from the setting
aside of a portion of Australia for Japanese coloniza-
tion, Manchuria offers the great hope of relief and
the greatest source of future strength.

326 MANCHURIA: THE COCKPIT OF ASIA

It is, we must repeat, the peculiar tragedy of the
Japanese people that they rose to the position of a
Great Power too late to join in the carving up of the
world's empty places in the interests of the predomi-
nant nations. Every year it becomes more and more
difficult to secure any adjustment of national bound-
aries, however just the demand behind the change,
without provoking an international crisis, if not
actual war. Yet some adjustment there must be if
Japan is not to suif er a decline as rapid as was her rise.

Admitting both the breaches of treaty obligations
by the Japanese in Manchuria, and the abundant
provocation offered to them by successive Chinese
Governments, it says much for Japanese patience
that she waited until her investments, her property
and the lives of her subjects had been rendered inse-
cure by the spread of lawlessness north of the Great
Wall before she attempted to secure, by direct action,
that position in Manchuria which is vital to her
existence, interests which, however just in abstract
may be the Chinese case, no Japanese statesman dare
permit to go by default.

For good or ill, the future of Manchuria will be
fashioned in Tokyo. Other nations may insist upon
the "Open Door." Susceptibilities may have to be
considered. Camouflage may be employed to conceal
uncomfortable facts; but the central fact will remain
Manchuria, the Promised Land of Asia, will in the
immediate future go forward to a new era of swift

THE FUTURE OF MANCHURIA 327

development under the guiding hand of Japan, in
the interests of the world in general.

Any "settlement" which does not include the grant
of Japan's minimum demands will be no settlement,
but only the interlude to a fresh crisis in the future.
For if one thing is true of the present position in
Manchuria, it is that no treaty which cuts across the
inexorable facts of history and economic necessity
will be observed, or can protect Manchuria from its
destiny. Treaties are open to conflicting interpreta-
tions, whereas Japan's needs are pressing, and her
capital, skilled workers, and her bayonets are near.

It is the prospect of strenuous opposition to these
facts by the Great Powers and the certainty of the
relentless march of Japanese policy, which makes safe
the prediction that Manchuria will remain the cock-
pit of Asia for half a century to come. Twenty-five
years have passed since the Japanese first went to
Manchuria; twenty-five more may have gone before
the supremacy of Japan is complete, unless within
that time Tokyo has suffered a definite check upon
some other issue. For nothing short of a national
defeat in war can rob Japan of the fruits awaiting
the nation which develops the riches of the Manchu-
rian plains.

THE END